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Fair division problems have been vastly studied in the past 60 years. This line of
research was initiated by the work of Steinhaus in 1948 in which the author introduced
the cake cutting problem as follows: given a heterogeneous cake and a set of agents
with different valuation functions, the goal is to find a fair allocation of the cake to the
agents. In order to study this problem, several notions of fairness are proposed, the most
famous of which are proportionality and envy-freeness, introduced by Steinhaus in 1948
and Foley in 1967. The fair allocation problems have been studied in both divisible and
indivisible settings.
For the divisible setting, we explore the ”Chore Division Problem”. The chore
division problem is the problem of fairly dividing an object deemed undesirable among
a number of agents. The object is possibly heterogeneous, and hence agents may have
different valuations for different parts of the object. Chore division is the dual problem
of the celebrated cake cutting problem. We give the first discrete and bounded envy-free
chore division protocol for any number of agents.
For the indivisible setting, we use the maximin share paradigm introduced by Bud-
ish as a measure of fairness. We improve previous results on this measure of fairness in
the additive setting and generalize our results for submodular, fractionally subadditive,
as well as subadditive settings. We also model the maxmin share fairness paradigm for
indivisible goods with different entitlements.
For the indivisible setting, we also consider the most studied notion of fairness,
envy-freeness. It is known that envy-freeness cannot be always guaranteed in the alloca-
tion of indivisible items. We suggest envy-freeness up to a random item (EFR) property
which is a relaxation of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and give an approximation
guarantee. For this notion, we provide a polynomial-time 0.72-approximation allocation
algorithm.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
One of the great challenges of our era is a thorough understanding of fairness. The
problem of fairly allocating limited natural resources such as fossil fuels and clean water
is always a great challenge in the world. Fair division is considered as one of the important
active areas in microeconomics and algorithmic game theory today. The literature usually
distinguishes between allocation of indivisible goods and divisible goods. The application
of the fair allocation of divisible goods is when the goal is to fairly divide land, time,
memory on a computer, or any other divisible item or chore. For instance, after the
collapse of Germany in 1945, the problem of fair separation of Berlin between the Soviet,
French, British, and American zones was an important challenge. The fair allocation of
indivisible goods is also important when the goal is to fairly allocate some indivisible
items such as furniture or indivisible tasks. For instance, after any divorce, the court will
divide property between spouses in a way that it considers fair.
This thesis is divided into four parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, we consider the
problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the maxmin share paradigm intro-
duced by Budish [1] as a measure for fairness. Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang [2] were
the first to investigate this fundamental problem in the additive setting. They show that a
maxmin guarantee (1-MMS allocation) is not always possible even when the number of
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agents is limited to 3. While the existence of an approximation solution (e.g. a 1/2-MMS
allocation) is quite straightforward, improving the guarantee becomes subtler for larger
constants. Kurokawa et al. [2] provide a proof for existence of a 2/3-MMS allocation and
leave the question open for better guarantees.
Our main contribution is an answer to the above question. We improve the result
of Kurokawa et al. to a 3/4 factor in the additive setting. The main idea for our 3/4-
MMS allocation method is clustering the agents. To this end, we introduce three notions
and techniques, namely reducibility, matching allocation, and cycle-envy-freeness, and
prove the approximation guarantee of our algorithm via non-trivial applications of these
techniques. Our analysis involves coloring and double counting arguments that might be
of independent interest.
One major shortcoming of the current studies on fair allocation is the additivity
assumption on the valuations. We alleviate this by extending our results to the case of
submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive settings. More precisely, we give
constant approximation guarantees for submodular and XOS agents, and a logarithmic
approximation for the case of subadditive agents. Furthermore, we complement our re-
sults by providing close upper bounds for each class of valuation functions. Finally, we
present algorithms to find such allocations for additive, submodular, and XOS settings in
polynomial time.
This work was published at EC-2018 [3].
In the second part, Chapter 3, we consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of
indivisible items among a set of players. Envy-free up to one good (EF1) and envy-free
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up to any good (EFX) are two well-known extensions of envy-freeness for the case of in-
divisible items. It is shown that EF1 can always be guaranteed for agents with subadditive
valuations [4]. In sharp contrast, it is unknown whether or not an EFX allocation always
exists, even for three agents and additive valuations. In addition, the best approximation
guarantee for EFX is (φ− 1) ' 0.61 by Amanitidis et al. [5].
In order to find a middle ground to bridge this gap, in this paper we suggest another
fairness criterion, namely envy-freeness up to a random good or EFR, which is weaker
than EFX, yet stronger than EF1. For this notion, we provide a polynomial-time 0.72-
approximation allocation algorithm. For our algorithm we introduce Nash Social Welfare
Matching which makes a connection between Nash Social Welfare and envy freeness. We
believe Nash Social Welfare Matching will find its applications in future work.
The third part, Chapter 4, considers the chore division problem, introduced by Gard-
ner in 1970s [6]. Chore division is the problem of fairly dividing a chore among n dif-
ferent agents. In particular, in an envy-free chore division, we would like to divide a
negatively valued heterogeneous object among a number of agents who have different
valuations for different parts of the object, such that no agent envies another agent. It is
the dual variant of the celebrated cake cutting problem, in which we would like to divide
a desirable object among agents. There has been an extensive amount of study and ef-
fort to design bounded and envy-free protocols/algorithms for fair division of chores and
goods, such that envy-free cake cutting became “one of the most important open prob-
lems in 20-th century mathematics” according to [7]. However, despite persistent efforts,
due to delicate nature of the problem, there was no bounded protocol known for cake
cutting even among four agents, until the breakthrough of [8], which provided the first
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discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for cake cutting for four agents. Afterward, [9],
generalized their work and provided an envy-free cake cutting protocol for any number
of agents to settle a significant and long-standing open problem. However, there is much
less known for chore division. Unfortunately, there is no general method known to apply
cake cutting techniques to chore division. Thus, it remained an open problem to find a
discrete and bounded envy-free chore division protocol even for four agents.
We provide the first discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for chore division
for an arbitrary number of agents. We produce major and powerful tools for designing
protocols for the fair division of negatively valued objects. These tools are based on
structural results and important observations. In general, we believe these structures and
techniques may be useful not only in chore division but also in other fairness problems.
This work was published at SODA-2018 [10].
In the last part, Chapter 5, we study the fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents
with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both
divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivis-
ible and agents have unequal entitlements. This problem is a generalization of the work by
Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang [2] wherein the agents are assumed to be symmetric with
respect to their entitlements. Although Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang show an almost
fair (constant approximation) allocation exists in their setting, our main result is in sharp
contrast to their observation. We show that, in some cases with n agents, no allocation
can guarantee better than 1/n approximation of a fair allocation when the entitlements
are not necessarily equal. Furthermore, we devise a simple algorithm that ensures a 1/n
4
approximation guarantee. We also run some experiments on real-world data and show
that, in practice, a fair allocation is likely to exist.
This work was published at Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research [11].
5
Chapter 2: Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods: Guaranteeing Approxi-
mate Maximin Shares
2.1 Introduction
Suppose we have a set of m indivisible items, and wish to distribute them among
n agents. Agents have valuations for each set of items that are not necessarily identical.
How hard is it to divide the items between the agents to make sure everyone receives a
fair share?
Fair division problems have been vastly studied in the past 60 years, (see, e.g. [12,
13, 14, 1, 15, 2, 16]). This line of research was initiated by the work of [16] in which the
author introduced the cake cutting problem as follows: given a heterogeneous cake and a
set of agents with different valuation functions, the goal is to find a fair allocation of the
cake to the agents.
In order to study this problem, several notions of fairness have been proposed, the
most famous of which are proportionality and envy-freeness, introduced by [16] and Foley
[17]. A division is called proportional, if the total value of the allocated pieces to each
agent is at least 1/n fraction of his total value for the entire cake, where n is the number
of agents. In an envy-free division, no agent wishes to exchange his share with another
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agent, i.e., every agent’s valuation for his share is at least as much as his valuation for the
other agents’ shares. Clearly, proportionality is implied by envy-freeness.
Dubins and Spanier [15] propose a simple moving knife procedure that can guaran-
tee a proportional division of the cake. For envy-freeness, Selfridge and Conway design
an algorithm that guarantees envy-freeness when the number of agents is limited to 3.
Later, Brams and Taylor extend this guarantee to an arbitrary number of agents in the ad-
ditive setting [18]. However, their method for allocating the cake makes an un-bounded
number of cuts. Recently, Aziz and Mackenzie proposed a bounded protocol for envy-free
allocation of the cake [9].
The problem becomes even more subtle when we assume the items are indivisible.
It is not hard to show that for indivisible items, neither proportionality nor envy-freeness
can be guaranteed; for instance, when the number of items is smaller than the number of
agents, at least one agent receives no items.
From a theoretical standpoint, proportionality and envy-freeness are too strong to be
delivered in the case of indivisible goods. Therefore, Budish [1] proposed a newer notion
of fairness for indivisible goods, namely the maxmin share, which has attracted a lot of
attention in recent years [2, 12, 14, 19, 20, 11, 21, 22]. Imagine that we ask an agent ai to
partition a setM ofm items into n bundles and collect the bundle with the smallest value.
To maximize his profits, agent ai tries to divideM in a way that maximizes the value of
the bundle with the lowest value to him. Based on this, the maxmin share of an agent ai,
denoted by MMSi, is the value of the least valuable bundle in agent ai’s allocation; that is,
the maximum profit ai can obtain in this procedure. Clearly, MMSi is the most that can
be guaranteed to an agent, since if all valuations are the same, at least one agent obtains
7
a valuation of at most MMSi from his allocated set. The question is then, whether there
exists an allocation which guarantees MMSi for every agent ai? Therefore, we call an
allocation MMS, if every agent ai receives a collection of items that are together worth
at least MMSi to him. Bouveret and Lemaitre [14] showed that for the restricted cases,
when the valuations of the items for each agent are either 0 or 1, or when m ≤ n + 3,
an MMS allocation is guaranteed to exist. In other words, each ai can be guaranteed to
receive a profit of at least MMSi from his allocated items.
While the experiments support the existence of an MMS allocation in general [14],
this conjecture was refuted by the pioneering work of Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang [2].
Kurokawa et al. [2] provided a surprising counter-example that admits no MMS alloca-
tion. They also show that a 2/3-MMS allocation always exists, i.e. there exists an algo-
rithm that allocates the items to the agents in such a way that every agent ai receives a
share that is worth at least 2/3MMSi to him. In particular, they show for n ≤ 4, their
algorithm finds a 3/4-MMS allocation. However, their algorithm does not run in poly-
nomial time unless we assume the number of agents is bounded by a constant number.
Following this work, Amanatidis, Markakis, Nikzad, and Saberi [12], improve this result
by presenting a polynomial time algorithm for finding a (2/3− ε)-MMS allocation to any
number of agents for constant ε. However, the heart of their algorithm is the same as
[2]. In addition to this, Amanatidis et al. prove that for n = 3, a 7/8-MMS allocation is
always possible. Note that, the counter example provided by Kurokawa et al.[2] requires
a number of goods that is exponential to the number of agents. Kurokawa et al.in [23]
provided a better construction for the counter-example with a linear number of goods.
In this work, we improve the result of Kurokawa et al.[2] by proving that a 3/4-
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MMS allocation always exists. We also give a polynomial time algorithm to find such
an allocation. Of course, this only holds if the valuation of the agents for the items are
additive. We further go beyond the additive setting and extend this result to the case of
submodular, XOS, and subadditive settings. More precisely, we give constant approxi-
mation algorithms for submodular and XOS settings that run in polynomial time. For the
subadditive case, we prove that a 1/10dlogme-MMS allocation is guaranteed to exist. We
emphasize that finding the exact value of MMSi for an agent is NP-hard. Furthermore,
to the best of our knowledge, no PTAS is known for computing the MMS values in non-
additive settings. Thus, any α-MMS allocation algorithm in non-additive settings must
overcome the difficulty that the value of MMSi is not known in advance. Therefore, our
algorithms don’t immediately follow from our existential proofs.
In order to present the results and techniques, we briefly state the fair allocation
problem. Note that you can find a formal definition of the problem with more details in
Section 3.2. The input to a maxmin fair allocation problem is a setM of m items and a
set N of n agents. Fix an agent ai ∈ N and let Vi : 2M → R+ be the valuation function
of ai. Consider the set Πr of all partitions of the items inM into r non-empty sets. We
define MMSrVi(M) as follows:






In the context of fair allocation, we denote the maxmin value of an agent ai by MMSi =
MMSnVi(M). The fair allocation problem is defined as follows: for a given parameter α,
can we distribute the items among the agents in such a way that every agent ai receives a
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set of items with a value of at least αMMSi to him? Such an allocation is called an α-MMS
allocation. We consider the fair allocation problem in both additive and non-additive set-
tings (including submodular, XOS, and subadditive valuations). For non-additive settings,
we use oracle queries to access the valuations. Note that, for non-additive settings, elic-
iting the entire valuation function of each agent needs an exponential number of queries.
However, our methods for allocating the items in non-additive settings only use a polyno-
mial number of queries.
There are many applications for finding fair allocations in the additive and non-
additive settings. For example, spliddit, a popular fair division website1 suggests indis-
putable and provably fair solutions for many real-world problems such as sharing rents,
distributing tasks, dividing goods, etc. For dividing goods, spliddit uses the maximum
Nash welfare allocation (the allocation that maximizes the product of utilities). However,
the current best approximation guarantee and the state-of-the-art method for allocating
indivisible goods is based on the result of [2] that guarantees a 2/3-MMS allocation. We
believe our results can improve their performance.
2.2 Preliminaries
Throughout this chapter we assume the set of agents is denoted byN and the set of
items is referred to byM. Let |N | = n and |M| = m, we refer to the agents by ai and to
the items by bi, i.e.,N = {a1, a2, . . . , an} andM = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}. We denote the valu-
ation of agent ai for a set S of items by Vi(S). Our interest is in valuation functions that are
monotone and non-negative. More precisely, we assume Vi(S) ≥ 0 for every agent ai and
1http://www.spliddit.org
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S ⊆ M, and for every two sets S1 and S2 we have Vi(S1 ∪ S2) ≥ max{Vi(S1), Vi(S2)}.
Due to obvious impossibility results for the general valuation functions, we restrict our
attention to four classes of set functions:
• Additive: A set function V (.) is additive if V (S1)+V (S2) = V (S1∪S2)+V (S1∩
S2) for every two sets S1, S2 ∈ ground(V ).
• Submodular: A set function V (.) is submodular if V (S1)+V (S2) ≥ V (S1∪S2)+
V (S1 ∩ S2) for every two sets S1, S2 ∈ ground(V ).
• Fractionally Subadditive (XOS): An XOS set function V (.) can be shown via a
finite set of additive functions {V1, V2, . . . , Vα} where V (S) = maxαi=1 Vi(S) for
any set S ⊆ ground(V ).
• Subadditive: A set function V (.) is subadditive if V (S1) + V (S2) ≥ V (S1 ∪ S2)
for every two sets S1, S2 ⊆ ground(V ).
For additive functions, we assume the value of the function for every element is
given in the input. However, representing other classes of set functions requires access
to oracles. For submodular functions, we assume we have access to query oracle defined
below. Query oracles are great identifier for submodular functions, however, they are
too weak when it comes to XOS and subadditive settings. For such functions, we use a
stronger oracle which is called demand oracle. It is shown that for some functions, such as
gross substitutes, a demand oracle can be implemented via a query oracle in polynomial
time [24]. In addition to this, we consider a special oracle for XOS functions which
is called XOS oracle. Access to query oracles for submodular functions, XOS oracle for
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XOS functions, and demand oracles for XOS and subadditive functions are quite common
and have been very fruitful in the literature [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 24, 30]. In what follows,
we formally define the oracles:
• Query oracle: Given a function f , a query oracle O is an algorithm that receives a
set S as input and computes f(S) in time O(1).
• Demand oracle: Given a function f , a demand oracle O is an algorithm that
receives a sequence of prices p1, p2, . . . , pn as input and finds a set S such that
f(S) −∑e∈S pe is maximized. We assume the running time of the algorithm is
O(1).
• XOS oracle: (defined only for an XOS functions f ) Given a set S of items, it
returns the additive representation of the function that is maximized for S. In other
words, it reveals the contribution of each item in S to the value of f(S).
Let Πr be the set of all partitions of M into r disjoint subsets. For every r-
partitioning P ∗ ∈ Πr, we denote the partitions by P ∗1 , P ∗2 , . . . , P ∗r . For a set function
f(.), we define MMSrf (M) as follows:





For brevity we refer to MMSnfi(M) by MMSi.
An allocation of items to the agents is a vectorA = 〈A1, A2, . . . , An〉where
⋃
Ai =
M and Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for every two agents ai, aj ∈ N . An allocation A is α-MMS, if
every agent ai receives a subset of the items whose value to that agent is at least α times
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MMSi. More precisely, A is α-MMS if and only if Vi(Ai) ≥ αMMSi for every agent
ai ∈ N .
We define the notion of reducibility for an instance of the problem as follows.
Definition 2.2.1 We say an instance of the problem is α-reducible, if there exist a set
T ⊂ N of agents, a set S of items, and an allocation A = 〈A1, A2, . . . , A|T |〉 of S to
agents of T such that
∀ai ∈ T Vi(Ai) ≥ αMMSi
and
∀ai /∈ T MMSn−|T |Vi (M\ S) ≥ MMSi.
Similarly, we call an instance α-irreducible if it is not α-reducible. The intuition behind
Definition 2.2.1 is the following: In order to prove the existence of an α-MMS alloca-
tion for every instance of the problem, it only suffices to prove this for the α-irreducible
instances.
Observation 2.2.2 Every instance of the fair allocation problem admits an α-MMS allo-
cation if this holds for all α-irreducible instances.
The reducibility argument plays an important role in both the existential proofs and
algorithms.
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2.3 Our Results and Techniques
Throughout this chapter, we study the fair allocation problem for additive and non-
additive agents. Kurokawa et al. [2] study the fair allocation problem and show a 2/3-
MMS allocation is guaranteed to exist for any number of additive agents. We improve
this result in two different dimensions: (i) we improve the factor 2/3 to a factor 3/4 for
additive agents. (ii) we provide similar guarantees for submodular, fractionally subaddi-
tive, and subadditive agents. Moreover, we provide algorithms that find such allocations
in polynomial time. A brief summary of our results is illustrated in Table 2.1.
2.3.0.1 Additive Setting
As mentioned before, the pioneering work of Kurokawa et al. [2] present the first
proof to the existence of a 2/3-MMS allocation in the additive setting. On the negative
side, they show that their analysis is tight, i.e. their method cannot be used to obtain a bet-
ter approximation guarantee. However, whether or not a better bound could be achieved
via a more efficient algorithm remains open as Kurokawa et al. [2] pose it as an open
problem.
We answer the above question in the affirmative. Our main contribution is a proof
to the existence of a 3/4-MMS allocation for additive agents. Furthermore, we show that
such an allocation can be found in polynomial time.
Theorem 2.3.1 Any fair allocation problem with additive agents admits a 3/4-MMS al-
location. Moreover, a (3/4− ε)-MMS allocation can be found in time poly(n,m) for any
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Previous work Additive Submodular XOS Subadditive
Existential proof 2/3 [2] 1/10 [19]a - -
Polytime algorithm 2/3− ε [12] 1/31 [19] - -
Upper bound 1− ε [2] - - -
Our results Additive Submodular XOS Subadditive
Existential proof 3/4 1/3 1/5 1/10dlogme
Polytime algorithm 3/4− ε 1/3 1/8 -
Upper bound - 3/4 1/2 1/2
Table 2.1: Summary of the results
aIn a parallel work to ours, Barman and Murthy in [19] (EC’17) consider the submodular case and
propose a 1/31 approximation guarantee.
ε > 0.
The above theorem is surprising, since most of the previous methods provided for
proving the existence of a 2/3-MMS allocation were tight. This convinced many in the
community that 2/3 is the best that can be guaranteed. This shows that the current tech-
niques and known structural properties of maximin share are not powerful enough to
prove the bounds better than 2/3. In this chapter, we provide a better understanding of
this notion by demonstrating several new properties of maximin share. For example, we
introduce a generalized form of reducibility and develop double counting techniques that
are closely related to the concept of maximin-share.
For a better understanding of our algorithm, we start with the case where valuations
of the agents for all items are small enough. More precisely, let 0 < α < 1 be a constant
number and assume for every agent ai and every item bj , the value of agent ai for item
bj is bounded by αMMSi. In this case, we propose the following simple procedure to
allocate the items to the agents.
• Arrange the items in an arbitrary order.
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• Start with an empty bag and add the items to the bag one by one with respect to
their order.
• Every time the valuation of an agent ai for the set of items in the bag reaches
(1 − α)MMSi, give all items of the bag to that agent, and continue with an empty
bag. In case many agents are qualified to receive the items, we choose one of them
arbitrarily. From this point on, we exclude the agent who received the items from
the process.
We call this procedure the bag filling algorithm. One can see this algorithm as an ex-
tension of the famous moving knife algorithm for indivisible items. It is not hard to
show that the bag filling algorithm guarantees a (1 − α)-MMS allocation to all of the
agents. The crux of the argument is to show that every agent receives at least one bag
of items. To this end, one could argue that every time a set of items is allocated to an
agent ai, no other agent aj loses a value more than MMSj . This, together with the fact
that Vi(M) ≥ nMMSi, shows that at the end of the algorithm, every agent receives a fair
share ((1− α)-MMS) of the items.
This observation sheds light on the fact that low-value items can be distributed in
a more efficient way. Therefore, the main hardness is to allocate the items with higher
values to the agents. To overcome this hardness, we devise a clustering method. Roughly
speaking, we divide the agents into three clusters according to their valuation functions.
We prove desirable properties for the agents of each cluster. Finally, via a procedure that
is similar in spirit to the bag filling algorithm but more complicated, we allocate the items
to the agents.
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Our clustering method is based on three important principles: reducibility, matching
allocation, and cycle-envy-freeness. We give a brief description of each principle in the
following.
Reducibility: The reducibility principle is very simple and elegant but plays an
important role in the allocation process. Roughly speaking, consider a situation where
for an agent ai and a set S of items we have the following properties: Vi(S) ≥ αMMSi,
and for all aj 6= ai, MMSn−1j (M\ S) ≥ MMSj, where Vi(S) is the valuation of agent ai
for subset S of items. Intuitively, since the maxmin shares of all agents except ai for all
the items other than set S are at least as much as their current maxmin shares, allocating
set S to ai cannot hurt the guarantee. In other words, given that an α-MMS allocation
is possible for all agents except ai with items not in S, we can allocate set S to agent
ai and recursively solve the problem for the rest of the agents. Although the definition
of reducibility is more general than what mentioned above, the key idea is that reducible
instances of the problem can be transformed into irreducible instances (see Observation
2.2.2). This makes the problem substantially simpler, since α-irreducible instances of the
problem have many desirable properties. For example, in such instances, the value of
every agent ai for each item is less than αMMSi. By setting α = 1/2, this observation
along with the analysis of the bag filling algorithm, proves the existence of a 1/2-MMS
allocation. It is worth to mention that a special form of reducibility, where |S| = 1 is used
in the previous works [12, 2].
Matching allocation: At the core of the clustering part, we use a well-structured
type of matching to allocate the items to the agents. Intuitively, we cluster the agents to
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deal with high-value or in other words heavy items. In order to cluster a group of agents,
we find a subset T of agents and a subset S of items, together with a matching M from
S to T . We choose T , S, and M in a way that (i) every item assigned to an agent has a
value of at least β to him, (ii) agents who do not receive any items have a value less than β
for each of the assigned items. Such an allocation requires careful application of several
properties of maximal matchings in bipartite graphs. A matching with similar structural
properties is previously used by Kurokawa et al. [2] to allocate the bundles to the agents.
Cycle-envy-freeness: Envy-freeness is itself a well-known notion for fairness in
the resource allocation problems. However, this notion is perhaps more applicable to the
allocation of divisible goods. In our algorithm, we use a much weaker notion of envy-
freeness, namely cycle-envy-freeness. A cycle-envy-free allocation contains no cyclic
permutation of agents, such that each agent envies the next agent in the cycle. In the
clustering phase, we choose a matching M in a way that preserves cycle-envy-freeness
for the clustered agents.
Cycle-envy-freeness plays a key role in the second phase of the algorithm. As
aforementioned, our method in the assignment phase is closely related to the bag filling
procedure described above. The difference is that the efficiency of our method depends on
the order of the agents who receive the items. Based on the notion of cycle-envy-freeness,
we prioritize the agents and, as such, we show the allocation is fair. An analogous concept
is previously used in [31], albeit with a different application than ours.
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2.3.0.2 Submodular, XOS, and Subadditive Agents
Although the problem was initially proposed for additive agents, it is very well-
motivated to extend the definition to other classes of set functions. For instance, it is
quite natural to expect that an agent prefers to receive two items of value 400, rather
than receiving 1000 items of value 1. Such a constraint cannot be imposed in the ad-
ditive setting. However, submodular functions which encompass k-demand valuations
are strong tools for modeling these constraints. Such generalizations have been made to
many similar problems, including the Santa Claus max-min fair allocation, welfare max-
imization, and secretary problems [32, 26, 27, 33]. The most common classes of set
functions that have been studied before are submodular, XOS, and subadditive functions.
We consider the fair allocation problem when the agents’ valuations are in each of these
classes. In contrast to the additive setting in which finding a constant MMS allocation
is trivial, the problem becomes much more subtle even when the agents’ valuations are
monotone submodular. For instance, the bag filling algorithm does not promise any con-
stant approximation factor for submodular agents, while it is straight-forward to show it
guarantees a (1− α)-MMS allocation for additive agents.
We begin with submodular set functions. We show that the fair allocation problem
with submodular agents admits a 1/3-MMS allocation. In addition, we show, given access
to query oracles, one can find such an allocation in polynomial time. We further com-
plement our result by showing that a 3/4-MMS is the best guarantee that one can hope to
achieve in this setting. This is in contrast to the additive setting for which the only upper
bound is that 1-MMS allocation is not always possible. We begin by stating an existential
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proof.
Theorem 2.3.2 The fair allocation problem with submodular agents admits a 1/3-MMS
allocation.
Our proof for submodular agents is fundamentally different from that of the additive
setting. First, without loss of generality, we assume MMSi = 1 for every agent ai ∈ N .
Moreover, we assume the problem is 1/3-irreducible since otherwise we can reduce the
problem. Next, given a function f(.), we define the ceiling function fx(.) as follows:
fx(S) = min{x, f(S)} ∀S ⊆ ground(f).
An important property of the ceiling functions is that they preserve submodularity, frac-
tionally subadditivity, and subadditivity. We define the bounded welfare of an allocation
A as∑V 2/3i (Ai). Given that, we show an allocation that maximizes the bounded welfare
is 1/3-MMS. To this end, let A be an allocation with the maximum bounded welfare and
suppose for the sake of contradiction that in such an allocation, an agent ai receives a
bundle of worth less than 1/3 to him. Since MMSi = 1, agent ai can divide the items into
n sets, where each set is of worth at least 1 to him. For a valuation function V , define the
contribution of an item bj in set S (bj ∈ S) as V (S) − V (S \ {bj}). Now, we randomly
select an element bj which is not allocated to ai. By the properties of submodular func-
tions, we show that if we allocate bj to ai, the expected contribution of bj to the bounded
valuation function of ai would be more than the current expected contribution of bj to
the bounded welfare of the allocation. Therefore, there exists an item bj such that if we
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allocate that item to agent ai, the total bounded welfare of the allocation will be increased.
This contradicts the maximality of the allocation.
Notice that Theorem 2.3.2 is only an existential proof. A natural approach to find
such a solution is to start with an arbitrary allocation and iteratively increase its bounded
welfare until it becomes 1/3-MMS. The main challenge though is that we do not even
know what the MMS values are. Furthermore, unlike the additive setting, we do not have
any PTAS algorithm that provides us a close estimate to these values. To overcome this
challenge, we propose a combinatorial trick to guess these values without incurring any
additional factor to our guarantee. The high level idea is to start with large numbers as
estimates to the MMS values. Every time we run the algorithm on the estimated values,
it either finds a desired allocation, or reports that the maximin value of an agent is mis-
represented by at least a multiplicative factor. Given this, we divide the maximin value of
that agent by that factor and continue on with the new estimates. Therefore, at every step
of the algorithm, we are guaranteed that our estimates are not less than the actual MMS
values. Based on this, we show that the running time of the algorithm is polynomial, and
that the resulting allocation has the desired properties.
Theorem 2.3.3 Given access to query oracles, one can find a 1/3-MMS allocation to
submodular agents in polynomial time.
Finally, we show that in some instances with submodular agents, no allocation is
better than 3/4-MMS.
Theorem 2.3.4 For any integer number c > 0, there exists an instance of the fair al-
location problem with n ≥ c submodular agents for which no allocation is better than
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3/4-MMS.
We show Theorem 2.3.4 by a counter-example. In this counter-example we have n
agents and 2n items. Moreover, the valuation functions of the first n − 1 agents are the
same, but the last agent has a slightly different valuation function that makes it impossible
to find an allocation which is better than 3/4-MMS. The number of agents in this example
can be arbitrarily large.
Similar to the submodular setting, we provide an upper bound on the quality of any
allocation in the XOS setting. We show the following theorem by a counter-example.
Theorem 2.3.5 For any integer number c, there is an instance of the fair allocation prob-
lem with XOS agents where n ≥ c and no allocation is better than 1/2-MMS.
Next, we state the main theorem in the XOS setting.
Theorem 2.3.6 The fair allocation problem with XOS agents admits a 1/5-MMS alloca-
tion.
Our approach for proving Theorem 2.3.6 is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3.2.
Again, we scale the valuations to make sure MMSi = 1 all agents and define the notion of




i (Ai). However, as XOS functions do not adhere
to the nice structure of submodular functions, we use a different analysis to prove this
theorem. Let A be an allocation with the maximum bounded welfare. In case all agents
receive a value of at least 1/5, the proof is complete. Otherwise, let ai be an agent that
receives a set of items whose value to him is less than 1/5. In contrast to the submodular
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setting, giving no item alone to ai can guarantee an increase in the bounded welfare of the
allocation. However, this time, we show there exists a set S of items such that if we take
them back from their recipients and instead allocate them to agent ai, the bounded welfare
of the allocation increases. The reason this holds is the following: since MMSi = 1, agent
ai can split the items into 2n sets where every set is worth at least 2/5 to ai, otherwise
the problem is 1/5-reducible. Moreover, since the valuation functions are XOS, we show
that giving one of these 2n sets to ai will increase the bounded welfare of the allocation.
Therefore, if A is maximal, then A is also 1/5-MMS.
Finally, we show that a 1/8-MMS allocation in the XOS setting can be found in
polynomial time. Our algorithm only requires access to demand and XOS oracles. Note
that this bound is slightly worse than our existential proof due to some computational
hardnesses. However, the blueprint of the algorithm is based on the proof of Theorem
2.3.6.
Theorem 2.3.7 Given access to demand and XOS oracles, we can find a 1/8-MMS allo-
cation for the problem with XOS agents in polynomial time.
We start with an arbitrary allocation and increase the bounded welfare until the allo-
cation becomes 1/8-MMS. The catch is that if the allocation is not 1/8-MMS, then there
exists an agent ai and a set S of items such that if we take back these items from their
current recipients and allocate them to agent ai, the bounded welfare of the allocation
increases. In order to increase the bounded welfare, there are two computational barriers
that need to be lifted. First, similar to the submodular setting, we do not have any esti-
mates to the MMS values. Analogously, we resolve the first issue by iteratively guessing
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the MMS values. The second issue is that in every step of the algorithm, we have to find a
set S of items to allocate to an agent ai that results in an increase in the bounded welfare.
Such a set S cannot be trivially found in polynomial time. That is where the demand and
XOS oracles take part. We show how to find such a set in polynomial time. The high-level
idea is the following: first, by accessing the XOS oracles, we determine the contribution
of every item to the bounded welfare of the allocation. Next, we set the price of every
element equal to three times the contribution of that element to the bounded welfare and
run the demand oracle to find which subset has the highest profit for agent ai. We show
this subset has a value of at least 1/4 to ai. Next, we sort the elements of this set based on
the ratio of contribution to the overall value of the set over the price of the item, and select
a prefix for them that has a value of at least 1/4 to ai. Finally, we argue that allocating
this set to ai increases the bounded welfare of the allocation by at least some known lower
bound. This, married with the combinatorial trick to guess the MMS values, gives us a
polynomial time algorithm to find a 1/8-MMS allocation.
An immediate corollary of Theorems 2.3.3 and 2.3.7 is a polynomial time algorithm
for approximating the maxmin value of a submodular and an XOS function within factors
1/3 and 1/8, respectively.
Corollary 2.3.8 Let f be a submodular/XOS function on a set of ground elements S, and
let n be an integer number. Given access to query oracle/demand and XOS oracles of f ,




f(Si) ≥ c ·MMSnf
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where MMSnf denotes the maxmin value for function f on n subsets. Constant c equals
1/3 if f is submodular and is equal to 1/8 for the XOS case.
Finally, we investigate the problem when the agents are subadditive and present an
existential proof based on a well-known reduction to the XOS setting.
Theorem 2.3.9 The fair allocation problem with subadditive agents admits a 1/10dlogme-
MMS allocation.
2.4 A Brief Overview of the 3/4-MMS Algorithm
The purpose of this section is to present an abstract overview over the ideas behind
our algorithm for finding a 3/4-MMS allocation in the additive setting. For simplicity,
we start with a simple 1/2-MMS algorithm mentioned in Section 3.1.1. Recall that the
bag filling procedure guarantees a 1−α approximation solution when the valuations of the
agents for each item is smaller than α. Furthermore, we know that in every α-irreducible
instance, all the agents have a value less than α for every item. Thus, the following simple
procedure yields a 1/2-MMS allocation:
1. Reduce the problem until no agent has a value more than 1/2 for any item.
2. Allocate the items to the agents via a bag filling procedure.
Figure 2.1 shows a schematic representation of this algorithm. We can extend the
idea in 1/2-MMS algorithm to obtain a more efficient algorithm. Here is the sketch of the
2/3-MMS algorithm: consider a 2/3-irreducible instance of the problem. In this instance,












Figure 2.2: 2/3-MMS Algorithm
items are not yet small enough to run a bag filling procedure. The idea here is to divide
the agents into two clusters C1 and C2. Along this clustering, the items with a value in
range [1/3, 2/3) are given to the agents. In particular, one item is allocated to every agent
in C1 that is worth at least 1/3 to him and less than 1/3 to any agent not in C1. Next, we
refine Cluster C1. In the refining procedure, if any remaining item could singly satisfy
an agent in C1, we do so. After building C1 and C2 and refining C1, the remaining items
preserve the following two invariants:
1. The value of every remaining item is less than 1/3 to every remaining agent.
2. No remaining item can singly satisfy an agent in C1 (regarding the item that is
already allocated to them)
These two invariants enable us to run a bag filling procedure over the remaining items.
For this case, the bag filling procedure must be more intelligent: in the case that multiple
agents are qualified to receive the items of the bag, we prioritize the agents. Roughly
speaking, the priorities are determined by two factors: the cluster they belong to, and the
cycle-envy-freeness property of the agents in C1. In Figure 2.2 you can see a flowchart
for this algorithm.
Our method for a 3/4-MMS allocation takes one step further from the previous 2/3-

























Figure 2.4: Algorithm Phases
be further simplified. Via similar ideas, we build Cluster C1 and refine it. Next, we build
Clusters C2 and C3 and refine C2. After refining Cluster C2, the following invariants are
preserved for the remaining items:
1. Almost every remaining item has a value less than 1/4 to every remaining agent.
More precisely, for every remaining agent ai, there is at most one remaining item
bj with Vi({bj}) ≥ 1/4.
2. No remaining item can singly satisfy an agent in C1 and C2 (regarding the item that
is already allocated to them).
Finally, we run a bag filling procedure. Again, in the bag filling procedure, the
priorities of the agents are determined by the cluster they belong to, and the cycle-envy-
freeness of the clusters. In Figure 2.3, a flowchart for this algorithm is shown. Our
assumption is that the input is 3/4-irreducible. Hence, we describe our algorithm in two
phases: a clustering phase and the bag filling phase, as shown in Figure 2.4.
We show that all the steps of the algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time.
Furthermore, we show that the assumption that the input is 3/4-irreducible is without loss
of generality. In fact, we show that it suffices to check some invariants of irreducibility to


















Figure 2.5: Generalizing the algorithm into k clusters
2.5 Additive Agents
In this section we study the fair allocation problem in the additive setting. We
present a proof to the existence of a 3/4-MMS allocation when the agents are additive.
This improves upon the work of Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang [2] wherein the authors
prove a 2/3-MMS allocation exists for any combination of additive agents. As we show,
our proof is constructive; given an algorithm that determines the MMS of an additive
set function within a factor α, we can implement an algorithm that finds a 3/(4α)-MMS
allocation in polynomial time. This married with the PTAS algorithm of Epstein and
Levin [34] for finding the MMS values, results is an algorithm that finds a 3/(4+ ε)-MMS
allocation in polynomial time.
The main idea behind the 3/4-MMS allocation is clustering the agents. Roughly
speaking, we categorize the agents into three clusters, namely C1, C2, and C3. We show
that the valuation functions of the agents within each cluster show similar behaviors.
Along the clustering process, we allocate the heavy items (the items that have a valuation
of at least 1/4 to some agents) to the agents. By Observation 2.2.2, proving a 3/4-MMS
guarantee can be narrowed down to only 3/4-irreducible instances. The 3/4-irreducibility
of the problem guarantees that after the clustering process, the remaining items are light.
This enables us to run a bag filling process to satisfy the agents. In order to prove the cor-
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rectness of the algorithm, we take advantage of the properties of each cluster separately.
The organization of this section is summarized in the following: we start by a brief
and abstract explanation of the ideas in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5.1 we study the proper-
ties of the additive setting and state the main observations that later imply the correctness
of our algorithm. Next, in Section 2.5.2 we discuss a method for clustering the agents and
in Section 2.5.3 we show how we allocate the items to the agents of each cluster to ensure
a 3/4-MMS guarantee. Finally, in Section 2.5.5 we explain the implementation details
and prove a polynomial running time for the proposed algorithm.
Throughout this section, we assume MMSi = 1 for all agents ai ∈ N . This is
without loss of generality for the existential proof since one can scale the valuation func-
tions to impose this constraint. However, the computational complexity of the allocation
will be affected by this assumption since determining the MMS of an additive function is
NP-hard [34]. That said, we show in Section 2.5.5 that this challenge can be overcome
by incurring an additional 1 + ε factor to the approximation guarantee.
2.5.1 General Definitions and Observations
Throughout this section we explore the properties of the fair allocation problem
with additive agents.
2.5.1.1 Consequences of Irreducibility
Since the objective is to prove the existence of a 3/4-MMS allocation, by Observa-
tion 2.2.2, it only suffices to show every 3/4-irreducible instance of the problem admits
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a 3/4-MMS allocation. Therefore, in this section we provide several properties of the
3/4-irreducible instances. We say a set S of items satisfies an agent ai if and only if
Vi(S) ≥ 3/4. Perhaps the most important consequence of irreducibility is a bound on
the valuation of the agents for every item. In the following we show if the problem is
3/4-irreducible, then no agent has a value of 3/4 or more for an item.
Lemma 2.5.1 For every α-irreducible instance of the problem we have
∀ai ∈ N , bj ∈M Vi(bj) < α.
In other words, Lemma 2.5.1 states that in a 3/4-irreducible instance of the problem,
no item alone can satisfy an agent.
It is worth mentioning that the proof for Lemma 2.5.1 does not rely on additivity of
the valuation functions and holds as long as the valuations are monotone. Thus, regardless
of the type of the valuation functions, one can assume that in any α-irreducible instance,
value of any item is less than α for any agent. Hence the statement carries over to the
submodular, XOS, and subadditive settings.
Proof of Lemma 2.5.1: The key idea is that given MMSi ≥ 1 for an agent ai, then for
every item bj ∈ M we have MMSn−1i (M\ bj) ≥ 1. This holds since removing an item
from M will diminish the value of at most one partition in the optimal n partitioning
of the items. Therefore, at least n − 1 partitions have a value of 1 or more to ai and
thus MMSn−1i (M \ bj) ≥ 1. The rest of the proof follows from the definition of α-
irreducibility. If the valuation of an item bj to an agent ai is at least α, then the problem
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is α-reducible since if we allocate bj to ai, we have
MMSn−1Vk (M\ {bj}) ≥ 1
for every agent ak 6= ai. This contradicts with the α-irreducibility assumption. 2
As a natural generalization of Lemma 2.5.1, we show a similar observation for every
pair of items. However, this involves an additional constraint on the valuation of the other
agents for the pertinent items. In contrast to Lemma 2.5.1, Lemmas 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 are
restricted to additive setting and their results do not hold in more general settings.
Lemma 2.5.2 If the problem is 3/4-irreducible and Vi({bj, bk}) ≥ 3/4 holds for an agent
ai ∈ N and items bj, bk ∈M, then there exists an agent ai′ 6= ai such that
Vi′({bj, bk}) > 1
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that for every agent ai′ 6= ai we have
Vi′({bj, bk}) ≤ 1. By this assumption, we show
MMSn−1i′ (M\ {bj, bk}) ≥ 1 (2.1)
holds. This is true since removing two items bj and bk from M decreases the value of
at most two partitions of the optimal partitioning of M for MMSi′ . If n − 1 partitions
remain intact, then Inequality (2.1) trivially holds. If not, merging the two partitions that
initially contained bj and bk results in a partition with value at least 1 to ai. This partition
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together with the n − 2 remaining partitions result in a desirable partitioning ofM into
n− 1 partitions. Therefore, Inequality (2.1) holds for any agent ai′ , and this implies that
by allocating S = {bj, bk} to ai, not only does Vi(S) ≥ 3/4 hold, but also for every
ai′ 6= ai we have
MMSn−1i′ (M\ {bj, bk}) ≥ 1
which means the problem is 3/4-reducible, and it contradicts our assumption. 2
According to Lemma 2.5.2, in every 3/4-irreducible instance of the problem, for
every agent ai and items bj, bk, either Vi({bj, bk}) < 3/4 or there exists another agent
ai′ 6= ai, such that Vi′({bj, bk}) > 1. Otherwise, we can reduce the problem and find a
3/4-MMS allocation recursively. More generally, let S = {bj1 , bj2 , . . . , bj|S|} be a set of
items inM and T = {ai1 , ai2 , . . . , ai|T |} be a set of agents such that
(i) |S| = 2|T |
(ii) For every aia ∈ T we have Via({bj2a−1 , bj2a}) ≥ 3/4.
(iii) For every ai /∈ T we have Vi({bj2a−1 , bj2a}) ≤ 1 for every 1 ≤ a ≤ |T |.
then the problem is 3/4-reducible.
Lemma 2.5.3 In every 3/4-irreducible instance of the problem, for every set T = {ai1 , ai2 , . . . , ai|T |}
of agents and set S = {bj1 , bj2 , . . . , bj|S|} of items at least one of the above conditions is
violated.
Proof. The proof for this lemma is obtained by applying Lemma 2.5.2, |T | times. Con-
sider an agent ai /∈ T . According to the argument in Lemma 2.5.2, if we assign bj1 and
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bj2 to ai1 , ai can partition the items inM \ {bj1 bj2} into n − 1 partitions with value at
least 1 to ai, i.e.
MMSn−1i (M\ {bj1 , bj2}) ≥ 1.
By the same deduction, after assigning bj3 and bj4 to ai2 , we have
MMSn−2i (M\ {bj1 , bj2 , bj3 , bj4}) ≥ 1.
By repeating above argument |T | times, we have:
MMS
n−|T |
i (M\ S) ≥ 1.
On the other hand, by condition (II), every agent aik satisfies with items bj2k−1 and
bj2k . This means that we can reduce the instance by satisfying the agents in T by the items
in S, which is a contradiction by the irreducibility assumption. 2
2.5.1.2 Modeling the Problem with Bipartite Graphs
In our algorithm we subsequently make use of classic algorithms for bipartite graphs.
Let G = 〈V (G), E(G)〉 be a graph representing the agents and the items. Moreover, let
V (G) = X ∪Y where Y corresponds to the agents and X corresponds to the items. More
precisely, for every agent ai we have a vertex yi ∈ Y and every item bj corresponds to
a vertex xj ∈ X . For every pair of vertices yi ∈ Y and xj ∈ X , there exists an edge
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Figure 2.6: An example of β-filtering on a graph. After removing the edges with a value
smaller than β, some vertices may become isolated. All such vertices are removed from
the filtered graph.
We define an operation on the weighted graphs which we call filtering. Roughly
speaking, a filtering is an operation that receives a weighted graph as input and removes
all of the edges with weight less than a threshold from the graph. Next, we remove all of
the isolated2 vertices and report the remaining as the filtered graph. In the following we
formally define the notion of filtering for weighted graphs.
Definition 2.5.4 A β-filtering of a weighted graph H〈V (H), E(H)〉, denoted by
Hβ〈Vβ(H), Eβ(H)〉, is a subgraph of H where Vβ(H) is the set of all vertices in V (H)
incident to at least one edge of weight β or more and
Eβ(H) = {(u, v) ∈ E(H)|w(u, v) ≥ β}.
For the case of the value graph, we also denote by Yβ and Xβ the sets of agents and
items corresponding to vertices of Vβ(G). Figure 2.6 illustrates an example of a graph H ,
together with H0.4 and H0.5. Note that none of the vertices in H0.4 or H0.5 are isolated.
Denote by a maximum matching, a matching that has the highest number of edges
in a graph. In definition 2.5.5, we introduce our main tool for clustering the agents.




N(FH(M, X̂ )) = Ŷ \ (Ŷ1 ∪ Ŷ2) Ŷ2
FH(M, X̂ ) = X̂ \ X̂2
Figure 2.7: Definition of FH
Definition 2.5.5 Let H〈V (H), E(H)〉 be a bipartite graph with V (H) = X̂ ∪ Ŷ and let
M be a maximum matching of H . Define Ŷ1 as the set of the vertices in Ŷ that are not
saturated by M . Also, define Ŷ2 as the set of vertices in Ŷ that are connected to Ŷ1 by an
alternating path and let X̂2 = M(Ŷ2), where M(Ŷ2) is the set of vertices in X̂ that are
matched with the vertices of Ŷ2 in M . We define FH(M, X̂ ) as the set of the vertices in
X̂ \ X̂2.
For a better understanding of Definition 2.5.5, consider Figure 2.7. By the defini-
tion of alternating paths, there is no edge between the saturated vertices of FH(M, X̂ ) and
Ŷ1∪Ŷ2. On the other hand, sinceM is maximum, the graph doesn’t have any augmenting
path. Thus, there is no edge between unsaturated vertices in FH(M, X̂ ) and Ŷ1∪Ŷ2. As a
result, there is no edge between FH(M, X̂ ) and Ŷ1∪Ŷ2. Furthermore, FH(M, X̂ ) has an-
other important property: there exists a matching from N(FH(M, X̂ )) to FH(M, X̂ ), that
saturates all the vertices in N(FH(M, X̂ )), where N(FH(M, X̂ )) is the set of neighbors
of FH(M, X̂ ).
In Lemmas 2.5.7 and 2.5.6, we prove two remarkable properties for bipartite graphs.
As a consequence of these two lemmas, Corollary 2.5.8 holds for every bipartite graph.
We leverage the result of Corollary 2.5.8 in the clustering phase.
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Lemma 2.5.6 LetH(V,E) be a bipartite graph with V = X̂∪Ŷ and letM be a maximum
matching of H . Then, for every set T ⊆ X̂ \ FH(M, X̂ ) we have |N(T )| > |T |, where
N(T ) is the set of neighbors of T .
Proof. We define Ŷ1 as the set of vertices in Ŷ that are not saturated by M , and Ŷ2 as
the set of vertices in Ŷ that are connected to Ŷ1 by an alternating path. Moreover, let
X̂2 = M(Ŷ2). By definition, FH(M, X̂ ) = X̂ \ X̂2 (See Figure 2.7). As discussed before,
all the vertices in X̂2 are saturated by M . Consequently, all the vertices of T are saturated
by M and |N(T )| ≥ |T |.
Let M(T ) be the set of vertices which are matched to the vertices of T in M . We
know that every vertex of T is present in at least one of the alternating paths which connect
Ŷ1 to Ŷ2. Let
P = 〈ŷ0, x̂1, ŷ1, x̂2, ŷ2, . . . , x̂k, ŷk〉
be one of these paths that includes at least one of the vertices of T . Since P is an alter-
nating path which connects Ŷ1 to Ŷ2, ŷ0 ∈ Ŷ1 (see Figure 2.8). In addition, according to
the definition of alternating path, every edge (x̂j, ŷj) of P belongs to M and every edge
(x̂j, ŷj−1) does not belong to M .
Let x̂i be the first vertex of T that appears in P . We know that the edge (x̂i, ŷi−1)
does not belong to M . On the other hand, since x̂i is the first vertex of T in M , x̂i−1 /∈ T .
Note that ŷi−1 does not belong to M(T ), since every vertex of M(T ) is matched with
a vertex of T in M and (x̂i−1, ŷi−1) is in M . The fact that ŷi−1 /∈ M(T ) means N(T )
contains at least one vertex that is not in M(T ). Since all the vertices in M(T ) are in












Figure 2.8: Alternating path P connects Ŷ1 to Ŷ2 and intersects T
in P . Since x1 ∈ Ŷ1, xi 6= x1. By the assumption that xi is the first vertex of T in P , xi−1
does not belong to T . In addition, xi−1 is connected to xi, since (xi, xi−1) is an edge of
P . Thus, the vertices in T have at least one neighbour, which is not in M(T ). Therefore,
N(T ) = M(T ) cannot hold, and we have |N(T )| > |M(T )| which yields |N(T )| > |T |.
2
Lemma 2.5.7 For a bipartite graph H(V,E) with V = X̂ ∪ Ŷ , FH(M, X̂ ) = ∅ holds, if
and only if for all T ⊆ X̂ we have |N(T )| > |T |, where N(T ) is the set of neighbors of
T .
Proof. If FH(M, X̂ ) = ∅, according to Lemma 2.5.6,
∀T ⊆ X̂ |N(T )| > |T |.
On the other hand, suppose that for all T ⊆ X̂ we have |N(T )| > |T |. We show
that FH(M, X̂ ) = ∅. For the sake of contradiction, assume that FH(M, X̂ ) 6= ∅ and
let T = FH(M, X̂ ). Since there exists a matching from T to N(T ) that saturates all the
vertices of N(T ), we have |T | ≥ |N(T )|, which is a contradiction. Hence, FH(M, X̂ ) =
∅. 2
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Corollary 2.5.8 (of Lemmas 2.5.7 and 2.5.6) LetH(V,E) be a bipartite graph with V =
X̂ ∪ Ŷ and let M be a maximum matching of H . Furthermore, let H ′(V ′, E ′) be the in-
duced sub-graph of H , with V ′ = X̂ ′ ∪ Ŷ ′, where X̂ ′ = X̂ \ FH(M, X̂ ) and Ŷ ′ =
Ŷ \ N(FH(M, X̂ )). Then, for any maximum matching M ′ of H ′, FH′(M ′, X̂ ′) = ∅
holds.
2.5.1.3 Cycle-envy-freeness and MCMWM
In the algorithm, we satisfy each agent in two steps. More precisely, we allocate
each agent two sets of items that are together of worth at least 3/4 to him. We denote
the first set of items allocated to agent ai by fi and the second set by gi. Moreover, we
attribute the agents with labels satisfied, unsatisfied, and semi-satisfied in the following
way:
1. An agent ai is satisfied if Vi(fi ∪ gi) ≥ 3/4.
2. An agent ai is semi-satisfied if fi 6= ∅ but gi = ∅. In this case we define εi =
3/4− Vi(fi).
3. An agent ai is unsatisfied if fi = gi = ∅.
As we see, the algorithm maintains the property that for every semi-satisfied agent ai,
Vi(fi) ≥ 1/2 holds and hence, εi < 1/4.
To capture the competition between different agents, we define an attribution for an
ordered pair of agents. We say a semi-satisfied agent envies another semi-satisfied agent,
if he prefers to switch sets with the other agent.
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Definition 2.5.9 Let T be a set of semi-satisfied agents. An agent ai ∈ T envies an agent
aj ∈ T , if Vi(fj) ≥ Vi(fi). Also, we call an agent ai ∈ T a winner of T , if ai envies no
other agent in T . Similarly, we call an agent ai a loser of T , if no other agent in T envies
ai.
Note that it could be the case that an agent ai is both a loser and a winner of a set T
of agents. Based on Definition 2.5.9, we next define the notion of cycle-envy-freeness.
Definition 2.5.10 We call a set T of semi-satisfied agents cycle-envy-free, if every non-
empty subset of T contains at least one winner and one loser.
Let C be a cycle-envy-free set of semi-satisfied agents. Define the representation
graph of C as a digraph GC(V (GC),
−→
E (GC)), such that for any agent ai ∈ C, there is a
vertex vi in V (GC) and there is a directed edge from vi to vj in
−→
E (GC), if ai envies aj .
In Lemma 2.5.11, we show that GC is acyclic.
Lemma 2.5.11 For every cycle-envy-free set of semi-satisfied agents C, GC is a DAG.
Proof. Consider a cycle L in GC . For each vertex vj ∈ L, there is at least one vertex
vi ∈ L such that ai envies aj . Therefore, Considering S as the set of agents with vertices
in L, none of the agents of S is a loser. By the same deduction, none of the agents of S is
a winner. But this contradicts the fact that the set C is cycle-envy-free. 2
Definition 2.5.12 A topological ordering of a cycle-envy-free setC of semi-satisfied agents,
is a total order≺O corresponding to the topological ordering of the representation graph
GC . More formally, for the agents ai, aj ∈ C we have ai ≺O aj if and only if vi appears
before vj , in the topological ordering of GC .
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Note that in the topological ordering of a cycle-envy-free set C of semi-satisfied
agents, if ai ∈ C envies aj ∈ C, then ai ≺O aj .
Observation 2.5.13 Let C be a cycle-envy-free set of semi-satisfied agents. Then, for
every agent ai ∈ C such that aj ≺O ai, we have:
Vi(fj) ≤ 3/4− εi.
We define a maximum cardinality maximum weighted matching of a weighted
graph as a matching that has the highest number of edges and among them the one that has
the highest total sum of edge weights. For brevity we call such a matching an MCMWM.
In Lemma 2.5.14, we show that an MCMWM of a weighted bipartite graph has certain
properties that makes it useful for building cycle-envy-free clusters.
Lemma 2.5.14 Let H〈V (H), E(H)〉 be a weighted bipartite graph with V (H) = X̂ ∪ Ŷ
and let M = {(x̂1, ŷ1), ..., (x̂k, ŷk)} be an MCMWM of H . Then, for every subset T ⊆
{ŷ1, ŷ2, . . . , ŷk}, the following conditions hold:
• There exists a vertex ŷj ∈ T which is a winner in T , i.e., w(x̂j, ŷj) ≥ w(x̂i, ŷj), for
all x̂i ∈M(T ) and (x̂i, ŷj) ∈ E(H).
• There exists a vertex ŷj ∈ T which is a loser in T , i.e., w(x̂i, ŷi) ≥ w(x̂j, ŷi), for
all ŷi ∈ T and (x̂j, ŷi) ∈ E(H).
• For any vertex ŷi ∈ T and any unsaturated vertex x̂j ∈ X̂ such that (x̂j, ŷi) ∈
E(H), w(x̂i, ŷi) ≥ w(x̂j, ŷi).
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where M(T ) is the set of vertices which are matched by the vertices of T in M .
Proof.
We describe the proof for the first condition in more details. The proof for the
second condition is almost the same as the first condition.
The first condition: Suppose that there exists no such vertex. Our goal is to find
a new matching of H with the same cardinality, but with more weight. To this end, we
construct a directed graph H ′ from H as follows: for each ŷj ∈ T we consider a vertex
vj in V (H ′). Furthermore, there is a directed edge from vj to vi in H ′, if and only if
w(x̂j, ŷj) < w(x̂i, ŷj) in H .
If there exists a vertex vj with out-degree zero in H ′, then ŷj is the desired winner
in T , since
∀ŷi ∈ H,w(x̂j, ŷj) ≥ w(x̂i, ŷj).
Otherwise, the out-degree of every vertex in T is non-zero. Therefore, H ′ has at least one
cycle L = 〈vl1 , vl2 , . . . , vl|L|〉. Now, if we change matching M by removing the set of
edges
{(ŷl1 , x̂l1), (ŷl2 , x̂l2), . . . , (ŷl|L| , x̂l|L|)}
from M and adding
{(ŷl1 , x̂l2), (ŷl2 , x̂l3), . . . , (ŷl|L| , x̂l1)}
to M , the weight of our matching will be increased. Note that by the definition of an edge
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in H ′, we have
w(x̂l2 , ŷl1) > w(x̂l1 , ŷl1), w(x̂l3 , ŷl2) > w(x̂l2 , ŷl2), . . . , w(x̂l1 , ŷl|L|) > w(x̂l|L| , ŷl|L|).
But this contradicts the fact that M was MCMWM of H .
The second condition: The proof of this part is very similar to the proof of the
first condition. For the sake of contradiction suppose that for every vertex ŷj ∈ T , there
is at least one vertex ŷi ∈ T where w(x̂j, ŷi) > w(x̂i, ŷi) in H with (x̂j, ŷi) ∈ E(H).
Similar to the proof of the first condition, we construct a new directed graph H ′ from H
where we have a vertex vj in H ′ for each vertex ŷj in T . For every pair ŷi and ŷj which
are members of T we connect vi to vj with a directed edge in H ′ if
w(x̂j, ŷi) > w(x̂i, ŷi)
in H and (x̂j, ŷi) ∈ E(H). Note that if H ′ contains a vertex vi with in-degree equal to
zero, then ŷi is the desired loser in T . Thus, suppose that no vertex in H ′ has in-degree
zero and hence, H ′ has a directed cycle. Let L = 〈ŷl1 , ŷl2 , . . . , ŷl|L|〉 be a directed cycle
in H ′. Similar to the proof of the previous condition, we leverage L to alter M to a new
matching with more weight, which is a contradiction by the maximality of M .
The third condition: If w(x̂i, ŷi) < w(x̂j, ŷi), we can replace the edge between x̂i
and ŷi by (x̂j, ŷi) in M which yields a matching with a greater weight. This contradicts
the maximality of M . 2
Notice the similarities of the first and the second conditions of Lemma 2.5.14 with
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the conditions of the winner and loser in Definition 2.5.9. In Section 2.5.2, we assign
items to the agents based on an MCMWM of the value-graph. Lemma 2.5.14 ensures that
such an assignment results in a cycle-envy-free set of semi-satisfied agents.
2.5.2 Phase 1: Building the Clusters
In this section, we explain our method for clustering the agents. Intuitively, we
divide the agents into three clusters C1, C2 and C3. As mentioned before, during the algo-
rithm, two sets of items fi, gi are allocated to each agent ai. Throughout this section, we
prove a set of lemmas that are labeled as value-lemma. In these lemmas we bound the
value of fi and gi allocateed to any agent for other agents. A summary of these lemmas
is shown in Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.
After constructing each cluster, we refine that cluster. In the refinement phase of
each cluster, we target a certain subset of the remaining items. If any item in this subset
could satisfy an agent in the recently created cluster, we allocate that item to the corre-
sponding agent. The goal of the refinement phase is to ensure that the remaining items
in the targeted subset are light enough for the agents in that cluster, i.e., none of the
remaining items can satisfy an agent in this cluster.
We denote by S, the set of satisfied agents. In addition, denote by S1,S2, and
S3 the subsets of S, where Si refers to the agents of S that previously belonged to Ci.
Furthermore, we use Sr1 and Sr2 to refer to the agents of S1 and S2 that are satisfied in the
refinement phases of C1 and C2, respectively.
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2.5.2.1 Cluster C1
Consider the filtering G1/2〈V1/2(G), E1/2(G)〉 of the value-graph G and let M be
an MCMWM of G1/2. We define Cluster C1 as the set of agents whose corresponding
vertex is in N(FG1/2(M,X1/2)).
For brevity, denote by VC1 the set of vertices in V (G) that correspond to the agents
of C1. In other words:
VC1 = N(FG1/2(M,X1/2)).
Also, let FG1/2(M,X1/2) be U1 ∪ S1, where U1 is the set of unsaturated vertices in
FG1/2(M,X1/2) and S1 is the set of the saturated vertices. For each edge (xj, yi) ∈ M
such that xj ∈ S1, we allocate item bj to agent ai. More precisely, we set fi = {bj}.
Since w(xj, yi) ≥ 1/2, we have:
∀ak ∈ C1 Vk(fk) ≥ 1/2.
According to the definition of εi, we have
∀ak ∈ C1 εk ≤ 1/4. (2.2)
By the definition of FG1/2 , for every agent which is not in C1, the condition of
Lemma 2.5.15 holds. Note that all the agents that are not in C1, belong to either C2 or C3.
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Lemma 2.5.15 (value-lemma) For all ai ∈ C2 ∪ C3 we have:
∀aj ∈ C1 Vi(fj) < 1/2.
Proof. By definition, there is no edge between the vertices of FG1/2(M,X1/2) and Y1/2 \
N(FG1/2(M,X1/2)) in G1/2. Furthermore, all the items are in worth less than 1/2 for the
agents corresponding to the vertices in Y \ Y1/2. Thus, for every agent ai and every item
bj with yi ∈ Y \ N(FG1/2(M,X1/2)) and xj ∈ FG1/2(M,X1/2), we have Vi(bj) < 1/2.
According to the fact that the agents that are not selected in the clustering of C1 either
belong to C2 or C3, we have:
∀aj ∈ C1 Vi(fj) < 1/2.
2
For each vertex yi ∈ VC1 , denote by Nyi the set of vertices xj ∈ X \ X1/2, where
w(xj, yi) ≥ εi and let




Note that by definition, for any vertex xj ∈ U1 and yi /∈ VC1 , there is no edge
between xj and yi in G1/2 and hence w(xj, yi) < 1/2. Also, since the rest of the vertices
in W1 are from X \ X1/2, for any vertex yi and xj ∈ (W1 \ U1), w(xj, yi) < 1/2 holds.
Thus, we have the following observation:
Observation 2.5.16 For every item bj with xj ∈ W1 and every agent ai with yi /∈ VC1 ,
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Vi({bj}) < 1/2.
Now, define X ′ and Y ′ as follows:
X ′ = X \ (W1 ∪ S1),
Y ′ = Y \ VC1 .
Let G′〈V (G′), E(G′)〉 be the induced subgraph of G on V (G′) = Y ′ ∪ X ′. We use
graph G′ to build Cluster C2.
2.5.2.2 Cluster C1 Refinement
Before building Cluster C2, we satisfy some of the agents in C1 with the items
corresponding to the vertices of W1. Consider the subgraph G1〈V (G1), E(G1)〉 of G
with V (G1) = W1 ∪ VC1 . In G1, There is an edge between yi ∈ VC1 and xj ∈ W1, if
Vi({bj}) ≥ εi. Note that G1〈V (G1), E(G1)〉 is not necessarily an induced subgraph of
G. We use G1 to satisfy a set of agents in C1. To this end, we first show that G1 admits a
special type of matching, described in Lemma 2.5.17.
Lemma 2.5.17 There exists a matching M1 in G1, that saturates all the vertices of W1
and for any edge (xi, yj) ∈M1 and any unsaturated vertex yk ∈ N(xi), ak does not envy
aj .
Proof. First, we prove Lemma 2.5.18. This lemma ensures that there exists a matching in
G1 that saturates all the vertices in W1. Lemma 2.5.18 is a consequence of irreducibility.
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In fact, we show that if the condition in Lemma 2.5.18 does not hold, the instance is
reducible.
Lemma 2.5.18 For graph G1, we have
∀R ⊆ W1, |N(R)| > |R|.
Proof. Let M1 a matching with the maximum number of edges in G1 . Regarding
Lemma 2.5.7, it only suffices to show that FG1(M1,W1) is empty. For the sake of con-
tradiction, suppose that FG1(M1,W1) is not empty. As mentioned before, there exists a
matching between FG1(M1,W1) and N(FG1(M1,W1)) that saturates all the vertices in
N(FG1(M1,W1)). Let
MS = {(xj1 , yi1), (xj2 , yi2), . . . , (xjk , yik)}
be this matching. We show that the set of agents
T = {ai1 , ai2 , . . . , aik}
and the set of items
S = {fi1 , bj1 , fi2 , bj2 , . . . , fik , bjk}.
have all three conditions in Lemma 2.5.3 (Note that fil contains exactly one item). The
first condition is trivial: |S| = 2|T |. Regarding the definition of an edge in G1, we know
that fil ∪ {bjl} satisfy ail and hence, the second condition is held as well. For the third
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condition, we should prove that for every agent ail in T ,
Vi′(fil ∪ {bjl}) < 1 ∀ai′ /∈ T.
To show this, we consider two cases separately. First, if ai′ /∈ C1, by Lemma 2.5.15,
Vi′(fil) < 1/2 and by Observation 2.5.16, Vi′({bjl}) < 1/2, which means Vi′(fil ∪
{bjl}) < 1.
Moreover, consider the case that ai′ ∈ C1. Note that since ai′ /∈ T , it’s correspond-
ing vertex yi′ is not in N(FG1(M1,W1)), which means:
yi′ ∈ VC1 \N(FG1(M1,W1)).
By the definition of N(FG1(M1,W1), there is no edge between yi′ and xjl and hence,
Vi′({bjl}) < εi′ ≤ 1/4. On the other hand, by the irreducibility assumption and the fact
that fil contains exactly one item, Vi′(fil) < 3/4. Thus, Vi′(fil ∪ {bjl}) < 1.
As a result, Vi′(fil ∪ {bjl}) < 1 for every agent ai′ /∈ T which means the third
condition of Lemma 2.5.3 is held as well. Thus, regarding Lemma 2.5.3, the instance is
reducible. But this contradicts the irreducibility assumption. 2
The rest of the proof of Lemma 2.5.17 is as follows. Since we used MCMWM to
build cluster C1, regarding Lemma 2.5.14, C1 is cycle-envy-free. Consider the topological
ordering of C1 and let pai be the position of ai in this ordering. More precisely, pai = k if
ai is the k-th agent in the topological ordering of C1.
According to Lemma 2.5.18, the condition of Hall’s Theorem holds for graph G1
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and as a result there exists a matching in G1 that saturates all the vertices in W1. Among





We claim thatM1 is the desired matching described in Lemma 2.5.17. To prove our claim,
we must show that for any edge (xi, yj) ∈ M1 and any unsaturated vertex yk ∈ N(xi),
aj is a loser for the set {aj, ak}, which means ak does not envy aj . Note that if ak
envies aj , ak appears before aj in the topological ordering of C1 which means pak < paj .
Therefore, if we replace (xi, yj) by (xi, yk) in M1, pM1 will be decreased that contradicts
the minimality of pM1 . 2
Let M1 be a matching of G1 with the property described in Lemma 2.5.17. For
every edge (yi, xj) ∈ M1, we allocate item bj to agent ai i.e., we set gi = {bj}. By the
definition, ai is now satisfied. Thus, we remove ai from C1 and add it to S. Note that,
after refining C1, none of the items whose corresponding vertex is in X ′ \X ′1/2 can satisfy
any remaining agent in C1. Thus, Observation 2.5.19 holds.
Observation 2.5.19 For every item bj such that xj ∈ X ′, either xj ∈ X ′1/2 or for all
ai ∈ C1, Vi({bj}) < εi.
At this point, all the agents of S belong to Sr1 . Each one of these agents is satisfied
with two items, i.e., for any agent aj ∈ Sr1 , |fj| = |gj| = 1. In Lemma 2.5.20 we give an
upper bound on Vi(gj) for every agent aj ∈ Sr1 and every agent ai in C2 ∪ C3.
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Lemma 2.5.20 (value-lemma) For every agent ai ∈ C2 ∪ C3, we have
∀aj ∈ Sr1 Vi(gj) < 1/2.
Proof. Let bk be the item assigned to aj in the refinement of C1. Since xk ∈ W1, according
to Observation 2.5.16, Vi(gj) < 1/2. 2
Lemmas 2.5.20 and 2.5.15 state that for every agent ai ∈ C2 ∪ C3 and every agent
aj ∈ Sr1 , Vi(fj) and Vi(gj) are upper bounded by 1/2. This, together with the fact that
|fj| = |gj| = 1, results in Lemma 2.5.21.







fj ∪ gj) ≥ 1.
Proof. Let aj be an agent in Sr1 . First, note that |fj| = |gj| = 1. Lemma 2.5.15 together




(M\ fj ∪ gj) ≥ 1. (2.3)
Note that Equation (2.3) holds for every agent in Sr1 . Applying Equation (2.3) to all the





















Figure 2.9: Merging x1 and x2
2.5.2.3 Cluster C2
Recall graph G′〈V (G′), E(G′)〉 as described in the last part of Section 2.5.2.1 and
let G′1/2〈V1/2(G′), E1/2(G′)〉 be a 1/2-filtering of G′. Lemma 2.5.6 states that the size
of the maximum matching between X ′1/2 and Y ′1/2 is |X ′1/2|. Also, according to Corollary
2.5.8, for any maximum matchingM ′ ofG′1/2, FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2) is empty. In what follows,
we increase the size of the maximum matching inG′1/2 by merging the vertices ofX ′\X ′1/2
as described in Definition 2.5.22.
Definition 2.5.22 For merging vertices xi, xj of G′(X ′,Y ′), we create a new vertex la-
beled with xi,j . Next, we add xi,j to X ′ and for every vertex yk ∈ Y ′, we add an edge from
yk to xi,j with weight w(yk, xi) + w(yk, xj). Finally we remove vertices xi and xj from
X . See Figure 2.9.
In Lemmas 2.5.23 and 2.5.24, we give upper bounds on the value of the pair of items
corresponding to a merged vertex. In Lemma 2.5.23, we show that the value of a merged
vertex is less than 2εi to every agent ai ∈ C1. This fact is a consequence of Observation
2.5.19. Also, in Lemma 2.5.24, we prove that the value of the items corresponding to a
merged vertex is less than 3/4 to any agent. Lemma 2.5.24 is a direct consequence of
3/4-irreducibility. In fact, we show that if the condition of Lemma 2.5.24 does not hold,
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then the problem can be reduced.
Lemma 2.5.23 For any agent ak ∈ C1 and any pair of vertices xi, xj ∈ X ′ \ X ′1/2,
Vk({bi, bj}) < 2εk holds. In particular, total value of the items that belong to a merged
vertex is less than 2εk for ak.
Proof. According to Observation 2.5.19, for any agent ak ∈ C1 and for every xj ∈
X ′ \ X ′1/2 we have Vk({bj}) < εk. By additivity assumption, for any ak ∈ C1 we have
∀xi, xj ∈ X ′ \ X ′1/2 Vk({bi, bj}) < 2εk.
2
Lemma 2.5.24 For any pair of vertices xi, xj ∈ X ′ \ X ′1/2 and any vertex yk ∈ Y , we
have Vk({bi, bj}) < 3/4.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the problem is 3/4-irreducible, and
there exists a vertex yk ∈ Y such that Vk({bi, bj}) ≥ 3/4. According to Lemma 2.5.2
there exists an agent ak′ 6= ak such that
Vk′({bi, bj}) ≥ 1.
Since the valuations are additive, we know that one of the inequalities Vk′({bi}) ≥ 1/2 or
Vk′({bj}) ≥ 1/2 are held, which is contradiction, since we know both xi and xj belong
to X ′ \ X ′1/2. 2
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Corollary 2.5.25 (of Lemma 2.5.24) For any agent ai with yi ∈ Y , there is at most one
item bj , with xj ∈ X ′ \ X ′1/2 and Vi({bj}) ≥ 3/8.
Consider the vertices in X ′ \ X ′1/2. We call a pair (xi, xj) of distinct vertices in
X ′ \ X ′1/2 desirable for yk ∈ Y ′, if w(yk, xi) + w(yk, xj) ≥ 1/2. With this in mind,
consider the process described in Algorithm 1.
In each step of this process, we find an MCMWMM ′ ofG′1/2. Note thatM
′ changes
after each step of the algorithm. Next, we find a pair (xi, xj) of the vertices in X ′ \
X ′1/2 that is desirable for at least one agent in T = Y ′ \ N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2)). If no
such pair exists, we terminate the algorithm. Otherwise, we select an arbitrary desirable
pair (xi, xj) and merge them to obtain a vertex xi,j . According to the definition of T in
Algorithm 1, merging a pair (xi, xj) results in an augmenting path in G′1/2. Hence, the
size of the maximum matching inG′1/2 is increased by one. Note that after the termination
of Algorithm 1, either T = ∅ or no pair of vertices in X ′ \X ′1/2 is desirable for any vertex
in T .
Lemma 2.5.26 After running Algorithm 1, we have
|FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2)| = |N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2))|.
Proof. We prove Lemma 2.5.26 in two steps. Firstly, we show that
|FG′
1/2






(M ′,X ′1/2)| ≥ |N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2))|. (2.5)
Inequalities (2.5) and (2.5) yields
|FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2)| = |N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2))|. (2.6)
To show Inequality (2.4), argue that before Algorithm 1 starts, we have
FG′
1/2




(M ′,X ′1/2)) = ∅
and all the vertices in X ′1/2 are saturated by M ′. In each step of Algorithm 1, we add
a new vertex to X ′1/2, and the size of the maximum matching M ′ is increased by one.
Therefore, after each step of Algorithm 1, all of the vertices in X ′1/2 remain saturated by
M ′. Since FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2) ⊆ X ′1/2, all the vertices of FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2) are also saturated
by M ′, which means
|FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2)| ≤ |N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2))|.
To prove Inequality (2.5), note that by definition, FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2) has a property
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Algorithm 1: Merging vertices in G′
Data: G′(V (G′), E(G′))
1 while True do




4 T = Y ′ \N(FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2));
5 Q = Set of all desirable pairs in X ′ \ X ′1/2 for the agents in T ;
6 if Q = ∅ then
7 STOP;
8 else




that there exists a matching from FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2) to N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2)) that saturates
all the vertices of N(FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2)). Therefore, we have
|FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2)| ≥ |N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2))|.
This completes the proof. 2
We define Cluster C2 as the set of agents that correspond to the vertices of
N(FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2)). Also, denote by VC2 the vertices in N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2)). For each
agent ai ∈ C2, we allocate the item corresponding to M ′(yi) (or pair of items in case
M ′(yi) is a merged vertex) to ai.
Note that we put the rest of the agents in Cluster C3. Therefore, Lemma 2.5.27 holds
for all the agents of C3.
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Lemma 2.5.27 (value-lemma) For all ai ∈ C3 we have
∀aj ∈ C2, Vi(fj) < 1/2.
Proof. Firstly, we clarify what agents are in C3. Roughly speaking, the agents that are not















The term Y ′ \ Y ′1/2 refers to the vertices that are filtered in G′1/2 which means no
edge with weight at least 1/2 is incident to any of these vertices. On the other hand, for
every agent aj ∈ C2, fj corresponds to a vertex in FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2). Hence, for every agent
aj ∈ C2 and every agent ai with corresponding vertex in Y ′ \ Y ′1/2 we have Vi(fj) < 1/2
Next, consider the term Y ′1/2 \ N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2)). By definition, the vertices
of FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2) are only incident to the vertices of N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2)) in G′1/2. Re-
garding the definition of an edge in G′1/2, for every agent aj ∈ C2 and agent ai with
yi ∈ Y ′1/2 \N(FG′1/2(M
′,X ′1/2)) we have Vi(fj) < 1/2.
Therefore, for all ai ∈ C3 we have:
∀aj ∈ C2 Vi(fj) < 1/2.
2
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2.5.2.4 Cluster C2 Refinement
The refinement phase of C2, is semantically similar to the refinement phase of C1. In
the refinement phase of C2, we satisfy some of the agents of C2 by the items with vertices
in X ′ \ X ′1/2. Note that none of the vertices in X ′ \ X ′1/2 is a merged vertex.
The refinement phase of C2 is presented in Algorithm 2. Let ai1 , ai2 , . . . , aik be the
topological ordering of the agents in C2 as described in Section 2.5.1.3. In Algorithm 2,
We start with yi1 and W2 = ∅ and check whether there exists a vertex xj ∈ X ′ \ (X ′1/2 ∪
W2) such that Vi1({bj}) ≥ εi1 . If so, we add xj to W2 and satisfy ai1 by allocating bj
to ai1 . Next, we repeat the same process for yi2 and continue on to yik . Note that at
the end of the process, W2 refers to the vertices whose corresponding items are allocated
to the agents that are satisfied during the refinement step of C2. For convenience, let
S2 = FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2) and define X ′′ and Y ′′ as follows:
X ′′ = X ′ \ (W2 ∪ S2),
Y ′′ = Y ′ \ VC2 .
Let G′′〈V (G′′), E(G′′)〉 be the induced subgraph of G′ on V (G′′) = X ′′ ∪ Y ′′. We
use G′′ to build Cluster C3.
Observation 2.5.28 After running Algorithm 2, For every item bj with xj ∈ X ′′ \ X ′′1/2
and every agent ai ∈ C2, we have Vi({bj}) < εi.
In the following two lemmas, we give upper bounds on the value of gi for every
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Algorithm 2: Refinement of C2
Data: G′(V (G′), E(G′))
Data: ai1 , ai2 , . . . , aik = Topological ordering of agents in C2
1 for l : 1→ k do
2 if ∃xj ∈ X ′ \ (X ′1/2 ∪W2) s.t. Vi1({bj}) ≥ εil) then
3 gil = bj ;
4 W2 = W2 ∪ xj;
5 C2 = C2 \ ail;
6 S = S ∪ ail;
7 end
8 end
agent ai ∈ Sr2 . First, in Lemma 2.5.29, we show that for every agent aj ∈ C1, Vj(gi) is
upper bounded by εj . Furthermore, by the fact that the agents that are not selected for
Clusters C1 and C2 belong to Cluster C3, we show that Vj(gi) is upper bounded by 1/2 for
every agent aj ∈ C3.
Lemma 2.5.29 Let ai ∈ Sr2 be an agent that is satisfied in the refinement phase of Cluster
C2 and aj be an agent in C1. Then, Vj(gi) < εj .
Proof. Regarding Observation 2.5.19, after refinement of C1, all the items with vertex in
X ′ \ X ′1/2 are in worth less than εj for every agent aj ∈ C1. Furthermore, note that for
every agent ai ∈ Sr2 , gi is a single item with vertex in X ′ \ X ′1/2. Thus, Vj(gi) < εj for
every agent aj ∈ C1. 2
Lemma 2.5.30 (value-lemma) Let ai ∈ Sr2 be an agent that is satisfied in the refinement
phase of Cluster C2 and aj be an agent in C3. Then, Vj(gi) < 1/2.
Proof. According to Algorithm 2, for any agent ai ∈ Sr2 , the corresponding vertex of
the only member of gi is in X ′ \ X ′1/2. Therefore, for any agent aj /∈ C1 ∪ C2 we have
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Vj(gi) < 1/2. Finally, note that the remaining agents that are not in C1 and C2 belong to
C3. 2
2.5.2.5 Cluster C3.
Finally, Cluster C3 is defined as the set of agents corresponding to the vertices of
Y ′′. Let M ′′ be an MCMWM of G′′1/2. Note that by Lemma 2.5.6, all the vertices in X ′′1/2
are saturated by M ′′. For each vertex yi that is saturated by M ′′, we allocate the item (or
pair of items in a case that M ′′(yi) is a merged vertex) corresponding to M ′′(yi) to ai.
Unlike the previous clusters, this allocation is temporary. A semi-satisfied agent ai in C3
may lend his fi to the other agents of C3. Therefore, we have three type of agents in C3:
1. The semi-satisfied agents: we denote the set of semi-satisfied agents in C3 by Cs3
2. The borrower agents: the agents that may borrow from a semi-satisfied agent. An
agent aj in C3 is a borrower, if aj /∈ Cs3 and maxai∈CS3 Vj(fi) ≥ 1/2. We denote the
set of borrower agents in C3 by Cb3.
3. The free agents: the remaining agents in C3. We denote the set of free agents by
Cf3 .
So far, the agents corresponding to unsaturated vertices inY ′′1/2 belong to Cb3 and the agents
corresponding to the vertices in Y ′′ \ Y ′′1/2 are in Cf3 . As we see, during the second phase,
agents in C3 may change their type. For example, an agent in Cs3 may move to Cf3 or vice
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C1 C2
F = X ′′ \ X ′′1
2






Figure 2.10: Overview on the state of the algorithm




Note that by the definition, εi ≤ 1/4 holds for every agent of Cb3.
In Lemma 2.5.31, we show that the remaining items are not heavy for the agents
in C3. The main reason that Lemma 2.5.31 holds, is the fact that no pair of vertices is
desirable for any agents in C3 at the end of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 2.5.31 For all ai ∈ C3 and xj, xk ∈ X ′′ \ X ′′1/2, we have Vi({bj, bk}) < 1/2.
Proof. The algorithm 1 terminates when there is no desirable pair for the agents in T =
Y ′ \N(FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2)). Furthermore, by definition, for every agent ai ∈ C3 we have
yi ∈ Y ′ \N(FG′
1/2
(M ′,X ′1/2)).
But at the end of Algorithm 1, no pair of vertices is desirable for ai which means for every
xj, xk ∈ X ′′ \ X ′′1/2, we have Vi({bj, bk}) < 1/2 (note that X ′′ \ X ′′1/2 ⊆ X ′ \ X ′1/2). 2
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Corollary 2.5.32 (of Lemma 2.5.31) For any agent ai ∈ C3, there is at most one vertex
xj ∈ X ′′ \ X ′′1/2, such that Vi({bj}) ≥ 1/4.
2.5.3 Phase 2: Satisfying the Agents
2.5.3.1 An Overview on the State of the Algorithm
Before going through the second phase, we present an overview of the current state
of the agents and items. In Figure 2.10, for every agent ai ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ S , fi is shown by
a gray rectangle and for every agent ai ∈ S, gi is shown by a hatched rectangle.
Currently, we know that every agent in S belongs to Sr1 or Sr2 . These agents are
satisfied in the refinement phases of C1 and C2. The rest of the agents will be satisfied in
the second phase. For brevity, for i ≤ 2 we use Ssi to refer to the agents in Si that are
satisfied in the second phase. More formally,
for i = 1, 2 Ssi = Si \ Sri .
Since we didn’t refine Cluster C3, all the agents in the Cluster C3 are satisfied in
the second phase. As mentioned in the previous section, the item allocation to the semi-
satisfied agents in C3 is temporary; That is, we may alter such allocations later. Therefore,
in Figure 2.10 we illustrate such allocations by dashed lines.
In this section, we denote the set of free items (the items corresponding to the
vertices in X ′′ \ X ′′1/2 at the end of the first phase) by F . By Observations 2.5.19, 2.5.28
and Corollary 2.5.32, we know that the items in F have the following properties:
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∀ai ∈ C1 ∀ai ∈ C2 ∀ai ∈ C3
∀aj ∈ C1 - Vi(fj) < 1/2 (?) Vi(fj) < 1/2 (?)
∀aj ∈ C2 Vi(fj) < 3/4 (‡) - Vi(fj) < 1/2 (†)
∀aj ∈ Cs3 Vi(fj) < 3/4(‡) Vi(fj) < 3/4(‡) -
?: Lemma 2.5.15 †: Lemma 2.5.27 ‡: Lemma 2.5.33
Table 2.2: Summary of value lemmas for fi
∀ai ∈ C1 ∀ai ∈ C2 ∀ai ∈ C3
∀aj ∈ Sr1 - Vi(gj) < 1/2 (?) Vi(gj) < 1/2 (?)
∀aj ∈ Sr2 Vi(gj) < εi(†) - Vi(gj) < 1/2 (‡)
?: Lemma 2.5.20 †: Lemma 2.5.29 ‡: Lemma 2.5.30
Table 2.3: Summary of value lemmas for the agents in Sri
1. For every agent ai in C1, Vi({bj}) < εi holds for all bj ∈ F (Observation 2.5.19).
2. For every agent ai in C2, Vi({bj}) < εi holds for all bj ∈ F (Observation 2.5.28).
3. For every agent ai in C3, there is at most one item bj ∈ F , such that Vi({bj}) ≥ 1/4
(Corollary 2.5.32).
In summary, items of F are small enough, therefore we can run a process similar
to the bag filling algorithm described earlier to allocate them to the agents. Recall that
our clustering and refinement methods preserve the conditions stated in Lemmas 2.5.15,
2.5.20, 2.5.27, 2.5.29 and 2.5.30. In addition to this, we state Lemma 2.5.33 as follows.
Lemma 2.5.33 (value-lemma) For every agent ai ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs3, we have
∀aj ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 Vj(fi) < 3/4.
Proof. At this point, for every agent ai ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs3, |fj| ≤ 2. If |fi| = 1 holds,
then according to Lemma 2.5.1, value of the item in fi is less than 3/4 to all other agents.
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Moreover, if |fi| = 2, then fi corresponds to a merged vertex. In this case, by Lemmas
2.5.23 and 2.5.24, value of fi is less than 3/4 to all other agents. 2
A brief summary of Lemmas 2.5.15, 2.5.20, 2.5.27, 2.5.29, 2.5.30 and 2.5.33 is
illustrated in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Moreover, since sets C1, C2 and Cs3 are cycle-envy-free,
Observation 2.5.13 holds for these sets.
2.5.3.2 Second Phase: bag filling
We begin this section with some definitions. In the following, we define the notion
of feasible subsets and, based on that, we define φ(S) for a feasible subset S of items.
Definition 2.5.34 A subset S of items in F is feasible, if at least one of the following
conditions are met:
• There exists an agent ai ∈ Cf3 such that Vi({S}) ≥ 1/2.
• There exists an agent ai ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs3 ∪ Cb3 such that Vi({S}) ≥ εi.
Definition 2.5.35 For a feasible set S, we define Φ(S) as the set of agents, that set S is
feasible for them.
Recall the notion of cycle-envy-freeness and the topological ordering of the agents
in a cycle-envy-free set of semi-satisfied agents. Based on this, we define a total order
≺pr to prioritize the agents in the bag filling algorithm.
Definition 2.5.36 Define a total order≺pr on the agents of C1∪C2∪C3 with the following
rules:
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• ai5 ≺pr ai1 ≺pr ai2 ≺pr ai3 ≺pr ai4 ∀ai1 ∈ C1, ai2 ∈ C2, ai3 ∈ Cs3, ai4 ∈
Cb3, ai5 ∈ Cf3
• ai ≺pr aj ⇔ ai ≺o aj ∀ai, aj ∈ C1∪C2∪Cs3, ai, aj in the same cluster
• ai ≺pr aj ⇔ i < j ∀ai, aj ∈ Cb3 ∨ ai, aj ∈ Cf3
Recall that ≺o refers to the topological ordering of a semi-satisfied set of agents.
Roughly speaking, for the semi-satisfied agents in the same cluster, ≺pr behaves in the
same way as≺o. Furthermore, for the agents in different clusters, agents in Cf3 , C1, C2, Cs3, Cb3
have a lower priority, respectively. Finally, the order of the agents in Cb3 and Cf3 is deter-
mined by their index, i.e., the agent with a lower index has a lower priority.
The second phase consists of several rounds and every round has two steps. Each
of these two steps is described below. We continue running this algorithm until F is no
longer feasible for any agent.
• Step1: In the first step, we run a process very similar to the bag filling algorithm
described in Section 2.1. That is, we find a feasible subset S ⊆ F , such that |S|
is minimal. Such a subset can easily be found, using a slight modification of the
bag filling process (see Section 2.5.5.2).
• Step2: In the second step, we choose an agent to allocate set S to him. In contrast to
the bag filling algorithm, we do not select an arbitrary agent. Instead, we select the
agent in Φ(S) with the lowest priority regarding≺pr, i.e., smallest element in Φ(S)
regarding ≺pr. Let ai be the selected agent. We consider three cases separately:
– ai ∈ Cf3 : temporarily allocate S to ai, i.e., set fi = S.
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– ai ∈ Cb3: let aj be the agent that Vi(fj) = 3/4− εj . Take back fj from aj and
allocate fj ∪ S to ai i.e. set fi = fj , fj = ∅ and gi = S. Remove ai from C3
and add it to S.
– ai ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs3: satisfy agent ai by S, i.e., set gi = S and remove ai from
its corresponding cluster and add it to S.
By the construction of Cs3, Cb3, and Cf3 , the above process may cause agents in C3 to
move in between Cs3, Cb3 and Cf3 . For example, if the first case happens, then ai is
moved from Cf3 to Cs3. In addition, all other agents in Cf3 for which S is feasible are
moved to Cb3. For the second case, aj is moved to one of Cf3 or Cb3, based on Vj(fk)
for every ak ∈ Cs3; that is, if there exists an agent ak ∈ Cs3 such that Vj(fk) ≥ 1/2,
aj is moved to Cb3. Otherwise, aj is moved to Cf3 . For both the second and the third
cases, some of the agents in Cb3 may move to Cf3 .
The second phase terminates, when F is no longer feasible for any agent. More details
about the second phase can be found in Algorithm 3. In Algorithm 3, we use Update(C3)
to refer the process of moving agents among Cs3, Cb3 and Cf3 .
In each round of the second phase, either an agent is satisfied or an agent in Cf3
becomes semi-satisfied. In Lemma 2.5.37, we show that if an agent ai ∈ Cf3 is selected
in some round of the second phase, then Vj(fi) is upper bounded by 2εj for every agent
aj ∈ C3 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs1 ∪ Cb1. As a consequence of Lemma 2.5.37, in Lemma 2.5.38 we show
that sets C1, C2 and C3 remain cycle-envy-free during the second phase. For convenience,
we use Rz to refer to the z’th round of the second phase.
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Algorithm 3: The Second Phase
Data: F , C1, C2, C3
1 while F is feasible do
2 S = a minimal feasible subset of F ;
3 ai = agent in Φ(S) with lowest order regarding ≺pr;
4 if ai ∈ Cf3 then
5 fi = S ;
6 Update(C3) ;
7 end
8 if ai ∈ Cb3 then
9 Let aj be the agent that Vi(fj) = 3/4− εi ;
10 fi = fj ;
11 gi = S ;
12 S = S ∪ ai ;
13 fj = ∅;
14 C3 = C3 \ ai ;
15 Update(C3) ;
16 end
17 if ai ∈ Cs3 then
18 gi = S;
19 S = S ∪ ai;
20 C3 = C3 \ ai ;
21 Update(C3) ;
22 end
23 if ai ∈ C1 ∪ C2 then
24 gi = S;
25 remove ai from its corresponding cluster ;
26 S = S ∪ ai;
27 end
28 end
Lemma 2.5.37 Let Rz be a round of the second phase that an agent ai ∈ Cf3 is selected.
Then, for every agent aj ∈ C3 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs1 ∪ Cb1, we have Vj(fi) < 2εj < 3/4.
Proof. According to Lemma 2.5.31, value of every pair of items in F is less than 1/2
to ai. Therefore, fi contains at least three items. Let bk be an arbitrary item in fi. Since
|fi| ≥ 3, fi \ {bk} is non-empty. On the other hand, S is minimal and hence, none of the
sets fi \ bk and {bk} is feasible for any agent. According to the definition of feasibility for
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the agents of C1 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs3 ∪ Cb3, we have
∀aj ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs3 ∪ Cb3 Vj(fi \ {bk}) < εj
and
∀aj ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs3 ∪ Cb3 Vj({bk}) < εj
which means
∀aj ∈ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ Cs3 ∪ Cb3 Vj(fi) < 2εj.
2
Lemma 2.5.38 During the second phase, the C1, C2 and Cs3 maintain the property of
cycle-envy-freeness.
Proof. The Lemma trivially holds for C1 and C2, since removing an agent from a cycle-
envy-free set preserves this property. For Cs3, there may be multiple rounds that an agent
is added to Cs3. We show that adding an agent to Cs3 preserves cycle-envy-freeness as well.
For the sake of contradiction, let Rz be the first round in which adding an agent ai
to Cs3 results in a set, that is no longer cycle-envy-free. Since Cs3 \ {ai} is cycle-envy-free,
every subset of Cs3 \{ai} contains at least one winner and one loser. Moreover, by Lemma
2.5.37 we have:
∀aj ∈ Cs3, j 6= i, Vj(fi) < 2εj. (2.8)
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Note that ai previously belonged to Cf3 . By definition of Cf3
∀aj ∈ Cs3, j 6= i, Vi(fj) < 1/2. (2.9)
Inequalities (2.8) and (2.9) together imply that ai is both a winner and a loser for
every subset of Cs3 that contains ai. This means that every subset of Cs3 contains at least
one winner and one loser, which is a contradiction.
2
Finally, for the rounds that an agents ai is satisfied, Lemmas 2.5.39 and 2.5.40 give
upper bounds on the value of gi for remaining agents in different clusters.
Lemma 2.5.39 (value-lemma) Let ai ∈ S be an agent that is satisfied in the second
phase. Then, for every other agent aj ∈ C1 ∪ C2 we have:
• If aj ≺pr ai, then Vj(gi) < εj .
• If ai ≺pr aj , then Vj(gi) < 2εj .
Proof.
If aj ≺pr ai, then gi is not feasible for aj , since the agent with the lowest priority
is satisfied in each round of the second phase. Thus, Vj(gi) < εj . For the case where
ai ≺pr aj , let bk be an arbitrary item of gi. According to the fact that gi is minimal,
gi \ {bk} is not feasible for any agent. Hence, Vj(gi \ {bk}) < εj . On the other hand, by
Observations 2.5.19 and 2.5.28, Vj({bk}) < εj . Therefore, Vj(gi) < 2εj . 2
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∀ai ∈ C1 ∀ai ∈ C2 ∀ai ∈ C3
∀aj ∈ Ss1 - Vi(gj) < 2εi(?) Vi(gj) < 1/2(†)
∀aj ∈ Ss2 Vi(gj) < εi(?) - Vi(gj) < 1/2(†)
∀aj ∈ S3 Vi(gj) < εi(?) Vi(gj) < εi(?) -
? : Lemma 2.5.39 †: Lemma 2.5.40
Table 2.4: Summary of value lemmas for gi
Lemma 2.5.40 (value-lemma) Let ai be an agent in Ss1 ∪ Ss2 . Then, for every agent
aj ∈ C3, we have Vj(gi) < 1/2.
Proof. Let Rz be the round, in which ai is satisfied. At that point, if aj ∈ Cf3 then
Vj(gi) < 1/2 trivially holds. Since in round Rz, aj ≺pr ai holds, gi was not feasible for
aj in the first place. Recall that in each round, the agent with lowest order in Φ(S) is
selected.
Furthermore, if in round Rz, aj was in Cs3∪Cb3, according to Observations 2.5.19 and
2.5.28, |S| ≥ 2, since no item alone can satisfy ai. If |S| = 2, then by Observation 2.5.31,
Vj(gi) < 1/2. For the case of |S| > 2, let bk be the item in S with the minimum value to
aj . According to Corollary 2.5.32, Vj({bk}) < 1/4. Also, since S is minimal, S \ {bk} is
not feasible for any agent and hence, Vj(S \ {bk}) < εj ≤ 1/4. Thus, Vj(S) < 1/2. 2
The results of Lemmas 2.5.39 and 2.5.40 are summarized in Table 2.4.
2.5.4 The Algorithm Finds a 3/4-MMS Allocation
In the rest of this section, we prove that the algorithm finds a 3/4-MMS allocation.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that the second phase is terminated, which means
F is not feasible anymore, but not all agents are satisfied. Such an unsatisfied agent
belongs to one of the Clusters C1 or C2, or C3. In Lemmas 2.5.41, 2.5.45, and 2.5.47, we
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separately rule out each of these possibilities. This implies that all the agents are satisfied
and contradicts the assumption. We begin with Cluster C3.
Lemma 2.5.41 At the end of the algorithm we have C3 = ∅.
To prove Lemma 2.5.41 we consider two cases separately. If C3 6= ∅, either there exists
an agent ai ∈ Cs3 ∪ Cb3 or all the agents of C3 are in Cf3 . If the former holds, we show
Cs3 is non-empty and assume ai is a winner of Cs3. We bound the total value of ai for all
the items dedicated to other agents and show the value of the remaining items in F is at
least εi for ai. This shows set F is feasible for ai and contradicts the termination of the
algorithm. In case all agents of C3 are in Cf3 , let ai be an arbitrary agent of Cf3 . With a
similar argument we show that the value of ai for the remaining unassigned items is at
least 3/4 and conclude that F is feasible for ai which again contradicts the termination of
the algorithm.
Before proceeding to the proof of Lemma 2.5.41, we show Lemmas (2.5.42, 2.5.43
and 2.5.44).
Lemma 2.5.42 Let ai be an agent in S3 and let Rz be the round of the second phase in
which ai is satisfied. Then, for any other agent aj that is in Cf3 in Rz, Vj(gi) < 1/2 holds.
Proof. In Rz, ai either belongs to Cs3 or Cb3. Thus, aj ≺pr ai, and thus gi is not feasible for
aj in that round. Therefore, Vj(gi) < 1/2. 2
Lemma 2.5.43 Let ai ∈ S3 be a satisfied agent and let Rz be the round in which ai is
satisfied. Then, for every other agent aj that belongs to Cs3 ∪ Cb3 in that round, either
Vj(gi) < εj or Vj(fi) ≤ 3/4− εj .
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Proof. If gi is not feasible for aj , then the condition trivially holds. Moreover, by the
definition, the statement is correct for the agents of Cb3. Therefore, it only suffices to
consider the case that aj ∈ Cs3 and gi is feasible for aj . Due to the priority rules for
satisfying the agents in the second phase, ai ≺pr aj and hence, ai cannot be in Cb3. Thus,
ai ∈ Cs3. According to Observation 2.5.13 and the fact that ≺pr is equivalent to ≺o for the
agents in Cs3, we have Vj(fi) ≤ 3/4− εj . 2
Lemma 2.5.44 During the second phase, for any agent ai in C3, we have:
∑
aj∈S3
Vi(fj ∪ gj) < |S3|+ 1/4.
Proof. To show Lemma 2.5.44, we show that for all the agents aj ∈ S3 except at most
one agent, Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 1 holds. To show this, let Rz be an arbitrary round of the second
phase, in which an agent aj ∈ C3 is satisfied. First, note that in Rz, aj belongs to Cs3 ∪ Cb3.
Also, in round Rz, ai belongs to one of Cs3, Cb3, or Cf3 .
If ai ∈ Cf3 , then by Lemma 2.5.42, Vi(gj) < 1/2 holds. On the other hand, by
definition, Vi(fj) < 1/2 and hence, Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 1.
Now, consider the case, where ai ∈ Cb3 ∪ Cs3. Note that by Lemma 2.5.43, either
Vi(fj) ≤ 3/4 − εi or Vi(gj) < εi. If Vi(gj) < εi, then by Lemmas 2.5.33 and 2.5.37, we
know Vi(fj) < 3/4 and hence, Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 3/4 + εi < 1.
For the case where Vi(fj) ≤ 3/4 − εi, let bl be the item in gj with the maximum
value to ai. By minimality of gj , gj \ {bl} is not feasible for any agent, including ai and
thus, Vi(gj \ {bl}) < εi. Recall that by Corollary 2.5.32, there is at most one item bk in
F , such that Vi(bk) ≥ 1/4. In addition to this, Vi(bk) < 1/2 trivially holds, since bk is not
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assigned to any agent during the clustering phase. If bl 6= bk, Vi(gj) < 1/4 + εi holds and
hence,
Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 3/4− εi + 1/4 + εi < 1.
Moreover, If bl = bk, Vi(gj) < 1/2+εi holds and thus, Vi(fj∪gj) < 3/4−εi+1/2+εi <
5/4. But, this can happen at most one round. Therefore, for all the agents aj ∈ S3 except
at most one, Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 1. Also, for at most one agent aj ∈ S3, Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 5/4.
Thus, ∑
aj∈S3
Vi(fj ∪ gj) < |S3|+ 1/4.
2
Proof of Lemma 2.5.41: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that C3 6= ∅. Note that,
by the definition of Cb3, if Cs3 = ∅ holds, then consequently Cb3 = ∅. Therefore, since
we have C3 = Cs3 ∪ Cb3 ∪ Cf3 , if C3 is non-empty, at least either of the two sets Cs3 or Cf3
is non-empty. In case Cs3 is non-empty, let ai be a winner of Cs3, otherwise let ai be an
arbitrary agent of Cf3 .
According to Lemma 2.5.40, for every agent aj ∈ Ss1 ∪ Ss2 , Vi(gj) < 1/2 holds.
Also, by Lemmas 2.5.20 and 2.5.30, for every agent aj ∈ Sr1 ∪Sr2 , we have Vi(gj) < 1/2.
Therefore,
∀aj ∈ S1 ∪ S2 Vi(gj) < 1/2.
Also, by Lemmas 2.5.15 and 2.5.27 we know that Vi(fj) < 1/2 for every aj ∈
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S1 ∪ S2. Thus, for every satisfied agent aj ∈ S1 ∪ S2, Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 1 holds, and hence
∑
aj∈S1∪S2
Vi(fj ∪ gj) < |S1 ∪ S2|. (2.10)
Moreover, by Lemma 2.5.44, the total value of items assigned to the agents in S3 to
ai is less than |S3|+ 1/4. More precisely,
∑
aj∈S3
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ |S3|+ 1/4. (2.11)
Inequality (5.5) along with Inequality (5.6) implies:
∑
aj∈S
Vi(fj ∪ gj) =
∑
aj∈S1∪S2




< |S1 ∪ S2|+ |S3|+ 1/4
= |S|+ 1/4
(2.12)
Recall that the total sum of the item values for ai is equal to n. In addition to this,
since every agent belongs to either of the Clusters C1, C2, C3, or S we have
|S|+ |C1|+ |C2|+ |C3| = n.
Furthermore, every item bj ∈ M either belongs to F or one of the sets fj′ and gj′ for an




























≥ n− (|S|+ 1/4)
= |C1|+ |C2|+ |C3| − 1/4
(2.13)
According to Lemmas 2.5.15 and 2.5.21,
∑
aj∈C1
Vi(fj) < 1/2|C1| (2.14)
and ∑
aj∈C2
Vi(fj) < 1/2|C2| (2.15)
hold. Inequalities (2.13), (2.14), and (2.15) together prove























Now, we consider two cases separately: (i) ai ∈ Cs3 and (ii) ai ∈ Cf3 .
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This combined with Inequality (2.16) concludes




≥ 1/2|C1|+ 1/2|C2|+ |C3| − 1/4− (3/4− εi)|Cs3|
≥ 1/2|C1|+ 1/2|C2|+ (1/4 + ε)|C3| − 1/4.
On the other hand, since ai ∈ Cs3, |C3| ≥ 1 and hence, Vi(F) ≥ 1/4 + εj − 1/4 = εj . This
means that F is feasible for ai, which contradicts the termination of the algorithm.




which by Inequality (2.16) implies:
Vi(F) > 1/2|Cs3|+ |Cb3|+ |Cf3 |+ 1/2|C2|+ 1/2|C1| − 1/4.
Since ai ∈ Cf3 , we have |Cf3 | ≥ 1 and hence, Vi(F) > 3/4. Again, this contradicts
the termination of the algorithm since F is feasible for ai. 2
Next, we prove a similar statement for C1.
Lemma 2.5.45 At the end of the algorithm we have C1 = ∅.
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Proof of Lemma 2.5.45 follows from a coloring argument. Let ai be a winner of C1. We
color all items in either blue or white. Roughly speaking, blue items are in a sense heavy,
i.e., they may have a high valuation to ai whereas white items are somewhat lighter and
have a low valuation to ai. Next, via a double counting argument, we show that ai’s value
for the items of F is at least εi and thus F is feasible for ai. This contradicts C1 = ∅ and
shows at the end of the algorithm all agents of C1 are satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 2.5.45: By Lemma 2.5.41, we already know C3 = ∅. Now, let ai be a
winner of the remaining agents in C1. For convenience, we color the items in either blue
or white. Intuitively, blue items may have a high value for ai whereas white items are
always of lower value to ai. Initially, all items are colored in white. For each aj ∈ N , if
|fj| = 1, then we color the item in fj in blue. Moreover, for every aj ∈ S, if |gj| = 1 and
Vi(gj) ≥ εi, then we color the item in gj in blue.
Now, let P = 〈P1, P2, . . . , Pn〉 be the optimal n-partitioning of the items in M
for ai, that is, the value of every partition Pk to ai is at least 1. Based on the coloring
procedure, we have three types of partitions in P:
• B2: the set of partitions with at least two blue items
• B1: the set of partitions with exactly one blue item
• B0: the set of partitions without any blue items
Note that every partition in P belongs to one of B0, B1 or B2. Hence,
|B0|+ |B1|+ |B2| = n (2.18)
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As declared, all the items in the partitions of B0 are white. The total value of these items





Vi(bj) ≥ 4εi|B0|. (2.19)
Also, each partition in B2 has at least two blue items, each of which is singly assigned to
another agent. We decompose the partitions of B1 into two disjoint sets, namely B̂1 and
B̃1. More precisely, let B̂1 be the partitions in B1, in which the blue item is worth more
than Vi(fi) to ai and B̃1 = B1 \ B̂1. As such, for each partition Pk ∈ B̃1, the white items
in Pk are worth at least
1− Vi(fi) = 1− (3/4− εi)
= 1/4 + εi
≥ 2εi
to ai. Therefore, ∑
Pk∈B̃1
Vi(W(Pk)) ≥ 2|B̃1|εi (2.20)
whereW(S) stands for the set of white items in a set S of items. On the other hand, since
the problem is 3/4-irreducible, by Lemma 2.5.1, no item alone is of worth 3/4 to ai and
thus for each partition Pk ∈ B̂1, the white items in Pk have a value of at least 1/4 ≥ εi to
ai. This implies that ∑
Pk∈B̂1
Vi(W(Pk)) ≥ |B̂1|εi. (2.21)
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≥ |B0|4εi + |B̂1|εi + |B̃1|2εi
≥ |B0|4εi + |B1|2εi − |B̂1|εi
≥ |B0|4εi + |B1|4εi + |B2|4εi − |B1|2εi − |B2|4εi − |B̂1|εi
= (2n− 2|B2| − |B1| − |B̂1|)2εi + (|B̂1|)εi
(2.22)
Note that the total value of white items that are assigned to the agents during the algorithm
is equal to Vi(W(M\F)). The rest of the white items are still in F . Thus, we have
Vi(W(M)) = Vi(W(M\F)) + Vi(F) (2.23)
Now, we provide an upper bound on the value of Vi(W(M \ F)). As a warm up, one
can trivially prove an upper bound of 2εi(2n − 1 − |B1| − 2|B2|) on Vi(W(M \ F)).
This follows from the fact that two sets of items are assigned to any agent and hence we
have a total of 2n disjoint sets. Among these 2n sets, at least one of them is empty (since
gi = ∅) and at least |B1| + 2|B2| of the sets contain a single blue item. On the other
hand, by Lemmas 2.5.23, 2.5.29, 2.5.37 and 2.5.39 every set with white items is of worth
at most 2εi to ai. Therefore, the total value of the white items inM\F to ai is less than
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2εi(2n− 1− |B1| − 2|B2|) and thus
Vi(W(M\F)) ≤ 2εi(2n− 1− |B1| − 2|B2|).
However, in order to complete the proof, we need a stronger upper bound on
Vi(W(M\F)). To this end, we provide the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2.5.46 Let aj be an agent such that |fj| = 1 and Vi(fj) > Vi(fi). Then, Vi(gj) <
εi.
Proof. First, note that if aj is not satisfied yet, then gj = ∅ and therefore Vi(gj) <
εi. Otherwise, we argue that agent aj is either satisfied in the second phase, or in the
refinement phases of C1 or C2.
Consider the case that aj is satisfied in the second phase. If aj ∈ Ss2 ∪ S3, then by
Lemma 2.5.39, Vi(gj) < ε holds. Also, if aj ∈ Ss1 , considering the fact that ai envies aj ,
ai ≺pr aj . Thus, by Lemma 2.5.39, we have Vi(gj) < εi.
Next, consider the case that aj is in Sr1∪Sr2 . Note that the matching of the refinement
phase of C1 preserves the property described in Lemma 2.5.17. Hence, if aj belongs to
Sr1 , then either aj ≺pr ai or there is no edge between yi and M1(yj) in G1, where M1(yj)
is the vertex matched with yj in M1. If aj ≺pr ai, according to Observation 2.5.13,
Vi(fj) ≤ 3/4 − εi holds. On the other hand, by the definition, if no edge exists between
yi and M1(yj) in G1, Vi(gj) < εi. In addition to this, if aj belongs to Sr2 , according
to Lemma 2.5.29, Vi(gj) < εi holds. Therefore, Lemma 2.5.46 holds for the agents in
Sr1 ∪ Sr2 .
2
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Note that since matching M of G1/2 for building Cluster C1 is MCMWM according
to condition (iii) of Lemma 2.5.14, there exists no agent ak, such that |gk| = 1 and
Vi(gk) > 3/4 − εi. Otherwise, by assigning the item in gj to ai instead of the item in fi,
we can increase the total weight of the matching, that contradicts the maximality of M .
According to Lemma 2.5.46, for all the agents aj with the property that fj is a blue
item that belongs to a partition in B̂1, Vi(gj) < εi holds. The number of such agents is at
least |B̂1|. Therefore, the total value of Vi(W(M\F)) is less than 2εi · (2n− 1− |B1| −
2|B2|− |B̂1|)+ εi · |B̂1|. Combining the bounds obtained in Observation 2.22 and Lemma




This contradicts the fact that the set F is not feasible for ai.
2
Finally, we show that all the agents in Cluster C2 are satisfied by the algorithm.
Lemma 2.5.47 At the end of the algorithm we have C2 = ∅.
The proof of Lemma 2.5.47 is a similar to both proofs of Lemmas 2.5.41 and 2.5.45.
Let ai be winner of Cluster C2. We consider two cases separately. (i) εi ≥ 1/8 and (ii)
εi < 1/8. In case εi ≥ 1/8, we use a similar argument to the proof of Lemma 2.5.41 and
show F is feasible for ai. If εi < 1/8 we again use a coloring argument, but this time we
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color the items with 4 different colors. Again, via a double counting argument we show
F is feasible for ai and hence every agent of C2 is satisfied when the algorithm terminates.
Proof of Lemma 2.5.47: Lemmas 2.5.41 and 2.5.45 state that at the end of the algorithm,
C1 = C3 = ∅. Now, let ai be a winner of C2. We consider two cases separately: εi ≥ 1/8
and εi < 1/8.
If εi ≥ 1/8, the proof follows from a similar argument we used to prove Lemma
2.5.45.
Lemma 2.5.48 If εi ≥ 1/8, then the following inequality holds:
∑
aj∈S
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ |S|+ 1/8.
Proof. We know S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3. For every agent aj in S3, by Lemmas 2.5.33 and
2.5.37, we know Vi(fj) < 3/4. Also, according to Lemma 2.5.39, Vi(gj) < εi ≤ 1/4.
Therefore, ∑
aj∈S3
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤
∑
aj∈S3
(3/4 + 1/4) = |S3|. (2.24)
Now, consider an agent aj ∈ S1. Note that by Lemma 2.5.15, Vi(fj) < 1/2. Also, remark
that either aj ∈ Sr1 or aj ∈ Ss1 . If aj ∈ Sr1 then according to Lemma 2.5.20, Vi(gj) < 1/2
holds and hence Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 1. Also, If aj ∈ Ss1 , then according to Lemma 2.5.39,
Vi(gj) < 2εi < 1/2. Thus, in both cases, Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 1 and hence:
∑
aj∈S1
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤
∑
aj∈S1
1 = |S1|. (2.25)
Finally consider a satisfied agent aj ∈ S2. Again, remark that either aj ∈ Sr2 or
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aj ∈ Ss2 holds.
Consider the case that aj ∈ Ss2 . If aj ≺pr ai, then by Observation 2.5.13, Vi(fj) ≤
3/4 − εi and by Lemma 2.5.39, Vi(gj) < 2εi ≤ 1/4 + εi which means Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 1.
Moreover, if ai ≺pr aj , according to Lemmas 2.5.33 and 2.5.39, Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 3/4 + εi ≤
1. Thus, we have:
∑
aj∈Ss2
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤
∑
aj∈Ss2
1 = |S1| (2.26)
It only remains to investigate the case where aj ∈ Sr2 . Note that since ai is not satisfied
in the refinement phase of C2, if ai ≺pr aj , then Vi(gj) < εi ≤ 1/4. Otherwise, we
could assign the item in gj to ai in the refinement phase of C2. Also, by Lemma 2.5.33,
Vi(fj) < 3/4 holds which yields Vi(fj ∪ gj) < 1.
Finally, if aj ≺pr ai, by Observation 2.5.13 Vi(fj) ≤ 3/4 − εi holds. Corollary
2.5.25 states that there is at most one item bk withMk ∈ X ′ \ X ′1/2 and Vi(bk) ≥ 3/8.
Also, note that since bk belongs to X ′ \ X ′1/2, Vi({bk}) < 1/2 holds. For agent aj , let bl
be the item that is assigned to aj in the refinement of C2, i.e., gj = {bl}. We have
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ 3/4− εi + Vi({bl}).
If bl 6= bk, Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ 3/4 − εi + 3/8 holds which by the fact that εi ≥ 1/8, implies
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ 3/4 − 1/8 + 3/8 ≤ 1. In addition to this, If bl = bk, Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ 3/4 −
1/8 + 4/8 ≤ 1 + 1/8. But this can happen for at most one agent. Thus, for every agent





Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ |Sr2 |+ 1/8. (2.27)
Inequality (2.27) together with Inequality (2.26) yields
∑
aj∈S2
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ |S2|+ 1/8. (2.28)
Furthermore, by Inequalities (2.24), (2.25) and (2.28) we have
∑
aj∈S
Vi(fj ∪ gj) =
∑
aj∈S1
Vi(fj ∪ gj) +
∑
aj∈S2








By Lemma 2.5.48, value of agent ai for the items assigned to the satisfied agents is
less than |S|+ 1/8. Recall that C2 = C3 = ∅ and hence |S| = n− |C2|. Therefore,
∑
aj∈S
Vi(fj ∪ gj) ≤ n− |C2|+ 1/8. (2.30)
Since ai is a winner of C2, for all aj ∈ C2, we have Vi(fj) ≤ Vi(fi). On the other hand,




























Also, Vi(fi) = 3/4− εi holds and Vi(fj) ≤ Vi(fi) for any aj ∈ C2 follows from the
fact that ai is a winner of C2. Therefore by Inequality (2.31) we have








= |C2| − 1/8− |C2|Vi(fi)
= |C2| − 1/8− |C2|(3/4− εi)
= |C2|(1/4 + εi)− 1/8.
Recall that by the assumption εi ≥ 1/8 holds. Moreover, εi ≤ 1/4, and thus
Vi(F) ≥ |C2|(1/4 + εi)− 1/8
≥ |C2|2εi − 1/8
≥ |C2|2εi − εi
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and since |C2| ≥ 1,
Vi(F) ≥ |C2|2εi − εi
≥ 2εi − εi
≥ εi
and thus F is feasible for ai. This contradicts the termination of the algorithm.
Next, we investigate the case where ε < 1/8. Our proof for this case is similar to





Lemma 2.5.21 states that the maxmin value of the agents in C2 ∪ C3 for the items in
M′ =M\Mr1 is at least 1. More precisely for every aj ∈ C2:
MMS
n−|Sr1 |
j (M\Mr1) ≥ 1 (2.32)
We color the items ofM′ in one of four colors blue, red, green, or white. Initially,
all the items are colored in white. For each agent aj ∈ N \ Sr1 , if |fj| = 1, then we color
the item in fj in blue. Also, if |fj| = 2 (which means fj is corresponding to a merged
vertex), color both the elements of fj in red. In addition to this, if |gj| = 1 then color the
item in gj in green. For any set S ⊆ M, we denote the subset of blue, red, green, and
white items in S by B(S),R(S), G(S), and W(S), respectively. Recall that by Lemma
2.5.24, every pair of items in red or green are worth less that 3/4 in total to ai. In other
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words,
Vi({bj, bk}) ≤ 3/4.
for any two different items bj, bk ∈ B(M) ∪ G(M). Also, according to Lemmas 2.5.39
and 2.5.37, every set including white items is worth less than 2εi < 1/4 to ai.
Now, let n′ = n − |Sr1 |. Let P = 〈P1, P2, . . . , Pn′〉 be the optimal n′−partitioning
ofM′ for ai. Recall that by Inequality (2.32) the value of every partition in P is at least 1
for ai. Based on the number of blue and red items in every partition, we define three sets
of partitions:
• B00 : Partitions with no red or blue items.
• B10 : Partitions with blue items, but without any red items.
• B01 : Partitions that contain at least one red item.
Next we prove Lemmas 2.5.49 and 2.5.50 to be used later in the proof.
Lemma 2.5.49 Let |G(B00)| be the number of green items in the partitions of B00. Then,
Vi(W(B00)) ≥ (3|B00| − |G(B00)|) · 1/4.

















Finally, we argue that the value of white items inB00 is at least |B000|+ |B100| ·1/2+ |B300| ·
1/4. This follows from the fact that every green item in Pk ∈ B100 has a value less than
1/2 and by Lemma 2.5.24, every pair of green items in Pk ∈ B200 are worth less than 3/4
to aj . According to the fact that the value of every partition Pk is at least 1, we have:





According to Equations (2.33) and (2.34), we have:
3|B00| − |G(B00)| ≤ 3|B000|+ 2|B100|+ |B200| ≤ 4|B000|+ 2|B100|+ |B200| (2.36)







Lemma 2.5.50 Vi(W(B10)) ≥ (2|B10| − |B(B10)| − |G(B10)|) · 1/4
Proof. First, note that every partition in B10 contains at least one blue item. Let Bw10 be
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the partitions in B10 that contains exactly one blue item and no green item. The other
items in each partition of Bw10, are white. Since the problem is 3/4-irreducible, the value
of every blue item to ai is less than 3/4 and therefore we have:
Vi(W(B10)) ≥ |Bw10| · 1/4
or
4Vi(W(B10)) ≥ |Bw10|. (2.38)
Moreover, let Bw̄10 = B10 \ Bw10. Since every partition in B10 contains at least one blue
item, every partition in Bw̄10 contains at least two items with colors blue or green. Thus,
we have:
|G(Bw̄10)|+ |B(Bw̄10)| ≥ 2|Bw̄10| (2.39)
Summing up Equations (2.38) and (2.39) results in
4Vi(W(B10)) + |G(Bw̄10)|+ |B(Bw̄10)| ≥ 2|Bw̄10|+ |Bw10|
which means:
4Vi(W(B10)) ≥ 2|Bw̄10| − |G(Bw̄10)| − |B(Bw̄10)|+ |Bw10|. (2.40)
Morover, we have |B(B10)| = |B(Bw10)|+ |B(Bw̄10)|. According to the fact that every
partition in Bw10 contains exactly one blue item, |B(Bw10)| = |Bw10| and hence, |B(B10)| =
88
|Bw10|+ |B(Bw̄10)|. By Equation (2.40), we have:
4Vi(W(B10)) ≥ 2|Bw̄10| − |G(Bw̄10)| − |B(B10)|+ |Bw10|+ |Bw10|.
Finally by the fact that 2|Bw10|+ 2|Bw̄10| = 2|B10|, we have:








For the partitions in B01, we construct a graph G01〈V01, E01〉, where every vertex
vj ∈ V01 corresponds to a partition Pj ∈ B01. Consider an agent aj such that fj consists
of a pair of red items bk, bk′ and let bk ∈ Pl and bk′ ∈ Pl′ . We add an edge (vl, vl′) to E01.
By the definition of B01, Pl, Pl′ ∈ B01 holds. Note that bk and bk′ might belong to the
same partition, i.e., Pl = Pl′ . In this case, we add a loop to G01. Furthermore, for every
item bk ∈ B(B01), we add a loop to the vertex vl, where bk ∈ Pl.
Next, define Rj as the set of partitions in B01, such that the degree of their corre-
sponding vertices in V01 are equal to j. In other words:
Pk ∈ Rj ⇐⇒ d(vk) = j
Next we prove Lemma 2.5.51.
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Lemma 2.5.51 For R1, we have:
Vi(W(R1)) ≥ (2|R1| − |G(R1)|) · 1/4
Proof. Consider a partition Pj ∈ R1. Since d(vj) = 1, Pj contains exactly one red item
and no blue item. Thus, other items in Pj are either green or white. We show that
|G(Pj)|+ 4.Vi(W(Pj)) ≥ 2. (2.41)
First, argue that if |G(Pj)| ≥ 2, then Inequality (2.41) holds. Also, if |G(Pj)| = 0, then
Vi(W(Pj)) ≥ 1/2, because the value of the red item in Pj is less than 1/2 (recall that all
the red items correspond to the vertices in X ′ \ X ′1/2). This immediately implies the fact
that 4.Vi(W(Pj)) ≥ 2. Finally, if |G(Pj)| = 1, then by Lemma 2.5.24, the total value of
the green and red items in Pj is less than 3/4 and hence, Vi(W(Pj)) ≥ 1/4 which means
|G(Pj)|+ 4.Vi(W(Pj)) ≥ 2.








|G(R1)|+ 4.Vi(W(R1)) ≥ 2|R1|
and hence,
Vi(W(R1)) ≥ (2|R1| − |G(R1)|) · 1/4
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Lemma 2.5.52 For R2, we have:
Vi(W(R2)) ≥ (|R2| − |G(R2)|) · 1/4
Proof. Let Pj be a partition in R2. First, we show the following inequality holds:
4Vi(W(Pj)) + |G(Pj)| ≥ 1 (2.42)
By the definition of R2, degree of vj is 2. Therefore, Pj contains two red items.
Note that the degree of the partitions in B01 that contain blue items is at least 3. Thus, Pj
contains no blue items. By Lemma 2.5.24, the total value of the red items in Pj is less
than 3/4. The rest of the items in Pj are either green or white. If Pj contains a green
item, then Inequality (2.42) holds. On the other hand, if Pj contains no green items, then
Vi(W(Pj)) ≥ 1/4 and hence, 4Vi(W(Pj)) ≥ 1. Therefore, Inequality (2.42) holds in
both cases.
Summing up Inequality (2.42) for all the partitions in R2, we have:
∑
Pj∈R2
4Vi(W(Pj)) + |G(Pj)| ≥ |R2|
which means:









Putting together Lemmas 2.5.49,2.5.50,2.5.51, and 2.5.52 we obtain the following
lower bound on the valuation of ai for all white items:





















(3|B00|+ 2|B10|+ 2|R1|+ |R2| − |B(B10)|)−
(
|G(B00)|









where |G(M′)| is the total number of green items.
The items in W(M′) are either allocated to an agent during the second phase, or
are still in F . LetW2 be the white items that are allocated to an agent during the second
phase. We have:
Vi(W(M′)) = Vi(W2) + Vi(F) (2.44)
Now, we present an upper bound on the value of Vi(W2). First, note that the number of
agents in S \ Sr1 is n′. Each of these n′ agents has two sets fj and gj , that leaves us 2n′
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sets. Since gi = ∅ we know that at least one of these sets is empty. Moreover, of all these
|G(M′)| sets contain a single green item and |B(B10)|+ |E01| of the sets contain either a
single blue item, or a pair of red items (recall that each edge of G01 refers to a blue item
or a pair of red items). Therefore, the number of the sets that contain only white items is
at most:
2n′ − 1− |G(M′)| − |B(B10)| − |E01|
By Lemmas 2.5.39 and 2.5.37, the value of every set with white items to ai is less
than 2εi < 1/4 and hence:
Vi(W2) ≤ (2n′ − 1− |G(M′)| − |B(B10)| − |E01|) · 1/4 (2.45)
Subtracting the lower bound obtained for Vi(W(M′)) in (2.43) from the upper bound for
Vi(W2) in (2.45) gives us a lower bound on the value of F :
Vi(F) = Vi(W(M′))− Vi(W2)
≥
(

























Next we provide Lemmas 2.5.53, 2.5.55, and 2.5.54 to complete the proof.
Lemma 2.5.53 |B00| ≥ |E01| − |B01|
Proof. First, note that |B00|+|B10|+|B01| = n′. Moreover we have |B(B10)|+|E01| ≤ n′.
To show this Lemma, note that each edge in G01 corresponds to the first set of an agent
in S \ Sr1 . Also, every blue item in B10 corresponds to the first set of an agent in S \ Sr1 .
Therefore, the total number of the agents must be more than this number. By the definition
of B10, we know that |B(B10)| ≥ |B10|. Therefore, we have:




|B00| ≥ |E01| − |B01|
2
Lemma 2.5.54 |E01| ≥ 3/2
∑










≥ 3/2∑j≥3 |Rj|+ |R2|+ |R1|/2. 2














|Rj|+ |R2|+ |R1|/2− |B01| (2.48)
Also, since there is a one-to-one correspondence between B01 and V01, |B01| = |V01|

















By applying Lemmas 2.5.55 and 2.5.54 to Inequality (2.46) we have:
Vi(F) =
(

























j≥3 2|Rj|+ 2|R2|+ 2|R1| = 2|V01| = 2|B01|. This, together with the
95
fact that |B00| + |B01| + |B10| = n′, yields Vi(F) ≥ (2n′ − 2n′ + 1) · 1/4. This means
Vi(F) ≥ 1/4 which is a contradiction since F is feasible for ai. 2
Theorem 2.5.56 All the agents are satisfied before the termination of the algorithm.
Proof. By Lemmas 2.5.41, 2.5.45, and 2.5.47, at the end of the algorithm all agents are
satisfied which means each has received a subset of items which is worth at least 3/4 to
him. 2
2.5.5 Algorithm
In this section, we present a polynomial time algorithm to find a (3/4 − ε)-MMS
allocation in the additive setting. More precisely, we show that our method for proving
the existence of a 3/4-MMS allocation can be used to find such an allocation in polyno-
mial time. Recall that our algorithm consists of two main phases: The clustering phase
and the bag filling phase. In Sections 2.5.5.1 and 2.5.5.2 we separately explain how to
implement each phase of the algorithm in polynomial time. Given this, there are still
a few computational issues that need to be resolved. First, in the existential proof, we
assume MMSi = 1 for every agent ai ∈ N . Second, we assume that the problem is 3/4-
irreducible. Both of these assumptions are without loss of generality for the existential
proof due to Observation 2.2.2 and the fact that one can scale the valuation functions to
ensure MMSi = 1 for every agent ai. However, the computational aspect of the problem
will be affected by these assumptions. The first issue can be alleviated by incurring an ad-
ditional 1 + ε factor to the approximation guarantee. Epstein and Levin [34] show that for
a given additive function f , MMSnf can be approximated within a factor 1 + ε for constant
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ε in time poly(n). Thus, we can scale the valuation functions to ensure MMSi = 1 while
losing a factor of at most 1 + ε. Therefore, finding a (3/4 − ε)-MMS allocation can be
done in polynomial time if the problem is 3/4-irreducible. Finally, in Section 2.5.5.3 we
show how to reduce the 3/4-reducible instances and extend the algorithm to all instances
of the problem. The algorithm along with the reduction yields Theorem 2.5.57
Theorem 2.5.57 For any ε > 0, there exists an algorithm that finds a (3/4 − ε)-MMS
allocation in polynomial time.
2.5.5.1 The Clustering Phase
Recall that in the clustering phase we cluster the agents into three sets C1,C2, and C3.
In order to build Cluster C1, we find an MCMWM of the 1/2-filtering of the value graph.
This can be trivially done in polynomial time since finding an MCMWM is polynomially
tractable [35]. However, the refinement phase of Cluster C1 requires finding FG(X ,M)
for a giving graph G and a matching M . In what follows, we show this problem can also
be solved in polynomial time.
Notice that finding an MCMWM of G can be done in polynomial time [35]. There-
fore, in order to determine FH(M, X̂ ), it only suffices to find the vertices of X̂ that are
reachable from the unmatched vertices of Ŷ by an alternating path. Let X̂ be the set of
these vertices. We can find X̂ using a depth-first-search from the unmatched vertices of
Ŷ . By definition, FH(M, X̂ ) = Ŷ \ X̂ . Therefore, FH(M, X̂ ) can be found in polynomial
time.
In addition to FG(X ,M), we also need to find a matching of the graph which sat-
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isfies the conditions of Lemma 2.5.17. We show in the following that this problem also
can be solved in polynomial time. First, note that in Lemma 2.5.18 we prove that G1 has
a matching that saturates all the vertices of W1. Now, let pak be the position of ak in the
topological ordering of C1, as described in the proof of Lemma 2.5.17. Furthermore, Let




Recall that in the proof Lemma 2.5.17, we show that M1 satisfies the condition described
in Lemma 2.5.17. Here, we show that M1 can be found in polynomial time. To this end,
we model this with a network design problem.
Orient every edge (xj, yi) ∈ G1 from yi to xj and set the cost of this edge to pai .
Also, add a source node s and add a directed edge from s to every vertex of VC1 with cost
0. Furthermore, add a sink node t and add directed edges from the vertices of W1 to t
with cost 0. Finally, set the capacity of all edges to 1.
One can observe that in a minimum cost maximum flow from s to t in this network,
the edges with non-zero flow between VC1 and W1 form a maximum matching M1. In ad-
dition to this, since the cost of the flow is minimal,
∑
(xj ,yi)∈M1 cost(xj, yi) is minimized.
Therefore, in this matching,
∑
(xj ,yi)∈M1 pi is minimized. Thus, the matching with desired
properties of Lemma 2.5.17 can be found in polynomial time.
The same algorithms can be used to compute Cluster C2. Finally, we put the rest of
the agents in Cluster C3.
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2.5.5.2 The bag filling Phase
In each round of the second phase, we iteratively find a minimal feasible subset of
F and allocate its items to the agent with the lowest priority in Φ(S). Note that for a
feasible set S, one can trivially find the agent with lowest priority in Φ(S) in polynomial
time. Thus, it only remains to show that we can find a minimal feasible subset of F in
polynomial time.
Consider the following algorithm, namely reverse bag filling algorithm: Start with
a bag containing all the items of F and so long as there exists an item bj in the bag such
that after removing bj , the set of items in the bag is still feasible, remove bj from the bag.
After this process, the remaining items in the bag form a minimally feasible subset of F .
Therefore, this phase can be run in polynomial time.
2.5.5.3 Reducibility
The most challenging part of our algorithm is dealing with the 3/4-irreducibility
assumption. The catch is that, in order to run the algorithm, we don’t necessarily need the
3/4-irreducibility assumption. Recall that we leverage the following three consequences
of irreducibility to prove the existential theorem.
• The value of every item inM is less that 3/4 to every agent.
• Every pair of items in X ′′ \ X ′′1/2 is in total worth less than 3/4 to any agent.
• The condition of Lemma 2.5.18 holds.
Therefore, the algorithm works so long as the mentioned conditions hold. Note that,
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although it is not clear whether determining if an instance of the problem is 3/4-reducible
is polynomially tractable, all of the above conditions can be validated in polynomial time.
This is trivial for the first two conditions; we iterate over all items or pairs of items and
check if the condition holds for these items. The last condition, however, is harder to
validate.
The condition of Lemma 2.5.18 holds if for all S ⊆ W1, |N(S)| > |S|. Recall
that in the proof of Lemma 2.5.18 we showed that if this condition does not hold, then
FG1(M,X ) is non-empty. Next, we showed that if FG1(M,X ) is non-empty, then we can
reduce the problem via satisfying every agents of FG1(M,X ) by his matched item in M .
Therefore, on the computational side, we only need to find whether FG1(M,X ) is empty
which indeed can be determined in polynomial time.
Note that every time we reduce the problem, |N | is decreased by at least 1, which
implies the number of times we reduce the problem is no more than n. Moreover, our re-
duction takes a polynomial time. Thus, the running time of the algorithm is polynomial.
2.6 Submodular Agents
Previous work on the fair allocation problem was limited to the additive agents [12,
2]. In real-world, however, valuation functions are usually more complex than additive
ones. As an example, imagine an agent is interested in at most k items. More precisely, he
is indifferent between receiving k items or more than k items. Such a valuation function
is called k-demand and cannot be modeled by additive functions. k-demand functions are
a subclass of submodular set functions which have been extensively studied the literature
100
of different contexts, e.g., optimization, mechanism design, and game theory [36, 37, 38,
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 30].
In this section, we study the fair allocation problem where the valuations of agents
are submodular. We begin by presenting an impossibility result; We show in Section
2.6.1 that the best guarantee that we can achieve for submodular agents is upper bounded
by 3/4. Next, we give a proof to the existence of a 1/3-MMS allocation in this setting.
This is followed by an algorithm that finds such an allocation in polynomial time. This is
surprising since even finding the MMS of a submodular function is NP-hard and cannot
be implemented in polynomial time unless P=NP [34]. In our algorithm, we assume we
have access to query oracle for the valuation of agents; That is, for any set S and any
agent ai, Vi(S) can be computed via a given query oracle in time O(1).
2.6.1 Upper Bound
We begin by providing an upper bound. In this section, we show for some instances
of the problem with submodular agents, no allocation can be better than 3/4-MMS. Our
counter-example is generic; We show this result for any number of agents.
Theorem 2.6.1 For any n ≥ 2, there exists an instance of the fair allocation problem
with n submodular agents where no allocation is better than 3/4-MMS.
Proof. We construct an instance of the problem that does not admit any 3/4 + ε-MMS
allocation. To this end, let n be the number of agents andM = {b1, b2, . . . , bm} where




0, if |S| = ∅
1, if |S| = 1
2, if |S| > 2
2, if S = {b2i, b2i+1} for some i
3/2, if |S| = 2 and S 6= {b2i, b2i+1} for any i.
Notice that MMSnf = 2. Moreover, in what follows we show that f is submodular.
To this end, suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exist sets S and S ′ such that
S ⊆ S ′ and for some element bi we have:
f(S ′ ∪ {bi})− f(S ′) > f(S ∪ {bi})− f(S). (2.51)
Since f is monotone and S ′ 6= S, f(S ′∪{bi})− f(S ′) > 0 holds and thus S ′ cannot have
more than two items. Therefore, S ′ contains at most two items and thus S is either empty
or contains a single element. If S is empty, then adding every element to S has the highest
increase in the value of S and thus Inequality (2.51) doesn’t hold. Therefore, S contains
a single element and S ′ contains exactly two elements. Thus, f(S) = 1 and f(S ′) ≥ 3/2.
Therefore, f(S ∪{bi})− f(S) ≥ 1/2 and f(S ′ ∪ {bi})− f(S ′) ≤ 1/2 which contradicts
Inequality (2.51).
Now, for agents a1, a2, . . . , an−1 we set Vi = f and for agent an we set Vn =
f(inc(S)) where bi is in inc(S) if and only if either i > 1 and bi−1 ∈ S or i = 1 and
bm ∈ S.
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The crux of the argument is that for any allocation of the items to the agents, some-
one receives a value of at most 3/2. In case an agent receives fewer than two items, his
valuation for his items would be at most 1. Similarly, if an agent receives more than two
items, someone has to receive fewer than 2 items and the proof is complete. Therefore,
the only case to investigate is where everybody receives exactly two items. We show in
such cases, minVi(Ai) = 3/2 for all possible allocations. If all agents a1, a2, . . . , an−1
receive two items whose value for them is exactly equal to 2, then by the construction of
f , the value of the remaining items is also equal to 2 to them. Thus, an’s valuation for the
items he receives is equal to 3/2. 2
Remark that one could replace function f with an XOS function
g(S) =

0, if |S| = ∅
1, if |S| = 1
2, if |S| > 2
2, if S = {b2i, b2i+1} for some i
1, if |S| = 2 and S 6= {b2i, b2i+1} for any i.
and make the same argument to achieve a 1/2-MMS upper bound for XOS and subaddi-
tive agents.
Theorem 2.6.2 For any n > 1, there exists an instance of the fair allocation problem
with n XOS agents where no allocation is better than 1/2-MMS.
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2.6.2 Existential Proof
In this section we provide an existential proof to a 1/3-MMS allocation. Due to the
algorithmic nature of the proof, we show in Section 2.6.3 that such an allocation can be
computed in time poly(n,m). For simplicity, we scale the valuation functions to ensure
MMSi = 1 for every agent ai.
We begin by introducing the ceiling functions.
Definition 2.6.3 Given a set function f(.), we define fx(.) as follows:
fx(S) =

f(S), if f(S) ≤ x
x, if f(S) > x.
A nice property of the ceiling functions is that they preserve submodularity, fractionally
subadditivity, and sub-additivity.
Lemma 2.6.4 For any real number x ≥ 0, we have:
1. Given a submodular set function f(.), fx(.) is submodular.
2. Given an XOS set function f(.), fx(.) is XOS.
3. Given an subadditive set function f(.), fx(.) is also subadditive.
Observation 2.6.5 fx(S) ≤ x for every given S.
Observation 2.6.6 fx(S) ≤ f(S) for every given S.
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Proof Of Lemma 2.6.4:
First Claim: By definition of submodular functions, for given sets A and B we have:
f(A ∪B) ≤ f(A) + f(B)− f(A ∩B)
We prove that fx(.) is a submodular function in three different cases:
First Case: Let both f(A) and f(B) be at least x. According to Observation 2.6.5,
fx(A ∪B) and fx(A ∩B) are bounded by x. Therefore, fx(A ∪B) + fx(A ∩B) ≤ 2x,
which yields:
fx(A ∪B) + fx(A ∩B) ≤ fx(A) + fx(B)
Second Case: In this case one of f(A) and f(B) is at least x. We have f(A∪B) ≥ x
and f(A∩B) is no more than max {f(A), f(B)}. As a result fx(A∪B) and one of fx(A)
or fx(B) are equal to x which yields:
fx(A ∪B) + fx(A ∩B) ≤ fx(A) + fx(B)
Third Case: In this case both f(A) and f(B) are less than x, and f(A ∩ B) is less
than x too. Since fx(A) = f(A), fx(B) = f(B), fx(A ∩ B) = f(A ∩ B), according to
Observation 2.6.6, fx(A ∪ B) ≤ f(A ∪ B) holds. Since f(.) is a submodular function,
we conclude that:
fx(A ∪B) ≤ fx(A) + fx(B)− fx(A ∩B).
105
Second Claim: Since f(.) is an XOS set function, by definition, there exists a finite set






for any set S ⊆ ground(f). With that in hand, for a given real number x, we define an
XOS set function g(.), and show g(.) is equal to fx(.).
We define g(.) on the same domain as f(.). Moreover, based on {f1, f2, . . . , fα}, we
define a finite set of additive functions {g1, g2, . . . , gβ} that describe g. More precisely,
for each set S in domain of f(.) we define a new additive function like gγ in g(.) as
follows: Without loss of generality let fδ be the function which maximizes f(S). For
each bi /∈ S let gγ(bi) = 0. Furthermore, for each bi ∈ S if f(S) ≤ x let gγ(bi) = fδ(bi),
and otherwise let gγ(bi) = xf(S)fδ(bi).
We claim that g(.) is equivalent to fx(.), which implies fx(.) is an XOS function.
g(.) and fx(.) are two functions which have equal domains. First, we prove that g(S) ≤
f(S) for any given set S. According to construction of g(.), for each additive function in
g(.) such gγ , there is at least one additive function in f(.) such fδ where gγ(bi) ≤ fδ(bi)
for each bi ∈M. Therefore, for any given set S we have:
g(S) ≤ f(S) (2.52)
Now, according to the construction of g(.), for any given set S where f(S) ≤ x, we have
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a function gγ(S) = f(S), and where f(S) > x, we have a function gγ(S) = x. Therefore,
we can conclude that:
g(S) ≥ fx(S) (2.53)
For any given set S where f(S) ≤ x, according to the definition of fx(.), f(S) =
fx(S), and using Inequalities (2.52) and (2.53) we argue that fx(S) = g(S). Moreover,
according to the construction of g(.), g(S) ≤ x for any given set S. Therefore, for any
given set S where f(S) > x, according to the definition of fx(.) and Inequality (2.53),
fx(S) = g(S) = x. As a result, by considering these two cases we argue that fx(.) and
g(.) are equivalent, which shows fx(.) is an XOS function.
Third Claim: In this claim, we use a similar argument to the first claim. By definition of
subadditive functions for any given sets A and B, we have:
f(A ∪B) ≤ f(A) + f(B)
We prove that fx(.) meets the definition of subadditive functions by considering two dif-
ferent cases. In the first case at least one of f(A) and f(B) is at least x, and in the second
case both f(A) and f(B) is less than x.
First Case: In this case fx(A) + fx(B) is at least x, and since fx(S) ≤ x for any
given set S, fx(A ∪B) ≤ x. Therefore,
fx(A ∪B) ≤ fx(A) + fx(B)
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Second Case: Since fx(A ∪ B) ≤ f(A ∪ B), f(A ∪ B) ≤ f(A) + f(B), f(A) =
fx(A), and f(B) = fx(B), we have:
fx(A ∪B) ≤ fx(A) + fx(B)
2
The idea behind the existence of a 1/3-MMS allocation is simple: Suppose the
problem is 1/3-irreducible and let A = 〈A1, A2, . . . , An〉 be an allocation of items to the






We refer to Expression (2.54) by ex(2/3)(A). We prove Vi(Ai) ≥ 1/3 for every agent
ai ∈ N . By the reducibility principal, it only suffices to show every 1/3-irreducible
instance of the problem admits a 1/3-MMS allocation. The main ingredients of the proof
are Lemmas 2.5.1, 2.6.7 and 2.6.8.
Lemma 2.6.7 Let S1, S2, . . . , Sk be k disjoint sets and f1, f2, . . . , fk be k submodular
functions. We remove an element e from
⋃
Si uniformly at random to obtain sets S∗1 =










The high-level intuition behind the proof of Lemma 2.6.7 is as follows: For sub-
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modular functions, the smaller the size of a set is, the higher the marginal values for
adding items to that set will be. Based on that, we show the summation of marginal
decreases for removing each element is bounded by the total value of the set and that
completes the proof.
Proof Of Lemma 2.6.7: Since f(.) is submodular, according to the definition of submod-
ular functions, for every given sets X and Y in domain of f(.) with X ⊆ Y and every
x ∈M \ Y we have:
f(X ∪ {x})− f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪ {x})− f(Y ) (2.55)
Let Si = {e1, e2, . . . , eα}, T0 = ∅, and Tj = {e1, e2, . . . , ej}, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ α.




fi(Si \ Tj−1)− fi(Si \ Tj) ≥
∑
1≤j≤α
fi(Si)− fi(Si − ej) (2.56)
Since fi(Si) =
∑
1≤j≤α fi(Si \Tj−1)−fi(Si \Tj), we can rewrite Inequality (2.56)




fi(Si)− fi(Si − e) (2.57)
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For every 1 ≤ i ≤ k we can rewrite Inequality (2.57) as follows:
∑
e∈si
fi(Si − e) ≥ (|Si| − 1)fi(Si) (2.58)
By adding (|⋃Si| − |Si|)fi(Si) to the both sides of Inequality (2.58), we have:
(|
⋃
Si| − |Si|)fi(Si) +
∑
e∈Si










Since Inequality (2.59) holds for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we can sum up both sides of












Si| − 1)fi(Si) (2.60)






















Lemma 2.6.8 Let f be a submodular function and S1, S2, . . . , Sk be k disjoint sets such
that f(Si) ≥ 1 for every set Si. Moreover, let S ⊆
⋃
Si be a set such that f(S) < 1/3. If
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we pick an element {e} of ⋃Si \ S uniformly at random, we have:
E[f(S ∪ {e})− f(S)] ≥ 2k/3|⋃Si \ S| .
The proof of Lemma 2.6.8 is very similar to that of Lemma 2.6.7. The main point is that
in submodular functions, the marginal increase decreases as the sizes of sets grow.
Proof Of Lemma 2.6.8: Similar to the proof of Lemma 2.6.7, we use Inequality (2.55)
as a definition of submodular functions. Let S ′i = Si \ S = {e1, e2, . . . , eα}, T0 = S, and
Tj = S ∪ {e1, e2, . . . , ej} for 1 ≤ j ≤ α. According to f(S) < 1/3, f(S ∪ S ′i) ≥ 1, and
Inequality (2.55) as a definition of sub-modular functions, we have:








f(S ∪ {e})− f(S)
(2.62)
Similar to Inequality (2.60), we can rewrite Inequality (2.62) with a summation,






f(S ∪ {e})− f(S) (2.63)
By dividing both sides of Inequality (2.63) over 1/|⋃Si \ S| we have:
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2k/3




f(S ∪ {e})− f(S))
= E[f(S ∪ {e})− f(S)]
(2.64)
2
Next, we show the fair allocation problem with submodular agents admits a 1/3-
MMS allocation3.
Theorem 2.6.9 The fair allocation problem with submodular agents admits a 1/3-MMS
allocation.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2.2, the problem boils down to the case of 1/3-irreducible instances.
Let the problem be 1/3-irreducible and A be an allocation that maximizes ex(2/3). Sup-
pose for the sake of contradiction that Vi(Ai) < 1/3 for some agent ai. In this case we




Aj \ {br}, if i 6= j
Aj ∪ {br} if i = j.
In the rest we show E[ex(2/3)(Ar)] > ex(2/3)(A) which contradicts the maximality
3Almost one year after the first draft of our work, the existense of a 1/10-MMS allocation in the sub-
modular case along with an algorithm to find a 1/31 approximation algorithm for the submodular case is
also proved in [19]. They also study the problem in the additive setting and present another 2/3-MMS
algorithm. This work is completely parallel to and independent of our paper. Moreover, their analysis is
fundamentally different from our analysis and also their bounds are looser.
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|M \ Ai| − 1
|M \ Ai|
. (2.65)
Moreover, by Lemma 2.6.8 we have






























































|M \ Ai| − 1
|M \ Ai|






Recall that by Lemma 2.5.1, the value of agent ai for any item alone is bounded by 1/3 and
thus E[Vi(Ari )− Vi(Ai)] = E[V 2/3i (Ari )− V 2/3i (Ai)]. Notice that by the definition, V (2/3)j
is always bounded by 2/3 and also Vi(Ai) < 1/3, therefore, ex(2/3)(A) ≤ 2n/3 − 1/3
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and thus




≥ ex(2/3)(A) + 1/3|M \ Ai|




In this section we give an algorithm to find a 1/3-MMS allocation for submodular
agents. We show our algorithm runs in time poly(n,m).
For simplicity, we assume for every agent ai, MMSi is given as input to the algo-
rithm. However, computing MMSi alone is an NP-hard problem. That said, we show in
Section 2.7.2.2 that such a computational barrier can be lifted by a combinatorial trick.
We refer the reader to Section 2.7.2.2 for a more detailed discussion. The procedure is
illustrated in Algorithm 4: Based on Theorem 2.6.9, one can show that in every iteration
of the algorithm value of ex2/3(A) is increased by at least 1/3m. Moreover, such an el-
ement be can be easily found by iterating over all items in time O(m). Furthermore, the
number of iterations of the algorithm is bounded by 2nm, since ex2/3(A) is bounded by
2n/3. Therefore, Algorithm 4 finds a 1/3-MMS allocation in time poly(n,m).
Theorem 2.6.10 Given access to query oracles, one can find a 1/3-MMS allocation for
submodular agents in polynomial time.
As a corollary of Theorem 2.6.10, one can show that the problem of finding the
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Algorithm 4: Finding a 1/3-MMS allocation for submodular agents
Data: N ,M, 〈V1, V2, . . . , Vn〉, 〈MMS1,MMS2, . . . ,MMSn〉
1 For every aj , scale Vj to ensure MMSj = 1;
2 while there exist an agent ai and an item bj such that Vi({bj}) ≥ 1/3 do
3 Allocate {bj} to ai;
4 M =M\ bj;
5 N = N \ ai;
6 end
7 A = an arbitrary allocation of the items to the agents;
8 while minV 2/3j (Aj) < 1/3 do
9 i = the agent who receives the lowest value in allocation A;
10 Find an item be such that:
ex(〈A1\{be}, A2\{be}, . . . , Ai−1\{be}, Ai∪{be}, Ai+1\{be}, . . . , An\{be}〉) ≥
ex(A) + 1/3m;
11 A = 〈A1\{be}, A2\{be}, . . . , Ai−1\{be}, Ai∪{be}, Ai+1\{be}, . . . , An\{be}〉;
12 end
13 For every ai ∈ N allocate Ai to ai;
maxmin value of a submodular function admits a 3 approximation algorithm.
Corollary 2.6.11 For a given submodular function f , we can in polynomial time split the
elements of ground set into n dijsoint sets S1, S2, . . . , Sn such that
f(Si) ≥ MMSnf/3
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2.7 XOS Agents
Class of fractionally subadditive (XOS) set functions is a super class of submodular
functions. These functions too, have been subject of many studies in recent years [44, 45,
26, 46, 47, 48, 49, 29, 50]. Similar to sub-modular functions, in this section we show a
1/5-MMS allocation is possible when all agents have XOS valuations. Furthermore, we
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complement our proof by providing a polynomial algorithm to find a 1/8-MMS allocation
in Section 2.7.2.
2.7.1 Existential Proof
In this section we show every instance of the fair allocation problem with XOS
agents admits a 1/5-MMS allocation. Without loss of generality, we assume MMSi = 1
for every agent ai. Recall the definition of ceiling functions.
Definition 2.7.1 Given a set function f(.), we define fx(.) as follows:
fx(S) =

f(S), if f(S) ≤ x
x, if f(S) > x.
As stated in Lemma 2.6.4, for every XOS function and every real number x ≥ 0, fx
is also XOS. The proof of this section is similar to the result of Section 4. However, the
details are different since XOS functions do not adhere to the nice structure of submodular







Now Let A = 〈A1, A2, . . . , An〉 be an allocation of items to the agents that max-
imizes ex2/5. Provided that the problem is 1/5-irreducible, we show A is a 1/5-MMS
allocation. Before we proceed to the main proof, we state Lemmas 2.7.2, and 2.7.3 as
auxiliary observations.
116
Lemma 2.7.2 Let f(.) be an XOS set function and f(S) = β for a set S ⊆ ground(f). If




f(S)− f(S \ Si)
)
≤ f(S).
Roughly speaking, the proof follows from the fact that for at least one of the additive set
functions in the representation of f , we have gj(S) = β. The rest of the proof is trivial by
the additive properties of gj .
Proof of Lemma 2.7.2: According to the definition of XOS function, f(.) is an XOS
function with a finite set of additive functions {g1, g2, . . . , gα}where f(S) = maxαi=1 gi(S)
for any set S ∈ ground(f). Let gj(.) be the additive function which maximizes S. Let
gj(S1) = α1, gj(S2) = α2, . . . , gj(Sk) = αk, which yields β =
∑
αi. Since gj(Si) = αi,
f(S \ Si) ≥ β − αi. Therefore, we have:
∑
f(S)− f(S \ Si) ≤
∑





By Lemma 2.5.1, we know that in every 1/5-irreducible instance of the problem,
the value of every item for a person is bounded by 1/5.
For XOS functions, we again, leverage the reducibility principal to show another
important property of the 1/5-irreducible instances of the problem.
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Lemma 2.7.3 In a 1/5-irreducible instance of the problem, for a given agent ai we can
divide the items into 2n sets S1, S2, . . . , S2n such that
Vi(Si) ≥ 2/5
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Proof. According to the definition of MMS, we know that ai can divide items to n sets
P = 〈P1, P2, . . . , Pn〉 such that Vi(Pj) ≥ 1 for any Pj . The catch is that ai can divide
each of these n sets to two disjoint sets such that the value of each of these new sets
be at least 2/5 to him. Let T = {b1, b2, . . . , bγ} be one of these n sets, and gj(.) be an
additive function which maximizes Vi(T ). Let Tk = {b1, b2, . . . , bk} for any 1 ≤ k ≤ γ.
According to Lemma 2.5.1, since the problem is 1/5-irreducible, the value of any item is
less than 1/5 to ai. Therefore, there is a set Tk among T1 to Tγ where 2/5 ≤ gj(Tk) < 3/5.
Since gj(.) is one of additive functions of XOS function Vi, we have Vi(Tk) ≥ 2/5.
Moreover, since gj(Tk) < 3/5, gj(T \ Tk) ≥ 2/5, which yields Vi(T \ Tk) ≥ 2/5. As a
conclusion, we can divide each of n sets to two disjoint sets with at least 2/5 value to ai.
2
We first apply Lemma 2.5.1 and show in such instances of the problem the valuation
of every agent for every item is bounded by 1/5. We remark that for every agent ai, one
can split the items into n partitions such that each partition is worth at least 1 to ai.
Combining the two observations, we conclude that such a decomposition is possible for
every agent ai. Next we prove the main theorem of this section.
118
Theorem 2.7.4 The fair allocation problem with XOS agents admits a 1/5-MMS alloca-
tion.
Proof. Similar to what we did in Section 2.5, we only prove this for 1/5-irreducible
instances of the problem. By Observation 2.2.2, we can extend this result to all instances
of the problem.
Consider an allocationA = 〈A1, A2, . . . , An〉 of items to the agents that maximizes
ex2/5. We show that such an allocation is 1/5-MMS. Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that there exists an agent ai who receives a set of items which are together of worth less
than 1/5 to him. More precisely,
V
2/5
i (Ai) = Vi(Ai) < 1/5.
Since the problem is 1/5-irreducible, by Lemma 2.7.3, we can divide the items into 2n
sets S1, S2, . . . , S2n such that Vi(Sj) ≥ 2/5 for every 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n. Note that in this case,
V
2/5
i (Sj) = 2/5 follows from the definition. Moreover by monotonicity, V
2/5
i (Sj ∪Ai) =
2/5 holds for every j.
Now consider 2n allocations A1,A2, . . . ,A2n such that
Aj = 〈Aj1, Aj2 . . . , Ajn〉




Ak ∪ Sj, if k = i
Ak \ Sj, if k 6= i.
We show at least one of these allocations has a higher for ex2/5 than A. Since V 2/5i is








k (Ak \ Sj)
)
≤ V 2/5k (Aj)












k (Aj \ Sj)
≥ 2nV 2/5k (Ak)− V
2/5
k (Ak)
= (2n− 1)V 2/5k (Ak)
(2.70)


























































(2n− 1)V 2/5k (Ak)
≥ 4n/5 + (2n− 1)(ex2/5(A)− 1/5)
≥ 2n · ex2/5(A) + (4n− 2n+ 1)/5− ex2/5(A)
≥ 2n · ex2/5(A) + (2n+ 1)/5− ex2/5(A)















ex2/5(Aj) ≥ 2n · ex2/5(A) + (2n+ 1)/5− ex2/5(A)
≥ 2n · ex2/5(A) + (2n+ 1)/5− 2n/5
≥ 2n · ex2/5(A) + 1/5.
Therefore, ex2/5(Aj) > ex2/5(A) + 1/10n holds for at least oneAj which contradicts the
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maximality of A. 2
2.7.2 Algorithm
In this section we provide a polynomial time algorithm for finding a 1/8-MMS al-
location for the fair allocation problem with XOS agents. The algorithm is based on a
similar idea that we argued for the proof of Theorem 2.7.4. Remark that our algorithm
only requires access to demand and XOS oracles. It does not have any additional infor-
mation about the maxmin values. This makes the problem computationally harder since
computing the maxmin values is NP-hard [34]. We begin by giving a high-level intuition
of the algorithm and show the computational obstacles can be overcome by combinatorial
tricks. Consider the pseudo-code described in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5: Algorithm for finding a 1/8-MMS allocation
Data: N ,M, 〈V1, V2, . . . , Vn〉
1 For every aj , scale Vj to ensure MMSj = 1;
2 while there exist an agent ai and an item bj such that Vi({bj}) ≥ 1/8 do
3 Allocate {bj} to ai;
4 M =M\ bj;
5 N = N \ ai;
6 end
7 A = an arbitrary allocation of the items to the agents;
8 while minV 1/4j (Aj) < 1/8 do
9 i = the agent who receives the lowest value in allocation A;
10 Find a set S such that:
ex1/4(〈A1 \ S,A2 \ S, . . . , Ai−1 \ S,Ai ∪ S,Ai+1 \ S, . . . , An \ S〉) ≥
ex1/4(A) + 1/12n;
11 A = 〈A1 \ S,A2 \ S, . . . , Ai−1 \ S,Ai ∪ S,Ai+1 \ S, . . . , An \ S〉;
12 end
13 For every ai ∈ N allocate Ai to ai;
As we show in Section 2.7.2.1, Command 10 of the algorithm is always doable.
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More precisely, there always exists a set S that holds in the condition of Command 10.
Notice that in every step of the algorithm, ex1/4(A) is increased by at least 1/12n and this
value is bounded by 1/4 · n = n/4. Therefore the algorithm terminates after at most 3n2
steps and the allocation is guaranteed to be 1/8-MMS.
That said, there are two major computational obstacles in the way of running Al-
gorithm 5. Firstly, finding a set S that holds in the condition of Command 10 can not
be trivially done in polynomial time. Second, scaling the valuation functions to ensure
MMSi = 1 for all agents is NP-hard and cannot be done in polynomial time unless P=NP.
To overcome the former, in Section 2.7.2.1 we provide an algorithm for finding such a set
S in polynomial time. Next, in Section 2.7.2.2, we present a combinatorial trick to run
the algorithm in polynomial time without having to deal with NP-hardness of scaling the
valuation functions.
2.7.2.1 Executing Command 10 in Polynomial Time
In this section we present an algorithm to execute Command 10 of Algorithm 5. We
show that such a procedure can be implemented via demand oracles.
Let for every bj /∈ Ai, cj be the amount of contribution that bj makes to ex1/4(A).
We set pe = 3(n/(n−1))ce and ask the demand oracle of Vi to find a set S that maximizes
Vi(S) −
∑
bj∈S pj . Via a trivial calculation, one can show that Vi(S) −
∑
bj∈S pj ≥ 1/4
holds for at least one set of items. The reason this is correct is that one can divide the
items into n partitions where each is worth at least 1 to ai. Moreover, the summation of
prices for the items is bounded by 3n/(n − 1) · (∑j 6=i V 1/4j (Aj)) ≤ 3n/4. Therefore,
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for at least one of those partitions Vi(S)−
∑
bj∈S pj is at least 1/4. Thus, the set that the
oracle reports is worth at least 1/4 to ai.
Now, let S∗ be the set that the oracle reports and for every bj ∈ S∗, c∗j be the
contribution of bj to Vi(S∗). We sort the items of S∗ based on c∗j − pj in non-increasing
order. Next, we start with an empty bag and add the items in their order to the bag until
the total value of the items in the bag to ai reaches 1/4. Since the value of every item
alone is bounded by 1/8, the total value of the items in the bag to ai is bounded by
3/8. Thus the contribution of those items to ex1/4(A) is at most (3/8)/(3n/(n − 1)) ≤
1/8 − 1/(10n). Therefore, removing items of the bag from other allocations and adding
them to Ai, increases ex1/4(A) by at least 1/10n.
Remark that one can use the same argument to prove this even if MMSi ≥ 1/(1 +
1/10n).
2.7.2.2 Running Algorithm 5 in Polynomial Time
As aforementioned, scaling valuation functions to ensure MMSi = 1 for every agent
ai is an NP-hard problem since determining the maxmin values is hard even for additive
agents [2]. Therefore, unlike Section 2.7.2.1, in this section we massage the algorithm to
make it executable in polynomial time.
Suppose an oracle gives us the maxnmin values of the agents. Provided that we can
run Command 10 of Algorithm 5 in polynomial time, we can find a 1/8-MMS allocation
in polynomial time. Therefore, in case the oracle reports the actual maxmin values, the
solution is trivial. However, what if the oracle has an error in its calculations? There are
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two possibilities: (i) Algorithm 5 terminates and finds an allocation which is 1/8-MMS
with respect to the reported maxmin values. (ii) The algorithm fails to execute Command
10, since no such set S holds in the condition of Command 10. The intellectual merit
of this section boils down to investigation of the case when algorithm fails to execute
Command 10. We show, this only happens due to an overly high misrepresentation of the
maxmin value for agent ai. Note that ai is the agent who receives the lowest value in the
last cycle of the execution.
Observation 2.7.5 Given 〈d1, d2, . . . , dn〉 as an estimate for the maxmin values, if Algo-
rithm 5 fails to execute Command 10 for an agent ai, then we have
di ≥ (1 + 1/10n)MMSi.
Proof of Observation 2.7.5 follows from the argument of Section 2.7.2.1. More precisely,
as mentioned in Section 2.7.2.1, such a set S exists, if MMSi ≥ 1/(1 + 1/10n). Thus,
given that the procedure explained in Section 2.7.2.1 fails to find such a set, one can
conclude the the reported value for MMSi is at least (1/(1 + 1/10n)) times its actual
value. Based on Observation 2.7.5, we propose Algorithm 6 for implementing a maxmin
oracle.
Note that in the beginning of the algorithm, we set di = Vi(M) which is indeed
greater than or equal to MMSi. By Lemma 2.7.5, every time we decrease the value of
di for an agent ai, we preserve the condition di ≥ MMSi for that agent. Therefore, in
every step of the algorithm, we have di ≥ MMSi and thus the reported allocation which
is 1/8-MMS with respect to di’s is also 1/8-MMS with respect to true maxmin values.
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Algorithm 6: Implementing a maxmin oracle
Data: N ,M, 〈V1, V2, . . . , Vn〉
1 for every ai ∈ N do
2 di ← Vi(M);
3 end
4 while true do
5 Run Algorithm 5 assuming maxmin values are d1, d2, . . . , dn;
6 if the Algorithm fails to run Command 10 for an agent ai then
7 di ← di/(1 + 1/10n);
8 end
9 else
10 Report the allocation and terminate the algorithm;
11 end
12 end
Thus, the algorithm provides a correct 1/8-MMS allocation in the end. All that remains
is to show the running time of the algorithm is polynomial.
Notice that every time we decrease di for an agent ai, we multiply this value by
1/(1 + 1/10n), hence the number of such iterations is polynomial in n, unless the val-
uations are super-exponential in n. Since we always assume the input numbers are rep-
resented by poly(n) bits, the number of iterations is bounded by poly(n) and hence the
algorithm terminates after a polynomial number of steps.
Theorem 2.7.6 Given access to demand and XOS oracles, there exists a polynomial time
algorithm that finds a 1/8-MMS allocation for XOS agents.
An elegant consequence of Theorem 2.7.6 is a 8-approximation algorithm for de-
termining the maxmin value of an XOS function with r partitions.
Corollary 2.7.7 Given an XOS function f , an integer number r, and access to demand
and XOS oracles of f , there exists a 8-approximation polytime algorithm for determining
MMSrf .
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Proof. We construct an instance of the fair allocation problem with r agents, all of whom
have a valuation function equal to f . We find a 1/8-MMS allocation of the items to the
agents in polynomial time and report the minimum value that an agent receives as output.
The 1/8 guarantee follows from the fact that every agent receives a subset of val-
ues that are worth 1/8-MMSi to him, and since MMSi is exactly equal to MMSrf , every
partition has a value of at least MMSrf/8. 2
Remark 2.7.8 A similar procedure can also be used to overcome the challenge of com-
puting the maxmin values for the algorithm described in Section 2.6.3.
2.8 Subadditive Agents
In this section we present a reduction from subadditive agents to XOS agents. More
precisely, we show for every subadditive set function f(.), there exists an XOS function
g(.), where g is dominated by f but the maxmin value of g is within a logarithmic factor of
the maxmin value of f . We begin by an observation. Suppose we are given a subadditive
function f on set ground(f), and we wish to approximate f with an additive function g
which is dominated by f . In other words, we wish to find an additive function g such that
∀S ⊆ ground(f) g(S) ≤ f(S)
and g(ground(f)) is maximized. One way to formulate g is via a linear program. Suppose
ground(f) = {b1, b2, . . . , bm} and let g1, g2, . . . , gm be m variables that describe g in the
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following way:












gi ≤ f(S) ∀S ⊆ ground(f)
gi ≥ 0 ∀bi ∈ ground(f)
We show the objective function of LP 2.73 is lower bounded by f(ground(f))/ logm.
The basic idea is to first write the dual program and then based on a probabilistic method,
lower bound the optimal value of the dual program by f(ground(f))/ logm.
Lemma 2.8.1 The optimal solution of LP 2.73 is at least f(ground(f))/ logm.








αS ≥ 1 ∀bi ∈ ground(f)
αS ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ ground(f)
By the strong duality theorem, the optimal solutions of LP 2.73 and LP 2.74 are equal [51].
Next, based on the optimal solution of LP 2.74, we define a randomized procedure to draw
a set of elements: We start with an empty set S∗ and for every set S ⊆ ground(f) we add
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all elements of S to S∗ with probability αS . Since f is subadditive, the marginal increase
of f(S∗) by adding elements of a set S to S∗ is bounded by f(S) and thus the expected





Remark that we repeat this procedure for all subsets of ground(S) independently and thus
for every bi ∈ ground(f),
∑
S3bi αS ≥ 1 holds we have
PR[bi ∈ S∗] ≥ 1− 1/e ' 0.632121 > 1/2 (2.76)
for every element bi ∈ ground(s). Now, with the same procedure, we draw dlogme + 2
sets S∗1 , S
∗
2 , . . . , S
∗
dlogme+2 independently. We define Ŝ =
⋃
S∗i . By Inequality (2.76) and
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the union bound we show
































and thus E[f(Ŝ)] ≥ 3/4f(ground(f)). On the other hand, by the linearity of expectation


















for big enough m. This shows the optimal solution of LP 2.73 is lower bounded by
f(ground(f))/(2dlogme) and the proof is complete. 2
In what follows, based on Lemma 2.8.1, we provide a reduction from subadditive
agents to XOS agents. An immediate corollary of Lemma 2.8.1 is the following:
Corollary 2.8.2 (of Lemma 2.8.1) For any subadditive function f and integer number
n, there exists an XOS function g such that
g(S) ≤ f(S) ∀S ⊆ ground(f)
and
MMSng ≥ MMSnf/2dlog ne.
Proof. By definition, we can divide the items into n disjoint sets such that the value of
f for every set is at least MMSnf . Now, based on Lemma 2.8.1, we approximate f for
each set with an additive function gi wile losing a factor of at most d2| log ground(f)|e
and finally we set g = max gi. Based on Lemma 2.8.1, both conditions of this lemma are
satisfied by g. 2
Based on Theorem 2.7.4 and Lemma 2.8.2 one can show that a 1/10dlogme-MMS
allocation is always possible for subadditive agents.
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Theorem 2.8.3 The fair allocation problem with subadditive agents admits a 1/10dlogme-
MMS allocation.
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Chapter 3: Almost Envy-free Allocation of Indivisible Goods
3.1 Introduction
Fair division is a fundamental and interdisciplinary problem that has been exten-
sively studied in economics, mathematics, political science, and computer science [52,
53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 4, 59, 19, 60, 5, 61]. Generally, the goal is to find an allocation of
a resource to n agents, which is agreeable to all the agents according to their preferences.
The first formal treatment of this problem was in 1948 by Steinhaus [62]. Following this
work, a vast literature has been developed and several notions for measuring fairness have
been suggested [62, 17, 1, 4, 61]. One of the most prominent and well-established fair-
ness notions, introduced by Foley [17], is envy-freeness, which requires that each agent
prefers his share over that of any other agent.
Traditionally, envy-freeness has been studied for both divisible and indivisible re-
sources. When the resource is a single heterogeneous divisible item (i.e, can be frac-
tionally allocated), envy-freeness admits strong theoretical guarantees. For example, it is
shown that allocations exist that allocate the entire resource, and are both envy-free and
Pareto efficient1 and allocate each agent a contiguous piece of the resource [63]. Apart
1An allocation is Pareto efficient if it is not possible to reallocate the resources such that at least one
agent is better off without making any other person worse off.
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from mere existence, there are algorithms that find an envy-free allocation for arbitrary
number of agents [64, 18, 65]. However, beyond divisibility, when dealing with a set of
indivisible goods, envy-freeness is too strong to be attained; for example, for two agents
and a single indivisible good, the agent that receives no good envies another party. There-
fore, several relaxations of envy-freeness are introduced for the case of indivisible items
[4, 1, 61]. One of these relaxations, suggested by Budish [1], is envy-freeness up to one
good (EF1)2. An allocation of indivisible goods is EF1 if any possible envy of an agent
for the share of another agent can be resolved by removing some good from the envied
share. In contrast to envy-freeness, EF1 allocation always exists. Indeed, a simple round-
robin algorithm always guarantees EF1 for additive valuations, and a standard envy-graph
based allocation guarantees EF1 for more general (sub-additive) valuations. Besides, it
is shown that any Nash welfare maximizing allocation (allocation that maximizes the
product of the agents’ utilities) is both Pareto efficient and EF1.
Recently, Caragiannis et al. [61] suggested another intriguing relaxation of envy-
freeness, namely envy-free up to any good (EFX), which attracted a lot of attention. An
allocation said to be EFX, if no agent envies another agent after the removal of any item
from the other agent’s bundle. Theoretically, this notion is strictly stronger than EF1
and is strictly weaker than EF. In contrast to EF1, questions related to EFX notion is
relatively unexplored. As an example, despite significant effort [61], the existence of
such allocations is still unknown, even for the case of three agents and additive valuations.
Furthermore, unlike EF1, Nash social welfare maximizing allocations are not necessarily




Given this impenetrability of EFX, a growing strand of research started consider-
ing its relaxations. For example, Plaut and Roughgarden [58], consider an approximate
version of EFX3 and provide a 1/2 approximation solution for agents with sub-additive
valuation functions. For additive valuations, this factor is recently improved to 0.618 by
Amanatidis et al. [5]. Another interesting relaxation is EFX-with-charity. Such alloca-
tions donate a bundle of items to charity and guarantee EFX for the rest of the items. The
less valuable the donated items are, the more desirable the allocation is. Caragiannis et
al.[66] show that there always exists an EFX-with-charity allocation where every agent
receives half the value of his bundle in the optimal Nash social welfare allocation. Re-
cently, Chaudhury et al. [60] have proposed an EFX-with-charity allocation such that no
agent values the donated items more than his bundle and the number of donated items is
less than the number of agents.
Considering the huge discrepancy between EFX and EF1, in this paper we wish to
find a middle ground to bridge this gap. We therefore suggest another fairness criterion,
namely envy-freeness up to a random item or EFR, which is weaker than EFX, yet stronger
than EF1. For this notion, we provide a polynomial time 0.72-approximation algorithm,
i.e., an algorithm that constructs 0.72-EFR allocations in polynomial time. Our allocation
method is based on a special type of matching, namely Nash Social Welfare Matching. In
Section 3.1.1, we briefly discuss our techniques to obtain these results.
3An allocation is α- approximate EFX, if for every pair of agents i and j, agent i believes that the share
allocated to him is worth at least α fraction of the share allocated to agent j, after removal of agent j’s least
valued item (according to agent i’s preference).
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3.1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Envy-freeness up to a random item. We suggest a new fairness notion, namely evny-
free up to a random good (EFR). Roughly speaking, in an EFR allocation, no agent i
envies another agent j (in expectation), if we remove a random good from the bundle of
agent j. In other words, the expected value of agent i for the bundle allocated to agent j,
after removing a random item from it is at most as much as the value of his own bundle.
Obviously, EFR is a weaker notion than EFX, yet stronger than EF1.
The intuition behind EFR is to use randomness to reduce the severe impact of small
items. To see what we mean by this term, consider the following scenario: suppose that
the value of agent i for his share is 1000. In addition, assume that the bundle allocated to
an agent j contains two items, each with value 600 to agent i. Even though the allocation
is currently EFX with respect to agent i, allocating even a very small item (say, with value
0 to agent i) to agent j violates EFX condition for agent i. This is a bit strange since
the last item allocated to agent j was totally worthless to agent i. However, allocating
any item with value less than 300 to agent j preserves EFR condition for agent i. This
property makes EFR more flexible, especially when the number of items is not too much.
On the other hand, as the number of items allocated to an agent grows larger, we expect
EFX and EFR to be more and more aligned.
Similar to EFX, we provide a counter example which shows that a Nash Social
Welfare allocation is not necessarily EFR. This separates EFR and EF1 given the fact
that a Nash Social welfare allocation is always EF1[61]. It is worth mentioning that
Caragiannis et al. [61] presented an example to show that Nash Social welfare allocation
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is not necessarily EFX. However, their example is still EFR. The difference between these
two examples can be seen as an evidence for the distinction between EFR and EFX.
As noted, the best approximation guarantee for EFX is 0.61 by Amanatidis et al. [5].
Since every EFX allocation is also EFR, this result also provides a 0.61-approximation
algorithm for EFR. In this paper, we improve this ratio to 0.72.
theoremefrthm There exists an algorithm that finds a 0.72-EFR allocation. In addi-
tion, such an allocation can be found in polynomial time.
In order to prove Theorem 3.1.1, we propose a three-step algorithm that finds a
0.72-EFR allocation in polynomial time. Roughly speaking, in the first two steps, we
allocate valuable (i.e., large) items while preserving the 0.72-EFR property. Next, we
use an envy-cycle based procedure to allocate the rest of the items. Figure 3.1 shows a








Figure 3.1: Flowchart of the 0.72-EFR allocation algorithm
The first challenge to address is the method by which we must allocate large items
in the first step. Interestingly, we introduce a special type of matching allocation with
intriguing properties which makes it ideal for our algorithm. We call such an allocation a
Nash Social Welfare Matching.
Nash Social Welfare Matching. In the first step of the algorithm, we allocate one item
to each agent such that the product of the utilities of the agents is maximized. The inter-
esting fact about this allocation is that, not only does this allocation allocates large items,
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but it also provides very useful information about the value of the rest of the items. In
Section 3.2 we broadly discuss such allocations and their properties. However, to shed
light on their usefulness, assume that after a Nash Social Welfare Matching, agent i en-
vies agent j with a ratio α > 1, meaning that he thinks the value of the good allocated
to agent j is α times more than the value of his item. In that case, we can immediately
conclude that the item allocated to agent j is α times more valuable to him (agent j) than
any remaining item; otherwise, we could improve the utility product by allocating the
most valuable remaining item to agent j and giving his former item to agent i (and of
course, freeing agent i’s former item). In addition, we can express the same proposition
for the value of the item allocated to agent i for agent j: the value of this item for agent
j is at most 1/α of the item allocated to agent j. The above statement can be generalized
to the arguments that include more than two agents. With this aim, we introduce several
new concepts, including envy-ratio graph (a complete weighted graph that represents the
envy-ratios between agents), improving cycles, and envy-rank.
It is worth mentioning that the main challenge in many fair allocation problems for
different fairness criteria (e.g., MMS, EFX) is allocating valuable items. The structure
of such matchings makes them ideal for allocating these items. We strongly believe that
using Nash Social Welfare matching is not only useful for our algorithm, but can also be
seen as a strong tool in the way of finding fair allocations related to the other fairness
notions, especially maximin-share. In Section 3.4 we show how to use NSW mathcing to
obtain the same approximation ratio as the state-of-the-art (φ− 1) [67] for EFX.
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3.1.2 Related work
Fair allocation of a divisible resource (konwn as cake cutting) was first introduced
by Steinhaus [62], and since then has been the subject of intensive studies. We refer the
reader to [68] and [69] for an overview on different fairness notions and their related
results. Proportionality and Envy-freeness are among the most important notions for cake
cutting. As mentioned, the literature of cake cutting admits strong positive results for
these two notions (see [62] for more details).
Since neither EF nor proportionality or any approximation of these notions can be
guaranteed for indivisible items, several relaxations are introduced for these two notions.
These relaxations include EF1 as well as EFX for envy-freeness and maximin-share [1]
as well as maximin fairness [70] for proportionality. In addition, the weighted version
of these notions (where the agents have different entitlements) are also considered. Nash
Social Welfare (NSW) is another important notion in allocation of indivisible goods which
is somewhat a trade off between fairness and optimality.
Apart from the results mentioned in the previous section for EFX and EF1, there are
other studies related to these notions. For example, Barman et al. [71] proposed a pseudo-
polynomial time algorithm that finds an EF1 and pareto efficient allocation. Furthermore,
they show that any EF1 and pareto efficient allocation approximates Nash Social Welfare
with a factor of 1.45. It is worth mentioning that the problem of whether a (strongly)
polynomial time algorithm can guarantee both EF1 and Pareto optimality is still open.
Maximin-share is one of the most well-studied notions in the recent years. In a
pioneering study, Kurokawa et al. [57] provided an approximation algorithm with the
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factor of 2/3 for maximin-share, and Amanatidis et al. [72] show that their method can
be implemented in polynomial time to obtain a 2/3−ε approximation guarantee. Barman
et al. [19] show that a simple round robin algorihtm can guarantee the approximation
of 2/3 for additive, and 1/10 for submodular valuations. This is later improved to 3/4
by Ghodsi et al. [54] and Garg et al. [73]. Ghodsi et al. also provided approximation
guarantees for submodular (1/3), XOS (1/5) and subadditive (1/ log n) valuations.
In addition, several notions are ramified from maximin-share. For example weighted
maximin-share (WMMS) [52] and pairwise maximin-share (PMMS) [61]. Several stud-
ies consider the relation between these notions and seek to find an allocation that guar-
antees a number of these notions simultaneously. For example, Amanatidis et al. [67]
investigate the connections between EF1 and EFX allocations with two other famous fair-
ness notions, namely maximin share fairness (MMS) and pairwise maximin share fairness
(PMMS). They show that any EF1 allocation is also a 1/n-MMS and a 1/2-PMMS al-
location. They also proved that any EFX allocation is a 4/7-MMS and a 2/3-PMMS
allocation.
3.2 Preliminaries and Basic Observations
Fair allocation problem. An instance of fair allocation problem is consisted a set of
n agents, a set M of m goods, and a valuation profile V = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn}. Each vi
is a function of the form 2M → R≥0 which specifies the preferences of agent i ∈ [n]
over the goods. Throughout the paper, we assume that a valuation function vi satisfies the
following conditions.
140
• Normalization: Vi(∅) = 0.
• Monotonicity: Vi(S) ≤ Vi(T ) whenever S ⊆ T .
• Additivity: Vi(S) =
∑
b∈S Vi({b}).
An allocation of a set S of goods is an n-partition A = 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉 of S,
where Ai is the bundle allocated to agent i. Allocation is complete, if S = M and is
partial otherwise. Since we are interested in the allocations that allocate the whole set of
items, the final allocation must be complete.
Fairness critera. Given an instance of fair division problem and an allocation A, an
agent i envies another agent j, if he strictly prefers Aj over his bundle Ai. An allocation
is then said to be envy-free (EF), if no agent envies another, i.e., for every pair i, j ∈ [n]
of agents we have Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Aj). As mentioned, envy-freeness is too strong to be
guaranteed in an allocation of indivisible items. Therefore, two relaxations of this notion
are introduced, namely envy-free up to one good (EF1) and envy-free up to any good
(EFX).
Definition 3.2.1 An allocation A is called
• envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for all i, j we have Vi(Ai) ≥ minb∈Aj Vi(Aj\{b}),
• envy-free up to any good (EFX) if for all i, j we have Vi(Ai) ≥ maxb∈Aj Vi(Aj \
{b}).
Even though these two notions seem to be somewhat related, there is a huge dis-
crepancy between the current results obtained for them. It is shown that even for instances
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with general valuations, an EF1 allocation always exists, and can be computed in polyno-
mial time [4]. In contrast, whether or not an EFX allocation exists is still open, even for
additive valuations and 3 agents.
In this paper, we introduce another relaxation of envy-freeness, namely envy-free
up to a random good. Let Dj be a uniform distribution over the items of Aj that selects
each item with probability 1/|Aj|.








Clearly, EFR lies in between EFX and EF1: EFX is a stronger notion that EFR, and EFR
is stronger than EF1. In Example 1, we show one structural difference between EF1 and
EFR: in contrast to EF1, EFR is not implied by an allocation that maximizes Nash social
welfare.
1 2 3 4 5
V1 3 3 1 1 1
V2 5 5 1 4 3
Figure 3.2: Agents’ valuations over items
Example 1 Consider an instance of the fair allocation problem with 5 items, and 2 agents
with the valuations represented in Figure 3.2. The unique allocation that maximizes the
NSW allocates the first 3 items to the first agent, and the other 2 to the second agent. Let
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≥ V2(A2) = 7,
and hence, this allocation is not EFR.
Finally, approximate versions of EFX and EFR are defined as follows.
Definition 3.2.3 For a constant c ≤ 1, an allocation A is called
• c-approximate envy-free up to any good (c-EFX), if for all i, j we have
Vi(Ai) ≥ c ·max
b∈Aj
Vi(Aj \ {b}) .
• c-approximate envy-free up to a random good (c-EFR) if for all i, j we have










Envy-ratio Graph. Envy-ratio graph is in fact a generalization of envy-graph intro-
duced by Lipton et al. [4]. Suppose that at some stage of our algorithm we have a
partial allocationA. We define a graph called envy-ratio graph to be a complete weighted
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digraph with the following construction: each vertex corresponds to an agent, and for
each ordered pair (i, j), there is a directed edge from vertex i to vertex j with weight
wi,j = Vi(Aj)/Vi(Ai).
Assuming each agent has a non-zero value for each good, for every i, j we have
wi,j ∈ [0,∞). Note that wi,j ≤ 1 implies that agent i does not envy agent j, whereas
wi,j > 1 indicates agent i envies agent j. The higher the value of wi,j is, the more envious
agent i is to the bundle of agent j. Indeed, the well-known envy-graph is a subgraph of
envy-ratio graph containing only the edges with wi,j > 1.
Nash Social Welfare (NSW) Mathcing. Nash social welfare, originally proposed by
Nash [59], is defined to be the geometric mean of agents’ valuations. Allocation that
maximizes Nash social welfare is known to have desirable properties. For example, such
allocations are proved to be EF1 and pareto optimal. Roughly, Nash social welfare maxi-
mizing allocations can be seen as a trade-off between social welfare and fairness.
In the first step of the algorithm, we allocate one item to each agent such that the
Nash social welfare of the agents is maximized. More formally, define Nash Social Wel-
fare matching of [m] to be a partial allocationA = 〈A1,A2, . . . ,An〉 , such that ΠiVi(Ai)
is maximized and where for every i we have |Ai| = 1.
Similar to Nash social welfare allocations, Nash social welfare matchings exhibit
beautiful properties which greatly help us in designing our algorithm. One simple prop-
erty of such allocations is shown in Observation 3.2.5. Before we state Observation 3.2.5,
we need to define concepts of improving and strictly improving cycles.
Definition 3.2.4 Let c = i1 → i2 → . . . → ik → i1 be a cycle in the envy-ratio graph.
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Then, c is an improving cycle, if
wi1,i2 × wi2,i3 × . . .× wik−1,ik × wik,i1 > 1 .
Furthermore, we say a cycle c is strictly improving cycle, if c is an improving cycle and
for every (i→ j) ∈ c we have wi,j > 1.
We note that strictly improving cycle is an essential concept in all envy-cycle elim-
ination methods [4, 19, 60, 5]. These methods typically rotate the shares over strictly
improving cycles to enhance social welfare. However, to the best of our knowledge, no
previous work made use of improving cycles.
Observation 3.2.5 Suppose that we allocate one item to each agent using Nash social
welfare matching. Then, the envy-ratio graph admits no improving cycle.
Proof. Assume c = i1 → i2 → . . . → ik → i1 is an improving cycle. Then, it is easy
to see that rotating the goods over this cycle (i.e., reallocating Aij to agent ij−1 for every
1 < j ≤ k, and reallocating Ai1 to agent ik) yields a matching with a higher Nash social
welfare. 2
A particularly useful case of Observation 3.2.5 is for the cycles of length 2, which
we state in Corollary 3.2.6.
Corollary 3.2.6 (of Observation 3.2.5) Suppose that for two agents i, j we have Vi(Aj) ≥
r · Vi(Ai), where r ≥ 1. Then, we have Vj(Ai) ≤ Vj(Aj)/r.
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Definition 3.2.7 Suppose that we allocate one item to each agent using Nash social wel-






where j0 = i. Roughly speaking, let p be a path leading to vertex i such that the product
of the weights of the edges in p is maximum. Then, envy-rank of agent i equals to the
product of the weights of the edges in p. Note that by Observation 3.2.5 we can assume
w.l.o.g that p is a simple path (i.e., p includes no duplicate vertices).
Observation 3.2.8 p is a simple path.
Proof. Assume p is not simple and let c be a cycle in p. By Observation 3.2.5 we know
that c can not be improving. Therefore, the product of the weight of the edges of p \ c is
as large as p. 2
To get a better understanding of these definitions take a look at Example 2.
Example 2 Consider an instance of the fair allocation problem with 4 items, 4 agents,
and a valuation profile V = {V1, V2, V3, V4} represented in Figure 3.3a. Let A be the
allocation that allocates item i to agent i. The envy-ratio graph and the envy graph of A
are shown in Figure 3.3b and Figure 3.3c respectively. This allocation is not envy-free,
however, it is both EFX and EFR since each agent receives only one item.
As we mentioned before, the envy-rank of an agent can be seen as the product of
the weights of the edges in a path leading to that agent. For instance, consider the agent
1. The envy-rank of this agent is 3 which is the product of the weights of the edges in
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1 2 3 4
V1 8 2 4 3
V2 4 2 0 2
V3 0 3 2 2
V4 1 6 3 9











































(d) Envy-ratio graph after eliminating a cycle.
Figure 3.3: An example to illustrate envy-ratio graph.
the path 3 → 2 → 1. Also consider the cycle 1 → 3 → 2 → 1. This cycle is an
improving cycle. Therefore, the allocation A is not a NSW matching. The allocation can
be improved by moving the items alongside this cycle which leads to a new allocation
A′ = 〈{3}, {1}, {2}, {4}〉. The envy-ratio graph of A′ can be seen in Figure 3.3d.
We finish our discussion in this section by mentioning some properties of envy-rank
values.
Observation 3.2.9 Suppose that allocation A allocates one item to each agent using a
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Proof. In the envy-ratio graph, the weight of the directed edge from i to j is wi,j =
Vi(Aj)
Vi(Ai) .
Recall that rj is the maximum product of the weights of the edges in a path leading to j.
Since the edge from i to j is also a path leading to vertex j, we have Vi(Aj)
Vi(Ai) = wi,j ≤ rj .
Now consider a path p leading to iwith the maximum product of the weights of the edges.
Based on the definition of envy-rank, the product of the weights of the edges in p is ri. We
can use the edge from i to j to extend this path. This new path leads to j, and its product








In addition to Observation 3.2.5, Nash social welfare matchings admit another im-
portant and elegant property, which we state in Observation 3.2.10. This observation pro-
vides upper bounds on the value of remaining goods and can be of independent interest
for various fair allocation problems.
Observation 3.2.10 Suppose that we allocate one item to each agent using a Nash social









Proof. First, for any agent i and any remaining good b, we have Vi(b) ≤ Vi(Ai), if not
NSW can be increased by giving b to i. On the other hand, consider a path leading to i
with the maximum product of the weights of the edges. By moving items along this path
and giving b to agent i, the NSW will be multiplied by a factor of ri · Vi(b)Vi(Ai) . Since A is




3.3 An approximate EFR Allocation
In this section, we present our algorithm for finding a 0.72-EFR allocation. Our
algorithm is divided into 3 steps, namely NSW matching, allocation refinement, and envy-
graph based allocation. In the first step, we allocate each agent one item using a Nash
social welfare matching and accordingly divide the agents into three groups based on
their envy-rank. Next, in the second step we allocate a set of goods to the agents in
each group, and finally in the third step we allocate the rest of the items using the classic
envy-cycle elimination method. The outline of our algorithm is represented in Algorithm
7.
3.3.1 Step 1.
In the first step, we allocate one item to each agent using a NSW matching. We first
show that this allocation can be found in polynomial time.
Observation 3.3.1 NSW matching can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Let G = (U1, U2) be a bipartite graph that has a vertex for each agent in U1 and
has a vertex for every item in U2. For every agent i and every item b we add an undirected
149
Algorithm 7: The outline of the 0.72-EFR algorithm.
// Step 1
1 (A,M′) = NSWMatchingAllocation(V ,M);
2 (G1, G2, G3) = EnvyRankPartition(A);
// Step 2
3 O = TopologicalOrderedAgents(A);
4 foreach i ∈ G3 ordered by O do
5 (A,M′) = ExtendAllocation(A,M′, i);
6 end
7 foreach i ∈ G3 ordered by O do
8 (A,M′) = ExtendAllocation(A,M′, i);
9 end
10 foreach i ∈ G2 ordered by O do
11 (A,M′) = ExtendAllocation(A,M′, i);
12 end
// Step 3
13 whileM′ 6= ∅ do
14 Eliminate all directed cycles in the envy-graph;
15 Let s be an arbitrary source in the envy graph;




edge with the weight of log Vi({b}) between their corresponding vertices. By finding
a maximum weighted matching in this graph, we get an allocation A such that every
agent has at most one allocated item. Also, this allocation maximizes
∑n
i=1 log Vi(Ai).
Therefore, this allocation also maximizes
∏n
i=1 Vi(Ai). Hence, A allocates at most one
item to every agent and maximizes Nash social welfare. 2
Let A be NSW matching and fix a parameter ϕ = 8/3. Based on the envy-rank of
the agents, we divide them into 3 groups G1,G2, and G3 as follows.
• Agent i belongs to G1 if ri > ϕ.
• Agent i belongs to G2 if 2 < ri ≤ ϕ.
• Agent i belongs to G3 if ri ≤ 2.
Note that by Observation 3.2.10, we know that for every remaining item b the following
properties hold.
• (Property 1): For every agent i ∈ G1 we have Vi(b) < Vi(Ai)/ϕ.
• (Property 2): For every agent i ∈ G2 we have Vi(b) < Vi(Ai)/2.
Intuitively, if each remaining item is worth less than Vi(Ai)/ϕ to every agent i,
then we can guarantee the approximation factor of 1/(1 + 1/ϕ) in the third step. This
property holds for the agents in G1; however, this is not the case for agents in G2 and G3.
In the second step, we seek to allocate a set of items to the agents in G2 and G3 so that the
same property holds for these agents. Note that alongside this property, the final partial
allocation after the second step must be fair (i.e., 0.72-EFR).
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3.3.2 Step 2.
In the second step, we allocate one item to each agent in G2 and two items to each
agent in G3. Algorithm 7 shows the method by which we allocate these items to the
agents in G2 and G3. Let O be a topological ordering of the agents with respect to the
envy-graph. We order the agents in G3 according to O and ask them one by one to pick
their most valuable remaining good. We then again ask agents in G3 to pick one more
item according to the same topological ordering O. Afterwards, we order the agents in
G2 according to O and ask them one by one to add the most desirable remaining item to
their bundles.
After this step the bundle of every agent in G3 contains three items. For an agent
i ∈ G3 we use {bi, b′i, b′′i } to denote the items allocated to this agent where b′i and b′′i are
the items allocated in Step 2 and b′i has been allocated before b
′′
i . Also, the bundle of every
agent in G2 contains two items. Similarly, for an agent i ∈ G2 we use {bi, b′i} to denote
the allocated items of this agent where b′i is the item received in Step 2. We also use {bi}
to denote the only item received by an agent i ∈ G1.
We begin our analysis by showing the following claim.
































Vi({b′}) . By Additivity assumption.

























2 We now show that at the end of Step 2 the following conditions hold.
• The current allocation is EFR with respect to the agents in G1.
• The current allocation is (3/4)-EFR with respect to the agents in G2 and G3.
Claim 3.3.3 By the end of Step 2, the allocation is EFR with respect to the agents in G1.







so the allocation is EFR from the agent i’s perspective. If j ∈ G1, then we have |Aj| = 1
and the claim clearly holds. Consider an agent j ∈ G2. At the end of Step 2, agent j
has two allocated items. By Observation 3.2.10 the valuation of the item b′j for agent i is
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≤ Vi(bj) + Vi(bi)/ri
2
Observation 3.2.10.













≤ 1 + 1/ri
2
· Vi(bi)







≤ Vi(bi) = Vi(Ai) .



















































= Vi(bi) = Vi(Ai) .
Therefore the allocation is EFR. 2
Claim 3.3.4 By the end of step 2, the allocation is (3/4)-EFR with respect to the agents
in G2.
Proof. Let i be an agent in G2, we show that for every other agent j, we have







therefore the allocation is (3/4)-EFR. For an agent j in G1, only one item is allocated to
this agent and the claim clearly holds.
Consider an agent j in G2. Recall that Aj = {bj, b′j} is the bundle of this agent.
We first consider the case that Vi(bi) < Vi(bj). In this case the position of agent i in O is
before agent j. Therefore, agent i receives his second good before agent j, and we have
Vi(b
′
i) ≥ Vi(b′j) . (3.1)










































Therefore, if Vi(bi) < Vi(bj), the allocation is EFR. The other case is when Vi(bi) ≥
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≤ Vi(bj) + Vi(bi)/ri
2
Observation 3.2.10.













· Vi(Ai) , ri > 2.
therefore the allocation in this case is EFR.
The only remaining case is when agent j is in G3. Since agent j has exactly three

















































· Vi(Ai) . ri > 2.
Therefore the allocation is (3/4)-EFR.
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2
Claim 3.3.5 By the end of step 2, the allocation is (3/4)-EFR with respect to the agents
in G3.
Proof. Let i be an agent in G2, we show that for every other agent j, we have






therefore the allocation is (3/4)-EFR. For an agent j in G1, the claim clearly holds since
this agent has only one allocated item.
Consider an agent j ∈ G2. Agent i receives his second item before agent j in Step
2 of our algorithm. Thus, we have
Vi(b
′








































Therefore the allocation is (3/4)-EFR.
The remaining case is when agent j is in G3. Consider the case that Vi(bi) < Vi(bj).
In this case the position of agent i in O is before agent j. Therefore, in Step 2 of our











































































Thus, the allocation is (3/4)-EFR.
The other case is when Vi(bi) ≥ Vi(bj). In this case agent i receives b′i prior to when
agent j receives b′′j , and we have
Vi(b
′





























































and the allocation is (3/4)-EFR. 2
3.3.3 Step 3.
In the third step, we use the envy-graph to allocate the rest of the items. We repeat
the following steps until all the goods are allocated.
• Find and eliminate all the directed cycles from the envy-graph. In order to eliminate
all cycles in the envy-graph, we repeatedly find a directed cycle in the envy-graph.
Let i1 → i2 → · · · → ik → i1 be a cycle in envy-graph. By definition, each agent






where A is the current allocation. We then exchange the allocations of the agents
that are in the cycle such that each agent ij receives Ai(j mod k)+1 . Note that this
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exchanging does not change bundles. Furthermore, the utility each agent does not
decrease. Hence, if the allocation is α-EFR before the exchange, it remains α-
EFR after it (Lemma 6.1 in [58]). Also, exchanging these allocations decreases the
number of edges in the envy-graph. Thus, we eventually find an allocation such
that its corresponding envy-graph is acyclic.
• Give an item to an agent that no-one envies. In the previous step we showed that
we can always find an allocation such that its corresponding envy-graph is acyclic.
Therefore, there should be a vertex in the envy-graph with no incoming edges. Let
i be the agent corresponding to this vertex. Since i has no incoming edges in the
envy-graph, no other agent envies i. At this step, we ask agent i to pick one item
among all remaining goods.
The following Lemma shows the approximation guarantee of our algorithm.
Lemma 3.3.6 Suppose that we are given a partial α-EFX allocation A such that for
every agent i and every remaining item b, we have Vi(b) ≤ α′ · (Ai) for some constant




Proof. The algorithm repeats the following steps until it allocates all items.
• Find and eliminate all the directed cycles from the envy-graph.
• Give an item to an agent that no-one envies.
Consider the step in which the algorithm eliminates cycles. As we discussed earlier, this
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step does not change the approximation factor of the algorithm. Hence, if the allocation is
α-EFX before this step, it remains α-EFX after it (See Lemma 6.1 in [58] for more detail).
Consider the second step of the algorithm. In this step, the algorithm finds an agent
such that no-one envies this agent, and it allocates an item to this agent. Suppose our
algorithm allocates item b to agent i. Since no-one envies agent i before this step, for
every other agent j, we have Vj(Ai) ≤ Vj(Aj) where A is the allocation of items before
this step. In addition we have Vj(b) ≤ α′ · Vj(Aj) since item b was among unallocated
items at the beginning of this step. Thus, we have
Vj(Ai) + Vj(b) ≤ (1 + α′) · Vj(Aj) .
This means that after allocation b, no agent j thinks the value of the bundle of agent i is
more than (1 +α′) ·Vj(Aj). Therefore, the allocation remains 11+α′ -EFX. Hence, the final
allocation is min{α, 1
1+α′
}-EFX. 2
Note that since EFX is a stronger notion of fairness than EFR, we can restate the
lemma above for EFR allocations.
Corollary 3.3.7 Suppose that we are given a partial α-EFR allocation A such that for
every agent i and every remaining item b, we have Vi(b) ≤ α′ · (Ai) for some constant




We now show that at the beginning of Step 3, the valuation of every remaining item
is small for all agents.
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Observation 3.3.8 efrsth Let A be the allocation after Step 2. Then for an agent i and
every remaining item b we have
• If i ∈ G1, Vi(b) ≤ Vi(Ai)/ϕ.
• If i ∈ G2, Vi(b) ≤ Vi(Ai)/3.
• If i ∈ G3, Vi(b) ≤ Vi(Ai)/3.
Proof. Consider an agent i ∈ G1, then by Observation 3.2.10 we have
Vi(b) ≤ Vi(Ai)/ri ≤ Vi(Ai)/ϕ .
Next consider an agent i ∈ G2. This agent has two allocated items. Let Ai = {bi, b′i} be
these items where bi is the item allocated using NSW matching. Since agent i picks his
best remaining item at Step 2 of our algorithm, we have
Vi(b) ≤ Vi(b′i) . (3.7)
Also by Observation 3.2.10 we have
Vi(b) ≤ Vi(bi)/ri ≤ Vi(bi)/2 , (3.8)







/3 = Vi(Ai)/3 .
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The last case is when i ∈ G3. In this case agent i has three allocated items which are all
larger than every remaining item. Therefore Vi(b) ≤ V (Ai)/3. 2
It follows from the observation above that for every agent i the valuation of every
remaining item is at most Vi(Ai)/ϕ after the second step of our algorithm. Recall that
our allocation by the end of Step 2 is (3/4)-EFR. Therefore, using Corollary 3.3.7, the







-EFR. Since ϕ = 8/3, it follows that our
final allocation is 8/11 ≈ 0.72-EFR. This, coupled with the fact that all the steps can be
implemented in polynomial time follows Theorem 3.1.1.
3.4 From NSW Matching to approximate EFX Allocation
In this section, we show that our idea to use NSW matching as the first step of the




is the golden ratio.
The approximation ratio of our algorithm matches the state-of-the-art (φ − 1) approxi-
mation result by Amanitidis et al. [67]. Likewise the algorithm in the previous section,
our (φ− 1)-EFX algorithm consists of 3 steps, namely NSW matching, allocation refine-
ment, and envy-graph based allocation. The first and the third steps of our algorithm are
almost the same as our previous algorithm. For the sake of completeness, we will briefly
restate these steps in the rest of the section. The outline of our algorithm is represented in
Algorithm 8.
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Algorithm 8: The outline of the (φ− 1)-EFX algorithm.
// Step 1
1 (A,M′) = NSWMatchingAllocation(V ,M);
2 (G1, G2) = EnvyRankPartition(A);
// Step 2
3 O = TopologicalOrderedAgents(A);
4 foreach i ∈ G2 ordered by O do
5 (A,M′) = ExtendAllocation(A,M′, i);
6 end
// Step 3
7 whileM′ 6= ∅ do
8 Eliminate all directed cycles in the envy-graph;
9 Let s be an arbitrary source in the envy graph;




In the first step, we allocate one item to each agent using NSW matching. Let A be




be the golden ratio. Based on the envy-rank of
the agents, we divide them into 2 groups G1 and G2, as follows:
• Agent i belongs to G1 if ri > φ.
• Agent i belongs to G2 if ri ≤ φ.
3.4.2 Step 2.
In the second step, we allocate one item to each agent in G2 via the following
process. let O be a topological ordering of the agents with respect to the envy-graph. We
order the agents in G2 according toO and ask them one by one to pick their most valuable
remaining good.
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After this step, the bundle of every agent in G2 contains two items. For an agent
i ∈ G2 we use {bi, b′i} to denote the items allocated to this agent where b′i is the item
allocated in Step 2. We also use {bi} to denote the only item received by an agent i ∈ G1.
We show that at the end of Step 2 the following clamis hold:
Claim 3.4.1 efxstf By the end of Step 2, the allocation is EFX with respect to the agents
in G1.
Proof. Let i be an agent in G1, we show that for every other agent j we have
Vi(Ai) ≥ max
b∈Aj
Vi(Aj \ {b}) ,




Vi(Aj \ {b}) = 0 ,
and the claim clearly holds.
Consider an agent j ∈ G2. At the end of Step 2, agent j has two allocated items.





















= Vi(bi) = Vi(Ai) . ri > 1.
Therefore the allocation is EFX. 2
Claim 3.4.2 efxsts By the end of Step 2, the allocation is (φ− 1)-EFX with respect to the
agents in G2.
Proof. Let i be an agent in G2, we show that for every other agent j we have
Vi(Ai) ≥ (φ− 1) ·max
b∈Aj
Vi(Aj \ {b}) ,
so the allocation is (φ − 1)-EFX from agent i’s perspective. If j ∈ G1, then we have
|Aj| = 1, and the claim clearly holds.
Consider an agent j in G2. We first consider the case that Vi(bi) < Vi(bj). In this
case, the position of agent i in O is before agent j. Therefore, agent i receives his second
good before agent j, and we have
Vi(b
′









































Vi(Aj \ {b}) .
Since 1
φ
= φ − 1, it follows that our allocation is (φ − 1)-EFX. The other case is when
Vi(bi) ≥ Vi(bj). In this case, we have
max
b∈Aj


















= Vi(bi) ≤ Vi(Ai) .
Therefore, in this case the allocation is EFX which completes the proof of the claim. 2
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3.4.3 Step 3.
In the third step, we use the envy-graph to allocate the rest of the items. We show
that at the beginning of Step 3, the valuation of every remaining item is small for all the
agents.
Observation 3.4.3 efxsth Let A be the allocation after Step 2. Then, for an agent i and
every remaining item b we have
• If i ∈ G1, Vi(b) ≤ Vi(Ai)/φ.
• If i ∈ G2, Vi(b) ≤ Vi(Ai)/2.
Proof. Consider an agent i ∈ G1, then by Observation 3.2.10 we have
Vi(b) ≤ Vi(Ai)/ri ≤ Vi(Ai)/φ .
Next, consider an agent i ∈ G2. This agent has two allocated items which are larger than
every remaining item. Therefore, Vi(b) ≤ V (Ai)/2. 2
Therefore, for every agent i, the valuation of every remaining item is at most
Vi(Ai)/φ. In order to complete the allocation we repeat the following steps until all
the goods are allocated.
• Find and eliminate all the directed cycles from the envy-graph.
• Allocate an item to an agent that no-one envies to him.
Recall that our allocation by the end of Step 2 is (φ−1)-EFX. Therefore, as we discussed
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= φ− 1, it follows that our final allocation is (φ− 1) ≈ 0.61-EFX.
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Chapter 4: Fair Allocation of Divisible Chores
4.1 Introduction
The chore division problem is the problem of fairly dividing an object deemed un-
desirable among a number of agents. The object is possibly heterogeneous, and hence
agents may have different valuations for different parts of the object. Chore division was
first introduced by Gardner [6] in 1970s, and is the dual problem of the celebrated cake
cutting problem. In cake cutting, we would like to fairly divide a good (such as a cake) for
which everyone has a positive valuation. In some sense, chore division is a minimization
problem while cake cutting is a maximization problem. Recently [8] provided a bounded
envy-free protocol for 4-person cake cutting, and later on a bounded envy-free protocol
for n-person cake cutting [9]. Chore division or cake-cutting with negative utilities is less
explored and much less is known about it. We provide the first discrete and bounded
envy-free chore division protocol for any number of agents.
The fair cake-cutting problem was introduced in the 1940s. There are different
ways one can define fairness. Initially, proportional division was studied. An allocation
is proportional if everyone receives at least a 1
n
fraction of the cake according to his/her
valuation. Proportional division was solved soon in 1950 [16]. A stronger criterion of
envy-freeness was proposed by George Gamow and Marvin Stern in 1950s, which is, no
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one envies another. In other words, each agent receives a part he thinks is the largest
part.1. The envy-free cake cutting problem became “one of the most important open
problems in 20th-century mathematics” according to Garfunkel [7].
For the case of two agents, the “I cut you choose” protocol simply provides an envy-
free allocation for both cake cutting and chore division. However, the problem is highly
more complicated for more agents. In general, since the valuations of agents for different
parts of the object may be complex, the standard is to assume a query access model for
evaluations. We can ask an agent its value for a part of the object, and also ask an agent to
trim the object up to a certain value. For the case of three agents, Selfridge and Conway
independently found an envy-free protocol for cake cutting. Oskui (see [69]) provided
a solution for 3-person chore division, which is similar to Selfridge-Conway procedure
for cake cutting, but is more complicated and needs 9 cuts instead of 5. Finding a finite
protocol for cake cutting with more than three agents remained an open problem for a
long time until [18] presented a finite envy-free protocol for cake cutting for any number
of agents in 1995. Although this was a breakthrough in the field, their protocol is finite
but unbounded, i.e., it does not guarantee any bound on the number of queries and even
the number of cuts. Later Peterson and Su [74] provided an unbounded envy-free protocol
for chore division. [75] and [76] gave “moving-knife” protocols for cake-cutting for four
and five agents. [77] gave a moving-knife procedure for 4-person chore division. A
moving-knife procedure involves one or more agents moving knives simultaneously with
some restrictions until one agent calls “stop”. Although moving-knife procedures are
more than existence theorems, “a moving knife protocol is certainly less than an effective
1It is easy to see an envy-free allocation is also proportional
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procedure in the algorithmic sense” according to [78]. That is because the continuous
movement of a knife cannot be captured by any finite protocol.
Having a bounded envy-free protocol even for four agents remained an important
open problem [79, 18, 68, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 69, 76]. The unboundedness of cake
cutting protocols was mentioned as a “serious flaw” [86], and finding a bounded protocols
was highlighted as “the central open problem in the field of cake-cutting” [84] and “one
of the most important open problems in the field” [76]. Brams and Taylor [18] were aware
of their protocol’s drawback and explicitly mentioned “even for n = 4, the development
of finite bounded envy-free cake cutting protocols still appears to be out of reach and a
big challenge for the future”.
Finally, the prominent work of Aziz and Mackenzie [8] provided a bounded envy-
free cake cutting protocol for four agents. Later they generalized their work and provided
an envy-free cake cutting protocol for any number of agents to settle a major and long-
standing open problem. However, it remained an open problem to find a bounded envy-
free chore division protocol even for n = 4. We provide the first discrete and unbounded
envy-free protocol for chore division among any number of agents.
4.2 Prelimiaries
In chore division, we are asked to partition a given chore R among n agents. Let
A = {a1, . . . , an} be the set of agents, and Ca(P ) denote the cost of some piece P ⊆ C
for agent a. w.l.o.g we assume that For every agent a, the cost of the whole chore is 1,
i.e., ca(C) = 1. An envy-free partition is a partition of R into n pieces P1, . . . , Pn and
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assigning them to the agents accordingly such that for every two agents a and b, Ca(Pa) ≤
Ca(Pb), where Pa and Pb denote the pieces assigned to agents a and b respectively.
For any protocol, we use the standard Robertson-Webb model [69]. In Robertson-
Webb model, the chore is modeled as an interval R = [0, 1]. We have absolutely no
knowledge about the agents’ cost functions in advance, except that the functions are de-
fined on sub-intervals of [0, 1], non-negative, additive, divisible, and normalized. There-
fore every information is obtained via queries. The complexity of a protocol is defined by
the number of queries it makes. There are two types of information queries:
• Trima(α): given a cost value 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, agent a returns an 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, such that
his cost for interval [0, x] equals α.
• Evala(x): returns the cost value of interval [0, x] for agent a.
In this proposal, we distinguish between cutting and trimming of a piece. Cutting a
piece P refers to dividing P into two pieces, but in trimming we only find a subinterval
in P and do not cut the piece. Note that in this proposal a piece P is not necessarily an
interval, but a union of intervals, since we may cut and join pieces. Although Eval and
Trim queries are defined on intervals, whenever we cut a piece we maintain the cost of
the new pieces. Thus we can translate a query on a piece to a query on the interval [0, 1].
4.3 Results and Techniques
Our main result is a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for dividing a chore
among n agents. Many techniques have been proposed for envy-free cake cutting. [9]
provide a bright and powerful framework to obtain a bounded and envy-free protocol for
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cake cutting among n agents. However the components of their framework and their pro-
tocols do not work for chore division. The protocols for positive valuations are not usually
applicable for negative valuations, and “in general there are no reductions from allocation
to chores to goods or vice versa”[87]. To solve the chore variant of the problem, we
borrow the general idea of their framework, but we have to provide novel techniques and
structural results and also rebuild their framework’s components. These new techniques
and structures not only deliver powerful tools for designing chore division protocols, but
also are useful in cake cutting.
In the following, we present the very high-level concepts and techniques used in
our protocol. The basic idea is to use an inductive algorithm. More precisely we use
induction on the number of agents and try to divide a chore only among a subset of the
agents.
Initially, we need an envy-free protocol which partially divides a chore among the
agents. The protocol does not necessarily allocate the whole chore, but roughly speaking
assigns a fraction of the chore, maintaining the envy-freeness. The protocol has other
plausible features to be mentioned later.
Having a partial allocation, we use the concept of irrevocable advantage (domi-
nance). It is the key of many fair allocation protocols [8, 9, 18, 76, 77, 74]. Assume that
the partial allocation is envy-free and we have a remaining or unallocated chore R. We
say an agent a has an irrevocable advantage to another agent b or a dominates b, if a thinks
she is assigned much less chore than b, such that she may not envy b even if we assign
the whole R to her. In other words, Ca(Pb) − Ca(Pa) ≥ Ca(R), where Pa and Pb are
the pieces allocated to a and b respectively in the partial allocation. We use a similar but
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weaker notion of significant advantage. Agent a has a significant advantage over b if Pa is
much more desirable than Pb to a with respect to the remaining chore, or more precisely
Ca(Pb) − Ca(Pa) ≥ α × Ca(R), where α is a constant to be defined later. Importantly
we show that significant advantage and irrevocable advantage are in some sense equiva-
lent. If agent a has an irrevocable advantage over b, then her advantage is significant as
well. On the other hand if agent a has a significant advantage over agent b, using some
partial allocation protocols we make R small enough for agent a to make the advantage
irrevocable.
Assume that we have a partial envy-free allocation. If there exists a set of agents
S ⊂ A, such that each agent in S has irrevocable advantage to every agent in A \ S, we
can leave A \ S unchanged, and assign the remaining chore inductively to S. Thus the
main goal of our protocol is to make a set of agents have significant/irrevocable advantage
over the rest of the agents.
The other very useful concept, introduced by [9], is the notion of snapshots. Re-
call that we have a partial allocation protocol. Every time we may partially allocate the
remaining chore to the agents. Each of these partial allocations is called a snapshot. The
chore assigned to each agent is the union of her assigned chores in all the snapshots. A
critical thing about snapshots is that we can use an agent’s advantage in one snapshot to
compensate her for modifications in other snapshots. Basically, if agent a has a lot of ad-
vantage over b in one snapshot, we can for example assign some of b’s chore to a in some
other snapshot. Also note that, as long as every snapshot is envy-free, if an agent a has
irrevocable advantage to agent b, then she also has irrevocable advantage in total. Thus
we can focus on one snapshot and deliver irrevocable advantage among some agents in
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that single snapshot. Then we can use other snapshots for having irrevocable advantage
among other agents. Another very handy use of snapshots is that we may have as many of
them as we need. Then we can concentrate on a set of similar snapshots. More precisely,
in a snapshot every agent can order the other agents based on how much is their value
for her allocated piece. [8] define two snapshots isomorphic if, roughly speaking, those
orderings of the agents are exactly the same. Here we need a stronger notion of isomor-
phism. First, we define a mask of a snapshot, which somehow codes the significance of
agents’ advantages. We say two snapshots are isomorphic if each agent orders the other
agents exactly the same and also their masks are the same. Having isomorphic snapshots,
we can modify the allocated pieces easier, and thus we construct as many snapshots to be
able to have a large enough set of isomorphic snapshots, using pigeon hole principle. We
initially call this set of snapshots the working set. We set aside the other snapshots and
only modify the working set.
The other useful concept that we introduce is a matching. A set of trimmed pieces
and agents have a matching if we can match every trimmed piece to an agent such that the
allocation is envy-free. We use this extra information about pieces to obtain more struc-
tural protocols. We show that if we have a matching we can define monotone protocols,
which means we may only make the trimmed pieces larger, obtaining an envy-free allo-
cation. We also use matching in the Sub Core protocol, in which we put a lower bound
on the trims of pieces and try to trim the pieces and guarantee to maintain a matching.
Now we describe a technical overview of the main protocols. As aforementioned
we need a partial envy-free allocation protocol called the core protocol. The Core protocol
is the main and most fundamental protocol of our algorithm. The Core protocol has to
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have the following properties.
• Assigns each agent a piece such that no agent envies another agent;
• Assigns at least a 1
n
fraction of the chore in one agent’s point of view;
• Most importantly, given a specific agent, guarantees that this agent has significant
advantage to another agent in this allocation.
The Core protocol is the “engine” of [8, 9]’s protocol for cake cutting, but unfortunately
their protocols are not applicable for the chore division. Instead we design a much sim-
pler Core protocol. Although our Core protocol is very simple, its proof is based on a
much more complicated infinite protocol which guarantees the existence of the desired
allocation. The basic idea of a Core protocol is as follows. We select a cutter agent that
divides the chore into n equal pieces. Note that the pieces are not necessarily equal to
other agents. Then we try to match each agent to one piece such that every agent receives
a part of its matched piece, but at least one agent may be given a whole piece. Thus, at
least 1
n
fraction of the cake is allocated in the cutter’s point of view. Also, the cutter re-
ceives some considerable advantage to the agent who has been given a whole piece. The
heart of our Core protocol is the following structural lemma.
Lemma 4.3.1 Given n pieces and n different agents, there exists an allocation of pieces
to agents such that a whole piece is allocated to one agent, and a trim of each piece is
allocated to exactly one agent, if and only if, there exists an ordering of the agents and an
ordering of the pieces such that the following protocol provides an envy-free allocation.
Agents receive their pieces one by one. The first agent receives the first piece. The i-th
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agent trims the i-th piece in such a way that she receives the largest part of it without
envying the first i− 1 agents. In other words she considers the first i− 1 allocated pieces,
if her cost for any of those pieces is less than her cost for the i-th piece, she trims the i-th
piece to make it equal to that piece.
Note that in such a protocol, the i-th agent may not envy the first i − 1 agents, but
some of the first i − 1 agents may envy the i-th agent. Roughly speaking, this lemma
shows that if there exists some “core-like” allocation of some pieces to agents, there exist
an ordering of both agents and pieces such that the first i − 1 agents also do not envy
the i-th agent, using the aforementioned protocol. Thus, if there exists such allocation,
we can try every ordering of agents and pieces to find an envy-free allocation using that
simple protocol. Interestingly, we design a protocol which is even infinite but outputs a
core-like allocation. However, knowing that there exists such a protocol is sufficient to be
able to design a much simpler Core protocol.
The other important component of our protocol is the Permutation protocol. As-
sume that there is a set S ⊂ A of agents, such that every agent in S has significant advan-
tage to some agent a ∈ A in a set of snapshots. If we could exchange the piece allocated
to awith the allocated piece of some other agent b /∈ S in some snapshot, then every agent
in S also has significant advantage to b. In Permutation we try to find such set S, that has
significant advantage to a, and then somehow move the a’s piece among every agent not
in S. Therefore every agent in S has significant advantage to every agent in A\S, and we
can do the chore division inductively as we discussed. For exchanging the agents’ pieces
we find a chain of agents, a1, a2, . . . , ak, such that ai receives ai−1’s piece and a1 receives
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ak’s piece. Since each snapshot is envy-free after changing the pieces, agents a1, . . . , ak
may envy each other or other agents. Thus we modify many other snapshots to guarantee
envy-freeness. [9] also have a Permutation protocol. The key difference between our Per-
mutation protocol is that in cake cutting we can add a piece of cake from R to a piece that
is assigned to an agent, such that another agent accepts to receive it. However in chore
division we have to remove a part of chore from a piece to be able to assign it to some
other agent. The difference is huge and makes the Permutation much more subtle because
of the two following reasons. First the part that we remove from a piece assigned to an
agent goes back to the remaining chore, or R. Since R becomes larger, the significance of
the advantages, which are defined based on R may change. Second, since the pieces that
we want to remove are already allocated, it is not easy to divide them between agents, or
remove similar pieces from other agents.
Moreover, we make use of two previously known fair division protocols. The pro-
tocols are used as infinite protocols for cake cutting, but we show that one can use them as
powerful tools for bounded protocols as well. The first protocol is the Near-exact protocol
introduced by [88]. In the Near-exact protocol, given a chore R, n agents, an integer m,
and a real number ε > 0, we divide E into m pieces, such that for each agent a and piece
P , |Ca(P ) − 1mCa(R)| ≤ εCa(R). In other words the pieces have almost equal costs for
the agents. We also show how one can use the Near-exact protocol to improve [9]. The
other protocol is the Oblige protocol, first used by [74]. In Oblige protocol we partition
the chore into 2n+1 pieces, and output a partial envy-free allocation such that every agent
is assigned at least one of the pieces completely. The combination of these protocols is
used in our Discrepancy protocol, described below.
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Another important component of our protocol is the Discrepancy protocol. We use
the Discrepancy protocol when we have a piece P that is very costly for a set of agents
S and R is relatively small, and in the contrary the rest of agents think R costs much
more than P . Thus we use a combination of Near-exact and Oblige protocols to divide R
among S and P among the rest of the agents, such that no agent envies another agent. In
this way we may inductively divide the chore among smaller set of agents.
4.4 The Main Protocol
The Main Protocol is responsible for allocating the whole chore between agents in
an envy-free manner. It tries to make a set of agents dominant to others and then allocates
the remaining chore between a smaller number of agents. The main protocol achieves
this goal by using two other protocols, the Core Protocol, and the Permutation Protocol.
Given an agent a as the cutter, the Core Protocol asks a to divide the chore into n equally
preferred pieces and then partially allocate the chore between agents such that at least one
piece is completely allocated and each agent gets part of a single piece. The Permutation
Protocol gets a partial allocation of the chore and tries to slightly modifies it to make a set
of agents dominant to others.
At first, the Main Protocol calls the Core Protocol many times, each time on the
remaining chore to create a large number of partial allocations. We call each of these
partial allocations a snapshot.
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Definition 4.4.1 A snapshot s is a partial envy-free allocation returned by Core Protocol.
We use sa to denote the allocated piece to the agent a.
After generating many snapshots, Main Protocol finds a set of similar snapshots and edit
these snapshots in Permutation Protocol. Each time we call the Core protocol, we get an
envy-free partial allocation of the chore. In each of these snapshots, each agent thinks
that the cost of her piece is less than the cost of others’. In particular, considering a
snapshot s and agents a and b, since the partial allocation obtained by Core Protocol is
envy-free, agent a thinks that cost of piece sa is not greater than cost of the sb. We define
the advantage of agent a over agent b in this snapshot, the amount of chore that a thinks
that she got less than agent b, i.e:
Advsa,b = Ca(s
b)− Ca(sa)
If the advantage that agent a has over b is greater than the cost of the residual chore, agent
a will not envy b, no matter how the residual chore will be allocated between agents. In
this case, we say that agent b is dominated by agent a. In Particular agent a dominates
agent b in the partial allocation s if Advsa,b ≥ Ca(R).
Since in Core Protocol the cutter cuts the chore into n equal pieces according to her
own perspective and the protocol allocates at least one piece completely, the cost of the
residual chore is at most
n− 1
n
for the cutter. In Permutation Protocol we modify a set
of similar snapshots such that if we reduce the size of chore by calling the Core Proto-
col nBn times with each agent as the cutter Bn times where Bn = nn, then we can find
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set of agents B such that each agent in A dominates every other agent in A \ B. There-




the Permutation Protocol, this agent will dominate agent b after reducing the size of chore.




and otherwise insignificant. Here a key idea is that if agent a has a significant advantage
over agent b, we can reduce the size of the remaining chore so that a dominates b. In
Permutation Protocol, we mainly try to modify snapshots such that it gives a significant
advantage to a set of agents over all other agents.
Since a significant value could become insignificant or vice versa by slightly mod-
ifying the residual chore or allocated pieces, we need large the gap between significant
and insignificant values to make sure that a significant value remains significant if we
only slightly modify the allocated pieces and R. To this end, we define very significant
and very insignificant values as follows:
Definition 4.4.2 A value v is very significant for an agent if it is at least 22n times the
cost of R in her perspective.
A value v is very insignificant for an agent if R costs at least 22n times more than v.
Aziz and Mackenzie in [9] show that we can large the gap between significant and in-
significant values using a bounded number of quires by calling the Core Protocol many
times.
184
At the beginning of Main Protocol, we run the Core Protocol ISn × nnn
n
times
where ISn = nn
n . Our goal is to find a set of ISn similar snapshots. In each run, we set
the first agent as the cutter and partially allocate the residual chore between agents. Lets
si be the snapshot generated in the ith call of Core Protocol. The following claim shows
that in each snapshot the cutter has a significant advantage over some other agent.
Claim 4.4.3 In each snapshot returned by the Core Protocol, the cutter has a significant
advantage over at least one other agent.
Proof. In the beginning of Core Protocol, the cutter a divides the residual chore R into
n equally preferred pieces. The Core Protocol returns a partial envy-free allocation such
that at least one piece is completely assigned to a single agent and update the residual
chore. If the cutter got this complete piece, then she thinks that 1/n of the chore is allo-
cated to her. Since the allocation is envy-free every other piece which is allocated to other
agents costs at least 1/n for the cutter. Hence the remaining chore has a cost equal to zero
to her, and based on the definition she has a significant advantage over all other agents.
Otherwise, assume that the complete piece is allocated to another agent. Since the partial
allocation is envy-free, the advantage of the cutter over this agent is at least
Ca(R)





n− 1 the cutter has a significant advantage over the agent who got
the complete piece. 2
After generating snapshots, in each snapshot s, for every agent a, we ask a to place
a trim on any piece other than sa to make it equal to her piece if cost of this piece is not
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significantly larger than sa in her perspective. Main Protocol passes these trim lines to
Permutation Protocol which uses the trim lines to modify the allocated pieces and make
them desirable for other agents, and then tries to exchange the pieces between agents.
An important observation is that if in a snapshot s an agent a has a significant advantage
over some other agent b, and we give sb to some other agent c while preserving the envy-
freeness, then a got a significant advantage over c in s.
We use ts,a1 , t
s,a
2 , · · · , ts,als,a to denote the trim lines from right to left on the piece sa
where s is an arbitrary snapshot and a is an arbitrary agent, and ls,a is number of agents
who had trim on this piece. In the same way we will denote agents who have trims on
this piece from right to left by ds,a1 , d
s,a
2 , · · · , ds,als,a . Moreover, we can partition each piece
based on trim lines. We use es,a1 , e
s,a
2 , · · · , es,als,a to partition sa, where e
s,a
i is a part of sa
between two consecutive trims which the left trim is ts,ai .
Permutation Protocol detaches some part of the pieces from trim lines. We want the
cost of all detached pieces be very small for all agents, so that very significant advantages
remain significant after this procedure. To this end, we make sure that every es,ai costs ei-
ther very significant or very insignificant for all the agents. For this purpose, while there
is an agent who thinks at least one part is neither very significant or very insignificant, we
keep reducing the size of the residual chore for this agent by calling Core Protocol. After
that for every part es,ai , we define mask of this piece or mask
s,a
i to be the set of agents
who think this part costs very significantly. After that, if we find a part es,ai which costs
very significantly to agent b, and trim line of this agent lies on the left of tsai , we can say
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that agent b has got a very significant advantage over agent a in this snapshot, and remove
trim on this agent from sa.
The set of snapshots given to Permutation Protocol should have very similar prop-
erties. In particular, the protocol needs that the order of trims on each piece be the same
between different snapshots and every part has the same mask in all the snapshots.
Definition 4.4.4 We call two snapshots s and s′ isomorphic if :
• For every pieces sa and s′a, they have the same number of trims on them and order
of agents who have a trim on these pieces be the same in both snapshots.
• For every part es,ai and e
s′,a
i , the mask of these parts be the same.
In the following lemma, we show that if we generate at least ISn × nnn
n
snapshots, then
we can find at least ISn isomorphic snapshots. The Main Protocol finds these isomorphic
snapshots and passes them to the Permutation Protocol.
Lemma 4.4.5 Every set of ISn × nnn
n
has at least ISn isomorphic snapshots.
Proof. Considering a piece in a snapshot, this piece has at most n− 1 trims on it, and for
each part of the piece between two trims, there are 2n possible ways to choose the set of








k!× 2nk ≤ n!× 2nn
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this number is less than nnn for n ≥ 3.
Since there are n pieces in a snapshot, the number possibilities a snapshot could have is
nn
nn . So, among ISn × nnn
n
snapshots, there are at least ISn isomorphic snapshots. 2
4.5 The Core Protocol
Aziz and Mackenzie in [9] present a Core Protocol as the core engine of their dis-
crete and bounded algorithm for the cake cutting problem. In each call of the Core Proto-
col, they allocate some cake from the residue to all the agents in an envy-free manner. By
each call of this protocol, they make the remaining cake smaller, but there is no guarantee
that calling this protocol for bounded times suffices to allocate all the cake in an envy-free
manner. Nonetheless, they use this protocol several times in different parts of their main
algorithm.
In the chore division problem, we have a Core Protocol, Algorithm 10, for allo-
cating additional chore from the residue to all the agents in an envy-free manner. Our
Core Protocol works as follows: First we ask the specified cutter to cut the chore into n
equal pieces p1, p2, . . . , pn according to her own perspective. Then, for each ordering of
the agents and each ordering of the pieces, we make a new allocation of the pieces to the
agents. In the new allocation, agents receive their pieces one by one. The first agent re-
ceives the first piece. The ith agent trims the ith piece in such a way to equalize it with her
most preferred piece among the first i− 1 allocated pieces (we consider the cost value of
each piece from its leftmost side to its trim.) If this allocation be envy-free we return the
allocation. In Lemma 4.5.15, we guarantee an ordering of agents and ordering of pieces
188
exists such that the protocol returns an envy-free allocation. In Subsections 4.5.1 through
4.5.7, we provide another core protocol, which is not bounded but we use it to guarantee
such an ordering of the agents and the pieces exists. For this reason, we call the new core
protocol Existential Core Protocol, Algorithm 11.
4.5.1 Existential Core Protocol
We call our Existential Core Protocol on set of agents A with one specified cutter,
and unallocated chore R. In the first step of the protocol we ask the cutter to cut the chore
into n equal pieces p1, p2, . . . , pn according to her own perspective. From now, we work
on these n pieces, and we frequently ask the agents to make trims on them. In different
steps of the algorithm, we may have many trims on each piece, but we have one specific
trim that we call it the main trim. We may change the position of the main trim on a piece,
but we always have exactly one main trim on each piece. As we mentioned before, our
Existential Core Protocol does not necessarily allocate whole of the chore to the agents,
and it finally allocates each of these pieces from their leftmost side to their main trim.
Initially the main trim of each piece is on its rightmost side, and we change their place
frequently during the algorithm. In each step of the algorithm we may allocate a piece up
to its main trim to only one agent. It is very crucial to note that, in this section, when we
say we allocate a piece to an agent we mean that it is allocated from its leftmost side to its
main trim. Also, when we ask the cost value of a piece from a specific agent, she reports
her cost value from the leftmost side of the piece to its main trim.
In Algorithm 11, after the cutter cuts the chore, we run the Separated Chore Core
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Protocol on all the agents and all the pieces with their main trims. The Separated Chore
Core Protocol receives n pieces of the chore with their main trims and a set of n agents,
and it returns an envy-free partial allocation of the pieces to the agents. The properties of
Separated Chore Core Protocol are as follows:
Definition 4.5.1 (Separated Chore Core Protocol Properties)
• It does not change the main trim of pieces to a righter position.
• It does not change the main trim of at least one of the pieces.
In Algorithm 11, when we call Separated Chore Core Protocol, all the main trims
are on the rightmost side of the pieces, but we make many other calls on Separated Chore
Core Protocol such that the main trims are not necessarily on the rightmost side of the
pieces. Separated Chore Core Protocol guarantees that its returned allocation does not
change the main trim of at least one piece. Therefore, we can imply that from the cutter’s
perspective, at least 1/n of the chore is allocated. Existential Core Protocol, Algorithm
11, returns the allocation that Separated Chore Core Protocol returned. In the following
Lemma we prove that if Separated Chore Core Protocol works, Existential Core Protocol
works as well.
Lemma 4.5.2 If Separated Chore Core Protocol, Algorithm 12, works, Existential Core
Protocol, Algorithm 11, gives an envy-free partial allocation to n agents in which one of
the agents is the cutter who cuts the chore into n pieces, each agent gets a part of one of
the pieces, and at least one agent gets a complete piece.
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Proof. If Algorithm 12 works correctly, its returned allocation is an envy-free partial
allocation, and it does not change the main trim of at least one of the pieces. Since in
Algorithm 11, we call Separated Chore Core Protocol for the pieces with a main trim
on the rightmost side, at least one of the pieces is completely allocated in the returned
allocation by Separated Chore Core Protocol. 2
4.5.2 Separated Chore Core Protocol
In this Subsection we describe Separated Chore Core Protocol, Algorithm 12. As
we mentioned in Subsection 4.5.1, this protocol receives a chore with n pieces as well as
a set of n agents, and it returns an envy-free partial allocation of the pieces to the agents
such that the main trim of at least one of the pieces remains intact. We say a piece is intact
during a protocol P if its main trim does not change during the call of P .
This protocol is based on an iterative idea in lines 2-21 of Algorithm 12. After the
ith iteration of the loop we ensure that we have a neat allocation for the first i agents. We
define a neat property for allocations as follows:
Definition 4.5.3 We call an allocation ofm disjoint pieces of the chore to n agents (where
n ≤ m) neat if the following properties hold:
• The allocation allocates a (not necessarily whole) part of exactly one of the pieces
to each agent.
• no agent prefers an unallocated piece or another agent’s allocation to her alloca-
tion.
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In the ith step of the loop, before running Line 20, we already have a neat allocation
of pieces to the first i agents (we describe it in details later), and in Line 20, by running
Best Piece Equalizer Protocol, it modifies the neat allocation. Best Piece Equalizer Proto-
col, Algorithm 15, is a protocol receiving a neat allocation of some pieces to some agents
(one piece each agent), and it returns a modified neat allocation of pieces to the agents
(one piece each agent). The properties of Best Piece Equalizer Protocol are as follows:
Definition 4.5.4 (Best Piece Equalizer Protocol Properties)
• The protocol is monotone.
• The returned allocation does not have any subset of bad agents.
We define the monotonicity of a protocol as follows:
Definition 4.5.5 Assume that P is a protocol which receives a neat allocation of pieces
to agent set A as input, and outputs another neat allocation of the pieces to the same set
of agents. We call protocol P monotone if and only if it does not change the main trim of
any piece p to a lefter position.
We also define a bad subset of agents as follows:
Definition 4.5.6 When we have a neat allocation of the pieces to some of the agents, we
call a subset of agents S bad if the following conditions hold:
• One piece is allocated to each agent in S.
• None of the allocated pieces to the agents in S is intact.
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• For each agent a ∈ S, the cost of the piece that we have allocated to a is less than
the cost of any other piece.
We describe Best Piece Equalizer Protocol more briefly in Subsection 4.5.5.
Now, we describe how the protocol makes a neat allocation of pieces to the first i
agents before running Best Piece Equalizer Protocol in Line 20. In the ith step of the loop,
agent ai chooses piece p which is her most preferred piece among all pieces. However, p
may be allocated before. If in the end of the (i − 1)th step of the loop, p is not allocated
to any agent, then we can simply allocate it to ai (As mentioned before, we emphasize
that when we allocate a piece to an agent, we allocate a partial part of it from its leftmost
side to its main trim). Although we easily handled the case that p is not allocated, the
other case is much harder. If p has been allocated to another agent aj before, we have a
conflict of interest on piece p. We define a popular piece and its happy or sad fan agents
as follows:
Definition 4.5.7 When at least two agents a and b prefer a specific piece p to all other
pieces, we call p a popular piece, and we call agents a and b the fans of piece p. We also
call agent a a happy fan of p if she is a fan of p and p is already allocated to her, and we
call her a sad fan of p if she is a fan of p but p is not already allocated to her.
According to Definition 4.5.7, piece p is a popular piece, agent aj is its happy fan,
and agent ai is its sad fan. We handle this conflict of interest based on two different
cases whether the main trim of p is the same its initial main trim or not. First, we deal
with the case that the main trim of p is not changed. In this case, we run Allocation
Extender Protocol for all the pieces with their main trims, the first i agents with their
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current allocation, the popular piece p, and its fan agents ai and aj . Allocation Extender
Protocol is a protocol which receives a neat allocation of pieces to the agents, a popular
piece p, and its two specific happy and sad fan agents a and b. Note that in the allocation
that this protocol receives, agent b is the only agent who does not have any piece. This
protocol returns a neat allocation of pieces to the agents such that every agent has a piece
and the main trim of piece p is not changed during the call of the protocol. We describe
Allocation Extender Protocol more briefly in Subsection 4.5.3.
Now, we deal with the case that p is not an intact piece. The general idea to handle
this case is that to modify the current allocation such that an intact piece becomes the
popular piece. Then, we can handle it similar to the previous case. We do this modifica-
tion by calling Core Match Refiner Protocol, Algorithm 17. Core Match Refiner Protocol
is a protocol which receives a neat allocation of pieces to agents, with a specific popular
piece p. This protocol returns a new neat allocation and a flag variable with the following
properties:
• In the new allocation piece p does not have any owner agent.
• If flag be false, the new allocation has assigned a piece to each called agent.
• If flag be true, the new allocation has assigned a piece to each called agent except
one of them, who is the sad fan of one of the intact pieces.
We call Core Match Refiner Protocol for all the pieces with their main trims, the
first i − 1 agents with their current allocation, and the popular piece p. The call returns
a refined neat allocation and a flag (In the case the flag is true, it returns the new popular
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piece q with agent a as its happy fan and agent b as its sad fan.) In the new allocation,
piece p does not have any owner agent, so we can easily allocate it to ai. If the flag is false,
we have already increased the size of our neat allocation. If the flag is true, the situation
is similar to the previous case such that there exists a popular intact piece q. Similar to
the first case, we can run Allocation Extender Protocol (Line 16 of the Algorithm 12).
In the following lemma, we prove the correctness of Separated Chore Core Protocol.
Lemma 4.5.8 If Allocation Extender Protocol, Core Match Refiner Protocol, and Best
Piece Equalizer Protocol work, Separated Chore Core Protocol, Algorithm 12, gives an
envy-free partial allocation to the called agents such that Separated Chore Core Protcol
Properties hold.
Proof. This protocol works based on an induction on the number of agents. We use a
stronger induction hypothesis to prove that the protocol works correctly. We prove that
after the i-th step of the loop, we have a neat allocation of pieces to the first i agents such
that at least one of the agents receives an intact piece, and there exists no bad subset of
agents.
As the base case of the induction, in the first step of the loop, since all the pieces are
unallocated, we can easily allocate the most preferred piece of a1 to her without changing
its main trim. Therefore, we have a neat allocation to the first agent who receives an intact
piece, and there exists no bad subset of agents.
Now, we assume that after the first i− 1 step of the loop, we have a neat allocation
of pieces to the first i agents such that at least one of the agents receives an intact piece,
and there exists no bad subset of agents. In the i-th step, if we can allocate the most
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preferred piece of ai, piece p, to her, since after the i−1-th step, we had a neat allocation,
we still have a neat allocation, and one of the agents still have an intact piece. By running
Best Piece Equalizer Protocol, since it is a monotone protocol, we do not change the main
trim of the allocated intact piece. Moreover, running Best Piece Equalizer Protocol makes
sure that we do not have any bad subset of agents in our neat allocation. Therefore, the
induction works for this case.
Now, we deal with the case that piece p has been allocated to aj , and we cannot
allocate it to ai. In this case, if p be an intact piece, we run Allocation Extender Protocol.
This protocol returns us a neat allocation of pieces to all the first i agents, and it does not
change the main trim of p. Therefore, we have a neat allocation such that at least one
of the agents receives an intact piece. Now, assume that p is not an intact piece. In this
case, first we run Core Match Refiner Protocol, and then we allocate p to ai (Since after
the i − 1-th step of the loop, we do not have any bad subset of agents, we can run Core
Match Refiner Protocol.) If flag be false, we already have a neat allocation, and Core
Match Refiner Protocol has assigned an intact piece to one of the agents. If flag be true,
we have converted this case to the case that the popular piece was intact. Therefore, by
running Allocation Extender Protocol, we have a neat allocation of pieces to all the first i
agents. In the end, running Best Piece Equalizer Protocol returns a refined neat allocation
without any bad subset of agents. As we mentioned, since this protocol is monotone, its
result does not change the main trim of an intact piece. Hence, we can infer that after the
last step of the loop, we have a neat allocation of pieces to agents such that at least one of
the pieces is intact, and there exists no bad subset of agents. 2
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4.5.3 Allocation Extender Protocol
In this subsection, we describe Allocation Extender Protocol, Algorithm 13. This
protocol receives a neat allocation of the pieces to the agents such that all the called
agents has a piece except agent b who is the sad fan of the popular piece p. The goal of
this protocol is that to find a neat allocation which allocates a piece to each called agent
and does not change the main trim of p.
In this protocol, first we ask agents a and b to trim each piece equal to p. For
each piece q, we change its main trim to the rightmost trim made by a and b. Then,
we deallocate all the allocated pieces but we remember the allocation as the original
mapping and the main trim of the pieces as the original mapping trims. Then we run
SubCore Protocol, Algorithm 14. SubCore Protocol is a protocol which receives a set of
agents and pieces with an original mapping such that the main trim of each piece is not
righter than its original mapping trim. It returns a neat allocation of pieces to agents (one
piece each agent) such that the following properties hold:
Definition 4.5.9 (SubCore Protocol Properties)
• It does not change the main trim of unallocated pieces.
• It does not change the main trim of any allocated piece to a lefter position.
• It does not change the main trim of a piece to a righter position than its original
mapping trim.
We describe this protocol more briefly in Subsection 4.5.4. We emphasize that
we do not change the original mapping during each call of SubCore Protocol. We call
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SubCore Protocol for all the first i agents except a and b with all the pieces except piece
p. This call gives us a neat allocation of the called pieces to the called agents. After this
call, we allocate a piece to a and another piece to b from the unallocated pieces in the
following manner. We should have at least two unallocated pieces such that one of them
is p. We take one of the other unallocated pieces q. First, we allocate q to the agent among
a and b who made the main trim on it, and then, we allocate p to the other agent. Now, we
have allocated a piece to each agent. In the following lemma, we prove that Allocation
Extender Protocol works correctly.
Lemma 4.5.10 If SubCore Protocol works, Allocation Extender Protocol returns a neat
allocation of pieces to agents (one piece each agent) such that p is an intact piece in this
protocol.
Proof. In the beginning of the Algorithm, agents a and b make trims on each piece equal
to p. They can make this trim because p is their most preferred piece. Then, by calling
SubCore Protocol, we have a neat allocation of pieces to all agents except a and b. Then,
as we mentioned, we allocate an unallocated piece to each agent a and b. Without loss of
generality, assume that agent a receives p and agent b receives q. Since SubCore Protocol
returns a neat allocation to the called agents, They do not envy each other. They also do
not envy to a, b or any unallocated piece, because after running SubCore Protocol, we
have not changed the main trim of pieces. agents a and b do not envy the other agents,
because according to SubCore Protocol Properties, SubCore Protocol does not change the
main trim of allocated pieces to a lefter position, and it does not change the main trim of
unallocated pieces. Agents a and b do not envy to an unallocated piece, because SubCore
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Protocol does not change the main trim of unallocated pieces. It is also easy to check that
they do not envy each other. 2
4.5.4 SubCore Protocol
In this Subsection, we describe Algorithm 14 in more details. As we mentioned
before, this protocol gets a subset of agents and a subset of pieces with their main trims
as well as the original mapping of agents to pieces. As we mentioned, in the original
mapping, we have an allocation of pieces to agents (one piece each agent, and some of
the pieces may be unallocated) such that in each call of the protocol, for each allocated
piece in the original mapping, its original mapping trim is righter than its main trim.
The protocol returns a neat allocation of pieces to the agents such that SubCore Protocol
Properties, definition 4.5.9, hold.
In this protocol, similar to the idea that we used in Algorithm 12, we find a neat
allocation iteratively. In Algorithm 14, we implement this loop in lines 2-32. We add the
agents one by one, and in the end of the i-th step of the loop, we have a neat allocation
of pieces to the first i agents. Similar to Algorithm 12 in the i-th step, we ask agent ai to
choose her most preferred piece. Assume that p is her choice, and it is not allocated to
other agents. In this case, we can easily allocate p to ai. Otherwise, we should handle the
case in a much more complicated manner.
When agent ai chooses a piece which is allocated to another agent, we have i agents
that the first preference of each of them is among i − 1 pieces. We call this set of allo-
cated pieces P . We have |P | = i − 1 allocated pieces, and we call these i − 1 pieces
199
contested pieces. The intuition to resolve this issue is to find a way to allocate one of
the pieces outside of P to one of the first i agents. However, none of the first i agents
may prefer these pieces. Hence, for using this idea, we need to change the main trim of
some contested pieces and reallocate them to agents. To this end, we ask each of the first
i agents to make a trim on each of the contested pieces to equalize it with the cost value
of her most preferred piece outside of P . For an agent, if the cost value of a contested
piece from its leftmost side to its original mapping trim was less than the cost value of
her most preferred piece outside of P , She makes a trim on the original mapping trim of
the contested piece. We define a representative agent for each piece in P (we have not
assigned them yet.) If the trim of agent aj ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , ai} on contested piece q was
the rightmost trim, and q was the original mapping of aj , we set aj as the representative
of q. Otherwise, the agent with the rightmost trim and lowest index is its representative.
We define set W as the set of agents who are the representative of at least one piece in
P . In Lemma 4.5.11, we prove that W is the set of agents who are guaranteed to have a
neat allocation. Therefore, our idea is to enlarge |W | up to |P | and make sure we have a
neat allocation of P to agents in W . In each step of the loop in lines 19-30 of Algorithm
14, we increase the size of W by adding exactly one agent to it. In each step of this
loop, we update the main trim of each piece in P by agents in W ′ = {a1, . . . , ai} \W
as follows: for each piece p ∈ P , we find the rightmost trim among the trims that the
agents in W ′ have made on p, and update the main trim of p to this trim. Then, we find
another mapping of pieces to agents in W ′ (one piece each agent), and we call it modified
original mapping. We will use this mapping as the original mapping in our recursive call
of SubCore Protocol. We find the modified original mapping as follows: we know that
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each agent in W is a representative of at least one piece in P . For each agent aj ∈ W , if
paj ∈ P and aj was the representative of paj , we assign paj to aj in the modified original
mapping. Otherwise, we assign an arbitrary piece, from the set of pieces that aj is their
representative, to her. In both cases, the modified original mapping trim is the trim of aj
on the piece. The modified original mapping trim of a piece is its main trim in the modi-
fied original mapping. Moreover, the modified original mapping trim of each unallocated
piece of P in the modified original mapping is the trim of its representative agent on it.
In Lemma 4.5.11, we prove that this is an envy-free mapping of pieces to agents.
After finding the modified original mapping of W to P , we call SubCore Protocol
on all pieces in P with their main trims, the agents in W , and the modified original
mapping of W recursively. This call allocates a piece of P to each agent in W in a neat
manner. If |W | = |P |, we break the loop, and among the first i agents, we have exactly
one agent that we have not allocated any piece to her. Let a be this specific agent. We
allocate the most preferred piece out of P for a to her. In Lemma 4.5.11, we prove that
this allocation is feasible. Now, as the other case, assume that |W | 6= |P |. In this situation,
we should further continue enlarging W . We take an arbitrary piece q from unallocated
pieces of P . Let agent a ∈ {a1, . . . , ai} \ W be the agent who has the rightmost trim
on q (In Lemma 4.5.11, we prove that this trim is the main trim of q.) If more than one
such agent exists, a is the agent with the lowest index. We allocate q to a and add a to
W . Note that in the beginning of this loop we ignore the previous trims of agents in W
and deallocate the allocated pieces, because we will find another allocation by calling
SubCore Protocol recursively.
In the following lemma, we prove that our SubCore Protocol guarantees a neat
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allocation, and all the SubCore Protocol Properties hold.
Lemma 4.5.11 Suppose that we have set A of n agents and m pieces where n ≤ m.
Each of the pieces has an original mapping trim as well as a main trim such that the main
trim of each piece is not righter than its original mapping trim. Also, assume that there
is a neat allocation for the agents and the pieces with their original mapping (using their
original mapping trims). Then, calling the SubCore Protocol for these agents and pieces
returns a neat allocation of pieces to agents such that all the SubCore Protocol Properties
that we mentioned in Definition 4.5.9 hold.
Proof. The SubCore Protocol works based on an induction on the number of agents n.
As the base case, when n = 1, the protocol allocates the most preferred piece of the only
agent to her, and it returns the allocation without changing any main trim. The allocation
is clearly neat, since the agent chooses her most preferred piece, and all the SubCore
Protocol Properties hold, since we do not change any main trim. Therefore, the Lemma
for n = 1 works.
For n agents, Algorithm 14 makes a neat allocation of the pieces to agents iteratively
by the loop in Lines 2-32. We call this loop the main loop of the protocol. The main idea
of the proof is as follows: in the end of the i-th iteration of the main loop, we make sure
that we have a neat allocation for the first i agents such that all the SubCore Protocol
Properties hold. For the first agent in the main loop, her most preferred piece can be
easily allocated to her, since none of the pieces has been allocated yet. Hence, after the
first iteration, we have not changed any main trim, and for the first agent, all the SubCore
Protocol Properties hold. Now, assume that after the i − 1-th iteration, for the first i − 1
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agents, we have a neat allocation such that all the SubCore Protocol Properties hold. In
the i-th step of the main loop, the algorithm first asks ai to choose her most preferred
piece p. We have two cases, and we discuss about them separately: (1) p is not allocated
to an agent and (2) p is allocated to an agent.
Case (1) is the easier case. In this case, we allocate p to ai tentatively. Since
after the i − 1-th iteration of the main loop, the allocation for the first i − 1 agents was
neat, after allocating p to ai, they do not envy ai. Moreover, since ai chooses her most
preferred piece, she does not prefer any other agent’s or any unallocated piece. Hence,
our allocation is a neat allocation. In this step of the loop, we do not change any main
trim, thus all the SubCore Protocol Properties hold.
Now, we deal with case (2). In this case, in our final allocation, we use the same set
of allocated pieces, P , as well as one of the pieces out of P . However, we may change
the allocation, and some agents may not receive the same piece that they had before. First
we reallocate P to i − 1 agents of the first i agents in the loop in Lines 19-30. Then, we
allocate one of the pieces out of P to the only remaining agent among the first i agents.
First, we prove that the properties of the SubCore Protocol hold. Line 23 is the only
place we may update the main trims during our protocol. In this update, we only may
change the main trim of the pieces in P , and we change them to a righter position. As
we discussed before, we allocate all the pieces in P by the end of the i-th iteration of the
main loop. Hence, we do not change the main trim of unallocated pieces, and we do not
change the main trim of the allocated pieces to a lefter position. Therefore, we can infer
that all the SubCore Protocol Properties hold.
Now, we prove that we find a neat allocation by the end of case (2). We initialize
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set W with the representatives of the pieces in P , and we increase its size one by one in
the loop in Lines 19-30. First of all, we prove that running SubCore Protocol recursively
is possible in this loop. To this end, we prove that the modified original mapping has two
properties:
• Property (A1): For each agent a ∈ W , if in the mapping, q be the assigned piece
to agent a, the modified original mapping trim of q is righter than its main trim.
• Property (A2): The modified original mapping is envy-free.
If we prove the above properties, calling SubCore Protocol in Line 24 is feasible.
Proof of Property (A1): Since q ∈ P , q is the most preferred piece among all the
pieces for at least one agent a in the first i agents. Therefore, the trim of a is not lefter
than the main trim of q, and it implies that the rightmost trim on q is not lefter than its
main trim.
Proof of Property (A2): For each agent a ∈ W , we show that in the modified
original mapping, she does not envy any other agent b ∈ W . Let p1 and p2 be the pieces
that we have assigned to agents a and b in the modified original mapping consecutively.
As the first case, let the trim of agent a on p2 be lefter than the trim of agent b on it. In
this case, clearly a does not envy b. As the second case, let the trim of both agents a and b
be lefter than the original mapping trim of p2. In this case, a does not envy b as well. The
reason is that in this case the cost value of p2, from its leftmost side to the trim of a, for a
is equal to the cost value of her most preferred piece outside of P , and the cost value of
p1, from its leftmost side to the trim of a, is at most equal to the cost value of her most
preferred piece outside of P . As the last case, assume that the trim of both agents a and
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b on p2 are on the original mapping trim of p2. We deal with this case in two following
subcases:
• SubCase 1: p1 is the assigned piece to agent a in the original mapping.
• SubCase 2: p1 is not the assigned piece to agent a in the original mapping.
Analysis of SubCase 1: Since the original mapping is envy-free, in this SubCase
agent a does not envy agent b.
Analysis of SubCase 2: Let q 6= p1 be the assigned piece to agent a in the original
mapping. If q ∈ P , since the trim of agent a on piece p2 is on its original mapping trim,
her trim on piece q should be on its original mapping trim as well. Therefore, agent a
should be the representative of q, and the protocol should assign q to a in the modified
original mapping instead of p1. Therefore, q /∈ P . Now, if q is the most preferred piece
for agent a outside of P , since the original mapping allocation is envy-free, the cost value
of q should be equal to the cost value of both p1 and p2 (for each of these pieces, by the
cost value of a piece, we mean its cost value for agent a from its leftmost side to the trim
of a.) In this situation, we can imply that agent a does not envy to b. Now, assume that
q is not the most preferred piece for agent a outside of P . Since the original mapping is
envy-free, the cost value of q, from its leftmost side to its original mapping trim, for a
is not more than the cost value of p2, from its leftmost side to its original mapping trim.
Since the main trim of q is not righter than its original mapping trim, and q is not the most
preferred piece for a outside of P , the trim of a on p2 should be lefter than its original
mapping trim. This is not feasible, because in this case, we assumed that the trim of both
agents a and b are on the original mapping trim of p2.
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The proof of Property (A2) is complete.
Immediately after calling SubCore Protocol, the agents in set W do not envy each
other, because we have recursively called the SubCore Protocol for smaller number of
agents, and according to the induction hypothesis, we can say that SubCore Protocol
returns a neat allocation. It also infers that the agents in W do not prefer the unallocated
pieces in P to their piece. Now, we prove that any agent a ∈ W does not prefer any
piece out of P to her own piece. To this end, assume that the allocated piece to agent
a after calling SubCore Protocol is piece p1. According to SubCore Protocol Properties,
the main trim of p1 is not righter than its modified original mapping trim. Therefore, if
the modified original mapping trim of piece p1 is made by agent a, she does not prefer
any piece outside of P to p1. Now, we deal with the case the modified original mapping
trim of piece p1 is made by another agent. We know that agent a has made the modified
original mapping trim of at least one of the pieces in P . Let p2 be this piece. According to
SubCore Protocol Properties, we know that after calling SubCore Protocol the main trim
of p2 is not righter than its modified original mapping trim. Therefore, we can infer that
since agent a does not prefer p2 to p1, she does not prefer the pieces outside of P as well.
After calling SubCore Protocol recursively, we have two following cases.
• Case A: |W | 6= |P |
• Case B: |W | = |P |
Analysis of Case A: If Case A happens, we take an arbitrary piece q from unallo-
cated pieces of P such that a ∈ W ′ is the agent with the lowest index among the agents
who have the rightmost trim on q. Then, we allocate it to a and add a to set W . First of
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all, we show that the main trim of q is equal to the trim of agent a on it. We know that im-
mediately after i− 1-th iteration of the main loop, for each piece in P , at least one agent
among the first i − 1 agents prefer the piece the most. Assume that immediately after
i− 1-th iteration of the main loop, agent b is the agent who prefers q the most. Therefore,
when the agents trim the pieces in P , agent b does not trim q on a lefter position than its
main trim. Now, if b /∈ W , we can make sure that we update the main trim of q by a
in Line 22. As the other case, assume that b ∈ W . In this situation, by calling SubCore
Protocol, in Line 24, we have allocated a piece q′ to b. According to SubCore Protocol
Properties, by calling SubCore Protocol, we have not changed the main trim of q′ to a
lefter position. Therefore, since b does not prefer q to q′, we can make sure that we update
the main trim of q by a in Line 22.
Now, we show that agent a does not envy to the other agents in W . For the sake
of contradiction assume that a envies another agent b ∈ W . Assume that after calling
SubCore Protocol, in Line 24, piece p1 is allocated to b. Before calling SubCore Protocol
agent a has made her trim on piece p1. Since before calling SubCore Protocol a /∈ W ,
according to SubCore Protocol Properties, when we call SubCore Protocol, we do not
change the main trim of p1 to a lefter position than the trim of agent a. Therefore, the
only way that a envies b is that the trim of agent a be on the original mapping trim of p1.
In this situation, the cost value of p1, from its leftmost side to its original mapping trim,
for agent a is less than the cost value of her most preferred piece outside of P , from its
leftmost side to its main trim. Now, assume that p2 is the allocated piece to agent a in the
original mapping. p2 should be in P or outside of P . Therefore, if we show that it can
be in none of them, it is a contradiction. First, we show that p2 /∈ P . If p2 ∈ P , since
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the original mapping is envy-free, the trim of agent a on p2 is on its original mapping
trim. Therefore, agent a should be the representative of p2. It means that before calling
SubCore Protocol, agent a should be in W , which is a contradiction. Now, we show that
p2 is not outside of P . We know that the cost value of p1, from its leftmost side to its
original mapping trim, for a is less than the cost value of her most preferred piece outside
of P , from its leftmost side to its main trim, and also we know that the original mapping
trim is envy-free. Therefore, we can infer that the cost value of p2, from its leftmost side
to its original mapping trim, for a is less than the cost value of her most preferred piece
outside of P , from its leftmost side to its main trim. Since the main trim of p2 is not righter
than its original mapping trim, we can say that the cost value of p2, from its leftmost side
to its main trim, for a is less than the cost value of her most preferred piece outside of P ,
from its leftmost side to its main trim. This is a contradiction, because p2 is in the outside
of P . According to this contradiction, we can infer that agent a does not envy any agent
b ∈ W . Moreover, since agent a updated the main trim of piece q, which is the piece that
we allocated to her, she does not prefer the pieces outside of P to q as well.
Analysis of Case B: If Case B happens, we break the loop. Let a be the only agent
in the first i agents that we have not allocated any piece to her. We allocate her most
preferred piece outside of P to her. Let q be this piece. Clearly, agent a does not prefer
any other piece outside of P to q, because q is the most preferred one. With a similar
argument that we made in the analysis of Case A, we can show that agent a does not envy
the agents in W .
In the above analyses we guaranteed the envy-freeness of our allocation. 2
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4.5.5 Best Piece Equalizer Protocol
In this Subsection, we describe Best Piece Equalizer Protocol. Assume that we have
a neat allocation of pieces to some agents. The goal of Best Piece Equalizer Protocol is
that to update the neat allocation and the main trims of the allocated pieces such that all the
Best Piece Equalizer Protocol Properties, Definition 4.5.4, hold. This protocol is based on
a loop in Lines 1-17. We call it as the main loop of the protocol. In each step of the main
loop we find a bad subset of agents, and by changing the current allocation, we make it a
non-bad subset. This loop ends when we do not have anymore bad subset. Assume that
S is a bad subset of agents in a step of the main loop, and P is the set of pieces that we
have allocated to S. While S is a bad set, we ask each agent a ∈ S to makes a trim on
each piece p ∈ P to equalize it with her most preferred piece out of P (If the cost value
of p from its leftmost side to its rightmost side was less than the cost value of her most
preferred piece out of P , she makes a trim on the rightmost side of p.) We call the leftmost
trim on p which is righter than its main trim as the equalizer trim of p, and we call the
current allocation of pieces to agents as the old allocation. We run Separated Chore Core
Protocol on all the agents in S and all the pieces in P with their equalizer trims as their
main trims. The call returns an envy-free partial allocation of pieces to agents such that
all Separated Chore Core Protocol Properties that we mentioned in Definition 4.5.1 hold.
We call the returned allocation the new allocation. In the new allocation, the main trim of
a piece may change to a lefter position than its initial main trim. This makes our protocol
non-monotone. We guarantee the monotonicity of the protocol by running Monotonicity
Saver Protocol. Monotonicity Saver Protocol is a protocol receiving n agents as well as n
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pieces, a neat allocation of pieces to agents (one piece each agent) as the old allocation,
and a neat allocation of pieces to agents (one piece each agent) as the new allocation.
This protocol returns another neat allocation such that the main trim of each piece in
the result allocation is not lefter than the main trim of the secondary allocation. We run
Monotonicity Saver Protocol for the agents in S, the pieces in P , and the old as well
as the new allocation. We update our current allocation with the returned allocation by
Monotonicity Saver Protocol.
In the following lemma, we prove the correctness of Best Piece Equalizer Protocol
if Separated Chore Core Protocol and Monotonicity Saver Protocol work correctly.
Lemma 4.5.12 If Separated Chore Core Protocol and Monotonicity Saver Protocol work
correctly, Best Piece Equalizer Protocol returns a neat allocation (one piece each agent),
and all the Best Piece Equalizer Protocol Properties, that we mentioned in Definition
4.5.4, hold.
Proof. First of all, we prove that in each iteration of the main loop we make subset S of
the agents a non-bad subset. When we ask each agent to make a trim on each piece p in
P to equalize it with her most preferred piece out of P , at least the trim of the owner of
p is righter than its main trim, because S is a bad subset of agents, and according to the
definition, the cost value of each piece for its owner in P should be less than her most
preferred piece out of P . Thus, we can guarantee that the two following properties:
• Property 1: The equalizer trim of each piece exists.
• Property 2: Each agent in S has a trim on at least one of the pieces which is not
lefter than the main trim of that piece.
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Then, by running Separated Chore Core Protocol, according to its properties in
Definition 4.5.1, we receive an allocation such that at least one of the called pieces is
intact, and the main trim of any other piece is not changed to a righter position. Before
running Separated Chore Core Protocol, we have an allocation, and we call it the old
allocation. After running Separated Chore Core Protocol we have another allocation, and
we call it the new allocation. Now, we prove that the allocation that we have after running
Montonicity Saver Protocol is neat, but before that let S1 be the subset of S such that
the main trim of their pieces have not changed by the Monotonicity Saver Protocol, and
S2 = S \ S1.
• proof of envy-freeness in S: Since the returned allocation by Monotonicity Saver
Protocol is envy-free partial, the agents in S do not envy each other.
• proof of envy-freeness of agents in S to agents out of S and unallocated pieces: As
we mentioned, Separated Chore Core Protocol returns an allocation such that none
of the main trims has changed to a righter position. Thus, according to Property 2,
we can infer that in the allocation returned by Separated Chore Core Protocol for
each agent a the cost value of at least one of the pieces in P is not more than the
cost value of her most preferred piece out of P . Based on this and envy-freeness
of the returned allocation by Separated Chore Core Protocol, we can infer that after
running Separated Chore Core Protocol and before running Monotonicity Saver
Protocol, the agents in S do not prefer any piece out of P to their allocated pieces.
Since after running Monotonicity Saver Protocol the allocated pieces to S1 (and
their main trims) have not changed, the agents in S1 do not envy to agents out of
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S and unallocated pieces. Moreover, in the Monotonicity Saver Protocol, we have
changed the allocated pieces to S2 to their allocated pieces in the old allocation.
In the old allocation, they did not prefer the pieces out of P to their own piece.
Therefore, they do not prefer these pieces again.
• proof of envy-freeness of agents out of S to agents in S: the main trim of allocated
pieces to agents in S1 have not changed to a lefter position, and the main trim of
pieces allocated to agents in S2 have not changed. Therefore, since before running
Separated Chore Core Protocol the agents out of S did not envy the agents in S,
after running Monotonicity Saver Protocol, we keep this envy-freeness property.
By running Monotonicity Saver Protocol, we make sure that after each iteration of
the main loop, the main trim of any piece has not changed to a lefter position. Therefore,
we can infer that our protocol is monotone.
Unfortunately, the main loop of our protocol may iterate infinite times, but the good
property of our protocol is that in each iteration, it changes the main trim of some pieces
(at least one piece) to a righter position, and it does not change the main trim of any piece
to a lefter position. The reason that in the main loop, we change the main trim of at
least one of the pieces to a righter position is that all the equalizer trims are righter than
the main trims, and by running Separated Chore Core Protocol at least one of the called
pieces remains intact. Since each piece has a rightmost side, a limit, and our protocol
is monotone, and it changes the main trim of at least one piece in each iteration, we can
infer that we converge to a neat allocation solution if the protocol does not finish in finite
iterations. 2
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4.5.6 Monotonicity Saver Protocol
In this subsection, we describe Monotonicity Saver Protocol, Algorithm 16. As we
mentioned in Subsection 4.5.5, this protocol receives a set of n pieces, a set of n agents,
and two different allocation of pieces to agents with different main trims. We call these
allocations the new and the allocations. Our goal is to change the new allocation such that
the main trim of each piece does not be lefter than its main trim in the old allocation.
Let P be the set of pieces whose main trim in the new allocation is lefter than its
main trim in the old allocation, and let S be the set of agents who own the pieces in
P . First, we deallocate the pieces that we have allocated to the agents of S in the new
allocation. Then, for each agent ai ∈ S, we change the main trim of pai to its main trim in
the old allocation, and we allocate it to ai. In Lemma 4.5.13, we prove that this allocation
is feasible and the protocol works correctly.
Lemma 4.5.13 Monotonicity Saver Protocol returns an envy-free partial allocation of
pieces to agents (one piece each agent) such that the main trim of each piece in the
returned allocation is not lefter than its main trim in the old allocation.
Proof. If the reallocation that we made during the protocol be feasible, clearly the main
trim of each piece in the returned allocation is not lefter than its main trim in the old
allocation. The reason is that we changed the main trim of each piece whose main trim
was lefter than its main trim in the old allocation. Now, first we prove that our reallocation
was feasible, and then we prove that the returned allocation is envy-free partial.
Let S ′ be the set of agents that we have allocated P to them in the old allocation. If
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S = S ′, it means that the reallocation is feasible. Clearly, |S| = |S ′|, and if for each agent
a ∈ S ′ we prove a ∈ S, it infers that S = S ′. Since the old allocation is an envy-free
partial allocation, for each agent a ∈ S ′, the main trim of the piece that we allocated to her
in the new allocation should be lefter than its main trim in the old allocation. Therefore,
we can imply that a ∈ S.
Now, we prove that the returned allocation is envy-free partial. The agents of S do
not envy each other, because the old allocation was envy-free. The agents of A \S do not
envy each other, because the new allocation was envy-free. The agents of S do not prefer
a piece whose main trim is righter than its main trim in the old allocation, thus they do not
envy the agents of A \ S. Finally, the agents of A \ S do not prefer a piece whose main
trim is righter than its main trim in the new allocation, thus they do not envy the agents of
S. 2
4.5.7 Core Match Refiner Protocol
In Core Match Refiner Protocol, Algorithm 17, we build a special graph that we
call it the Core Match Refiner Graph. We build Core Match Refiner Graph G as follows:
For each piece we have a vertex in G. We connect the vertex of piece p to the vertex of
piece q with a directed edge if and only if Ca(p) = Ca(q) where agent a is the owner of
p.
In the following lemma, we prove that Core Match Refiner Protocol works correctly.
Lemma 4.5.14 Core Match Refiner Protocol works correctly.
Proof. This lemma is almost trivial. The only point is that we can find a path P which
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ends in an unallocated or an intact piece. We can find P because we do not have any bad
subset of agents and we have at least one unallocated or intact piece. 2
4.5.8 Final Remarks
In the previous subsections, for each protocol P we prove that if each of the pro-
tocols that P calls it works correctly, P works correctly as well. In Figure 4.1, we have
a graph of these protocols. Protocol P1 has an edge to Protocol P2, if P1 calls P2. If
the graph did not have a loop, we could infer that the whole procedure works correctly.
However, we have two loops in the graph. The first loop happens in the SubCore Protocol
such that it calls itself recursively. Anytime this protocol calls itself, the call happens
on a smaller subset of agents, and we know that when the number of agents is one, it
does not call itself anymore. The second loop happens between Separated Chore Core
Protocol and Best Piece Equalizer Protocol. Similarly, each time Best Piece Equalizer
Protocol calls Separated Chore Core Protocol, the call happens on a smaller number of
agents. Moreover, Separated Chore Core Protocol does not call Best Piece Equalizer Pro-
tocol on a larger number of agents. We also know that when the number of agents is
one, Separated Chore Core Protocol does not call Best Piece Equalizer Protocol anymore.
Therefore, based on a simple induction we can infer that none of these loops makes any
issue in the correctness of the whole procedure.
Running Existential Core Protocol returns an envy-free partial allocation. As we
mentioned in Subsection 4.5.5, we may need infinite number of queries in each call of
Best Piece Equalizer Protocol. This makes Existential Core Protocol unbounded, but
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Figure 4.1: The Graph of the protocols in the Core. If Protocol P1 has an edge to Protocol
P2, it means that P1 calls P2.
since Best Piece Equalizer Protocol is a monotone protocol with an upper-bound, as we
discussed in Subsection 4.5.5, it converges to a solution.
Now, in the following lemma using Existential Core Protocol, we guarantee that
Core Protocol, Algorithm 10, returns an envy-free partial allocation.
Lemma 4.5.15 Core Protocol, Algorithm 10, is a discrete and bounded algorithm that
returns an envy-free partial allocation of pieces to agents (one piece each agent) such
that at least one of the pieces is completely allocated.
Proof. The algorithm is clearly discrete and bounded. Now, we show that there exists an
ordering of agents and pieces which guarantees an envy-free partial allocation. It suffices
to show that the returned allocation of Existential Core Protocol can be made by one of the
orderings of agents and pieces in Core Protocol. To this end, we analyze the properties of
the returned allocation by Existential Core Protocol. Existential Core Protocol guarantees
that we have allocated a complete piece to at least one of the agents. Without loss of
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generality, assume that agent a is this agent, and piece p is allocated to her. We create
two vectors VA and VP of the agents and the pieces consecutively. They finally will be
the ordering of the agents and the pieces that we are looking for. We add agent a to VA
and piece p to VP . In the end of each iteration of the main loop of Separated Chore Core
Protocol we call the best piece equalizer protocol. Therefore, in the returned allocation
we should not have any bad subset of agents. First of all, for each agent b 6= a who
has received a complete piece q, we add b to VA and q to VP . Now, we iteratively add
the other agents and pieces to VA and VP . Since there exists no bad subset of agents,
at least one of the agents outside of VA should prefer one of the pieces in VP as the
same as her own piece. We add this agent to the end of VA and its piece to the end of
VP . We do this iteratively until we do not have anymore agent outside of VA. Now, we
claim that the ordering of VA and VP guarantees an envy-free allocation in Core Protocol,
Algorithm 10. Since the returned allocation of Existential Core Protocol is envy-free,
the allocation is envy-free. Now, for each piece, we should make sure the trim that an
agent makes on it in Core Protocol, Algorithm 10, in the ordering of VA and VP is equal
to its main trim in the returned allocation by Existential Core Protocol. The completely
allocated pieces in the allocation of Existential Core Protocol are the first pieces in VP . In
Core Protocol, in the ordering of VA and VP , the agents trim the rightmost side of these
pieces similar to Existential Core Protocol. For the other pieces, in Core Protocol, the
agents trim the pieces to equalize them to their most preferred piece among the previously
allocated pieces. In the ordering of VA and VP , in the returned allocation by Existential
Core Protocol, we also know that for the incomplete pieces, their owners prefer at least
one of the previously allocated pieces as much as their own piece. It implies that we have
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the same trims on the returned allocations of both protocols for the incomplete pieces as
well.
Moreover, we should mention that the first agent in any ordering of agents in Algo-
rithm 10 receives a complete piece. Thus, we have allocated a complete piece to at least
one agent. 2
4.6 Permutation Protocol
In the Permutation Protocol, we are given a large number of isomorphic snapshots.
This protocol modifies these snapshots such that a set of agents B ⊂ A get a significant
advantage over other agents and it returns B. The Main Protocol use the result of permu-
tation protocol to make every agent in B dominant to every agent in A\B. After that, the
residual chore can be allocated among the agents in B without worrying about agents in
A \B.
The Permutation Protocol iteratively finds set of agents b1, b2, · · · , bk such that everyone
won’t envy others if agent bi give his allocated piece in all the snapshots to the agent
b(i−1)modk+1. Since envy-freeness won’t preserve by giving the allocated piece of one
agent to the other agent, we have to modify some snapshots to maintain envy-freeness.
To this end, during our work, we will reserve some snapshots and whenever we want to
swap the allocated pieces between agents, we modify the reserved snapshots to preserve
envy-freeness. We declare working set to be the set of snapshots that protocol is working
with them and use W to denote it. Note that the protocol will remove many snapshots
from the working set and reserve them for the further modifications.
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An important property of the Permutation Protocol is that it may modify some al-
located pieces by detaching small part of them and the protocol ensures that for each
modification, the cost of the detached piece is very insignificantly in every agent’s per-
spective. Therefore, in case an agent a had a very significant advantage over some agent
b in some snapshot, if we can modify the agents b’s piece and giving it to some other
agent c, then agent a would have a significant advantage over agent c, and later the Main
Protocol use the significant advantage that a has over c, to make him dominant over c.
Recall that in the main protocol every agent is placed a trim on every other agent’s
piece to make it equal to his piece. Since the snapshots are isomorphic, the order of the
trims is the same in all the snapshots. Moreover, we always modify all the snapshots in
the working set in the same way to preserve isomorphism.
For an agent a we use pa to denote agent a’s allocated piece in all the snapshots and
ta1, t
a
2, · · · , tala to denote the trim lines from right to left on pa where la is the number of
trims on pa and we use da1, d
a
2, · · · , dala to indicate the agents who had the trim on pa from
right to left.
Moreover, we can partition pa based on the trim lines. We use eai to denote the part
of pa which is between two consecutive trims and the left trim is tai . Recall that, The
Main Protocol ensures that for every eai , the mask of this part is the same across all the
snapshots, which means the agents who think the cost of this part is very significant are
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the same in all the snapshots.
These trim lines are somehow the guidelines for modifying the allocation. Consider
an arbitrary piece pa. If this piece has no trim on it, it means that all other agents have a
significant advantage over this agent, so we are done. Otherwise, consider the rightmost
trim of this piece which is ta1, if we cut pa from this trim, then agent d
a
1 is willing to ex-
change his piece for pa. This is a basic idea behind the Permutation Protocol. It iteratively
tries to detach some part of allocated pieces so that it finds a set of agents who are willing
to exchange their pieces between themselves.
At each iteration, Permutation Protocol creates an empty graph G with n nodes. It
adds a directed edge from node a to b if the next trim on the agent a’s piece is for b. We
add directed edges from a to all other nodes in case that all the trim lines on the agent a’s
piece are already detached. Recall that an agent places a trim on other agent’s piece if the
piece she has is not significantly smaller than the other agent’s piece. Therefore if a piece
has less than n− 1 trims and we detach all of them, the set of agents who did not have a
trim on this piece get a significant advantage over all other agents since every other agent
has this piece in some reserved snapshot, and the protocol can return this set of agents.
Therefore we can assume that all the pieces which all their trims are detached, had n− 1
trim lines. We call these pieces inactive and others active.
Definition 4.6.1 We call a piece inactive if it has n − 1 trims and all its trim lines are
already detached. We call every other piece an active piece. We call a node in the graph
220
inactive if its corresponding piece is inactive and otherwise active.
Considering an inactive piece, all the agents had this piece at some point. We can
easily make this piece desirable for every other agent by reattaching some of the detached
parts. Therefore, we can add directed edges from inactive pieces to all other nodes. Note
that the Core Protocol gives a significant advantage to the cutter over some other agent,
so at least one piece has less than n − 1 trim lines. Similar to the approach used in [9] it
is easy to show that the graph always contains a cycle with at least one active node.
Consider that we have found a cycle in graph G with at least one active node and
we want to detach the next part of corresponding piece of every active node. By detach-
ing some part of a piece and giving it to another agent, some other agents may envy. In
general, if ea1, · · · , eak are already detached from pa and we detach eak+1 and give this piece
to dak+1, agents a and d
a
1, · · · dak may envy dak+1 since the cost of this piece will be less than
what they have. Therefore, whenever we want to detach some part of a piece, we also
detach part of other agents’ pieces to preserve envy-freeness.
Recall that the snapshots in the working set are not necessary envy-free, but we
have modified some reserved snapshots such that no agent envies others. Therefore, a
reserved snapshot or a snapshot in the working set may not be envy-free, but if an agent
a envies another agent in a snapshot, this means that in other snapshots we have already
detached some part of a piece that a has, and the cost of detached piece is larger than the
amount that a envies others. For each snapshot, we define envious of a agent, to be the
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total amount that this agent envies others. We also say that a modification of a snapshot is
good if it does not increase the envious of any agent. Therefore it preserves envy-freeness
considering all the snapshots.
Definition 4.6.2 Consider a not necessary envy-free allocation ofm pieces P = {p1, · · · , pm}
and set of m agents A = {a1, · · · , am} such that piece pi is allocated to agent ai. For an
agent ai, we call the envious of this agent in this allocation, the total amount that agent





Lets suppose that for each piece pi there is a trim ti on it. We say that a modification is a
good modification if :
• For each piece pi it is cut upto its trim ti.
• Exactly one piece is allocated to every agent in A after changing the allocation.




It is obvious that the original allocation is a good modification for itself, i.e if we don’t cut
any piece and don’t change the allocation, then it is a good modification. In the following
lemma we show that there is good modification which is bounded and at least one piece
is cut from its trim.
Lemma 4.6.3 Consider the allocation ofm pieces P = {p1, · · · , pm} and set ofm agents
A = {a1, · · · , am} such that piece pi is allocated to agent ai. Lets suppose that for each
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piece pi there is a trim ti on it. There is a bounded algorithm which give us a good
modification of pieces in P such that at least one piece is cut from its trim.
Proof. For each pair of agents ai and aj , we create a virtual piece vi,j such that it costs
max{0, Cai(pi)− Cai(pj)} for agent ai and 0 for all other agents. Lets create new set of
set of pieces P ′ = {p′1, p′2, · · · , p′m} by attaching the virtual pieces to left of the pieces
in P , p′i = v1,i + v2,i + · · · + vm,i + pi. Every agent believes that the new allocation is




i)− Cai(p′j) = Cai(vi,i) + Cai(pi)− Cai(vi,j)− Cai(pj)
= Cai(pi)− Cai(pj)−max{0, Cai(pi)− Cai(pj)} ≤ 0
Cut each piece from its trim, then call the Subcore Protocol, giving it the pieces P ′ with
set of agents A and original mapping M = {p′1, p′2, · · · , p′m} to get new pieces P ′′ =
{p′′1, p′′2, · · · , p′′m}where p′′j is a the piece p′j after changing its main trim. Since the original
mapping was envy-free, the protocol gives us an envy-free allocation of pieces such that
at least one piece is intact. Therefore this piece is completely cut from its trim line.
Consider an agent ai and suppose that p′′j is allocated to him. Since the allocation is
envy-free, we have Cai(p
′′
j ) ≤ Cai(p′′k) for all k. Now we remove the virtual pieces and
show that what remains is a good modification of the original allocation. Since the virtual
pieces were completely on the left side of trims, they are still attached to the pieces in P ′′.
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Due to envy-freeness, we have:
m∑
k=1
max{0, Cai(p′′j )− Cai(p′′k)} = 0

















Suppose that we want to detach a part of a piece p. We relabel the agents in order
that they had a trim line on this piece, so that agent a1 was the first agent who had this
piece, agent a2 detached a first part and so on. Lets suppose that trim line of agent
ak is already detached and agent ak is the owner of this piece and we want to detach
the next part of this piece which is ea1k+1 and give it to the agent d
a1
k+1 which is ak+1
since we have relabeled the agents. Let A′ be set of agents who had this piece which is
A′ = {a1, · · · , ak}. If we detach this part and give it to agent ak+1, agents in A′ may
envy this agent. For an agent ai in A′, suppose that we have k set of reserved snapshots
S1, S2, · · · , Sk such that size of every set is at least |W |, and in all the snapshots in Sj , the
agent aj has the piece p and in each snapshot in Sj , ea1k+1 is more costly for ai than cost
of ea1k+1 in any other snapshot in working set, i.e, for a snapshot s in Sj and s
′ in working






. We merge all the snapshots in S1, S2, · · · , Sk in the following way:
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• For an agent aj inA′, we first concatenate the agent aj’s pieces in S1, S2, · · · , Si−1, Si+1, · · · , Sk.
Considering the snapshots in Sj , they are isomorphic, therefore we can remove ea1k+1
parts from aj’s pieces in these snapshots and concatenate the remaining to right of
the aj’s merged piece and then add all the ea1k+1 parts to right of the merged piece.
• For all other agents, we simply concatenate all this agent pieces in snapshots in
S1, S2, · · · , Sk.
We call this merging, the piecewise merging.
The main property of piecewise merging is that for an agent aj in A′ it keeps all the ea1k+1
parts of aj’s pieces on the rightside of the merged piece. Therefore if we detach those
parts from merged piece only agents in A′ may envy aj . To preserve envy-freeness be-
tween agents in A′, we use lemma 4.6.3. We attach virtual pieces to agents a1, a2, ..., ak
pieces and completely detach one of the ea1k+1 from one agent in A
′ while preserving the
envy-freeness.
Suppose that agent aj is the agent that his piece is cut from its trim line. The cost
of parts that are detached from aj’s piece is more than the sum of the cost of all ea1k+1
parts in the working set. Since the modification is a good modification, the cost of the
part detached from agent ai’s piece is not less than the cost of detached parts from other
agents’ pieces in her perspective. Therefore, agent ai does not envy ak+1 if we detach
ea1k+1 from the snapshots in the working set and give the piece p to ak+1.
Here an important observation is that, while we are using modifying the reserved
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snapshots, an agent might think that the cost of the detached part is very significant. Re-
call that mask of every ea1k+1 is the same, so by partially detaching some of the e
a1
k+1 parts,
at least one agent thinks that the cost of the detached part is very insignificant since we can
find a agent who thinks that cost of every detached part is very insignificant. Therefore
we have found a high discrepancy in agents’ valuation of detached parts in comparison to
R. We give this discrepant part to Discrepancy Protocol to allocated the whole chore.
Due to what we said, if we have a good set of reserved snapshots for every agent in
A′ with properties mentioned above, we can modify the reserved snapshots such that no
agent inA′ envy ak+1. To this end, we reserve some of the snapshots every time the proto-
col finds a cycle and exchanges pieces. We also reserve some snapshots at the beginning
of the protocol. In particular, every time we exchange pieces and give a new piece to an
agent ai, we ask other agents to reserve some snapshots. Specifically, if we give a new
piece to agent ai, we ask every other agent aj which had a trim on this piece including the
ai herself, to reserve for every part e on this piece, the half of the snapshots which cost
of e is the most. Suppose that this piece was owned by agent al at the beginning of the
protocol, we use Saveal,zaj ,ai to denote the reserved snapshots that agent aj reserved them
considering the cost of zth part of the piece originally owned by al which is ea1z when this
piece is reassigned to ai. At the beginning of the protocol, we ask each agent to reserve
half of the snapshots according to the cost of each part of each piece. We use Saveai,zaj ,ai to
denote the snapshots that agent aj reserved at the beginning of the protocol according zth
part of agent ai’s piece.
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Again suppose that we have relabeled the agents and we want to detach ea1k+1 from
the snapshots in the working set. It is easy to see that for an agent ai, the set of snapshots
Savea1,k+1ai,a1 , · · · , Savea1,k+1ai,ak have the all properties mentioned above. The size of each of
them is at least |W |, in Savea1,k+1ai,aj the agent aj has the piece that we want to detach some
part of it, and the cost of ea1k+1 is greater than the cost of same part in the working set’s
snapshots.
We modify the reserved snapshots as mentioned before, to preserve envy-freeness
while we are exchanging the pieces. The Permutation Protocol keeps doing the same
thing until it finds a piece that had less than n−1 trims on it and all its trims are detached.
Therefore, it finds set of agents who have a significant bonus over others and return this
set of agents.
4.7 The Discrepancy Protocol
The Discrepancy Protocol is responsible for dominating a set of agent to others
whenever we find an unallocated piece such that there is a high discrepancy in the agents’
evaluation of this piece.
Suppose that we have detached a piece that is very significant for a set of agents B and
very insignificant for others. Since the modifications in the Permutation Protocol were
very insignificant for all the agents, for each agent ai in B we have:
Cai(e) ≥ Cai(R)× 2n+1
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and for every other agent in C = A \B we have:
Cai(R) ≥ Cai(e)× 2n+1
So e costs at least 2n+1 times more than R for agents in B. We call Near Exact
Protocol and ask agents in B to divide the e into 2|C|+1 pieces with ε = 1/(2|C|+2),
therefore each piece costs at least Cai(e)/(2
|C|+2) ≥ 1/2n+1 where ai is an agent in
B. By calling the Oblige Protocol for these pieces and agents C, we get a partial envy-
free allocation of e such that each agent in C gets at least one intact piece. Therefore,
each agent ai in B thinks that every other agent C has got a piece that costs at least
Cai(e)
2n+1
≥ Cai(R). Hence, even if an agent in B gets all the R, she will not envy any
agent in C. However, agents in C are not happy with this assignment, since we are
given a part of the chore to them, without giving anything to agents in B. Similarly
R costs at least 2n+1 times more than e for agents in C. Again we do the same thing
and run Near Exact Protocol to divide R and partially assign it to agents in B. Finally,
we recursively allocated the remaining pieces of R between agents in B and remaining
pieces of e between agents in C. Due to what we said, this assignment would preserve
envy-freeness and allocate the whole chore.
4.8 Near-Exact Protocol
In this section we provide a protocol which partitions a chore R into m pieces that
are almost equal for every agent. [88] first provided an alternative envy-free cake cutting
protocol using a partitioning of a cake into m pieces that are almost equally valuable for
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every agent. Here we prove that a similar approach works for negative valuations and
provide the full proof for completeness. In particular we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8.1 Given a chore R, an integer m, and a real number ε > 0, there exists a
bounded protocol that partitions R into pieces P1, . . . , Pm, such that for every agent a,
and 1 ≤ i ≤ m
|Ca(Pi)− Ca(C)/m| ≤ εCa(C),
and moreover, for agent an, Can(Pi) = Can(C)/m.
Proof. The proof is by an induction on the number of agents n. The statement is trivial
for the case of n = 1. Let ε′ ∈ R and t ∈ N be two number to be defined later. Due
to induction hypothesis, there exists a bounded protocol that partitions R into mt pieces
P ′1, . . . , P
′
mt, such that for all m− 1 first agents, |Ca(P ′i )− Ca(R)/mt| ≤ ε′Ca(R). Now
without loss of generality assume that P ′i are in decreasing order according to an’s cost
function, or in other words for i < j, Can(P ′i ) ≥ Can(P ′j). Now let Q = P ′1 ∪ . . . ∪ P ′m,
and Qi = P ′m+i∪P ′2m+i∪ . . .∪P ′(t−1)m+i for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For an, Q1 and Qm are the
largest and the smallest pieces, respectively. Since Can(Q1) − Can(Qm) ≤ Can(P ′m+1),
an can divide Q among Q1, . . . , Qm to make them equal and obtain pieces P1, . . . , Pm.
Now for every agent a and piece P ,
(t− 1)(Ca(R)
mt





There we can choose ε′ small enough and t large enough to have
|Ca(Pi)− Ca(R)/m| ≤ εCa(R).
2
4.9 The Oblige Protocol
The Oblige Protocol is called by the Discrepancy Protocol to get a partial envy-free
allocation such that every agent gets at least one complete piece. The Discrepancy Proto-
col uses this property to make a set of agents dominant to others.
The Oblige Protocol gets set of n agents and a partitioning of the chore into 2n+1
pieces and returns a partial envy-free allocation such that for every agent at least one piece
is completely assigned to her. It asks agents a1, a2, · · · , an respectively, asking agent ai
to set aside her 2i−1 most costly pieces. Then it asks agents an, an−1, · · · , a1 respectively,
asking agent ai to return some part of her set aside pieces to create a 2i−1 + 1-way tie
for her smallest pieces. Finally, it asks agents a1, a2, · · · , an respectively, to choose their
smallest piece.
Lemma 4.9.1 The Protocol returns a partial envy-free allocation such that each agent
gets at least one complete piece.
Proof. The Protocol first asks each agent to reserve some of her largest pieces. After that
at least 2n+1 − (20 + 21 + · · · + 2n−1) ≥ 2n pieces will remain. In lines 4 - 5 each agent
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is asked to create a tie between her smallest pieces using her reservation. When agent ai
is asked to create a tie between her smallest pieces, there will be at least 2i−1 + 1 intact
pieces, therefore her (2i−1 + 1)th smallest piece has a value less than or equal to value of
one of the remaining intact pieces which are not greater than the values of her reserved
pieces. Therefore, for each of her 1st, 2nd,..., 2i−1th smallest pieces, she can return back
some part of one of her reserved pieces to equalize them with the value of (2i−1 + 1)th
smallest piece. Next, each agent ai is asked to take one of her smallest pieces. Since after
agent ai equalized her smallest pieces at most 2i−1 pieces are allocated or augmented, at
least one of the smallest pieces are available and she can take it. 2
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Algorithm 9: Main Protocol
Data: List of agents A = {a1, a2, ..., an} and chore R
1 if n = 1 then
2 Give the whole chore to the agent a1 ;
3 return the allocation;
4 end
5 else if n = 2 then
6 Run divide and choose procedure for agents a1 and a2 and chore R ;
7 return the allocation;
8 end
9 else
10 for i = 1...ISn × nnn
n
do
11 Run Core Protocol(a1, A,R) to create snapshot si and update the remaining
chore;
12 end
13 for i = 1...ISn × nnn
n
do
14 for every pair of agent a, b such that Advsia,b is not significant do













) ≤ Ca(esi,bj ) ≤ 22nCa(R) for some j do
20 Run Core Protocol(a,A,R);
21 if an agent c got a significant advantage over agent d in a snapshot s′ then
22 Remove trim line of agent c from s′d ;
23 end
24 end
25 if there is a set of agents B ⊂ A which every agents in B has significant every
other agent in A \B then
26 for each agent ai do
27 Call Core Protocol(ai, A,R) ;
28 end
29 Call Main(B,R) ;
30 return the allocation ;
31 end
32 Find the set S with the size of ISn of isomorphism snapshots;
33 Run the Permutation Protocol(C, A, R);
34 Let B be set of agents returned by the Permutation Protocol;
35 for each agent ai do
36 Call Core Protocol(ai, A,R) ;
37 end
38 Call Main(B,R) ;
39 return the allocation ;
40 end
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Algorithm 10: Existential Core Protocol
Data: Agent set A = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉, specified cutter acutter ∈ A, and unallocated
chore R
1 Specified cutter acutter divides the chore into n equal pieces according to her own
perspective;
2 Define p1, p2, . . . , pn the pieces that we have after the division of acutter;
3 for each permutation 〈a′1, a′2, . . . , a′n〉 of the agents do
4 for each permutation 〈pa′1 , pa′2 , . . . , pa′n〉 of the pieces do
5 Ask a′1 to make a trim on the rightmost side of the pa′1;
6 Allocate pa′1 to a
′
1;
7 for i from 2 to n do
8 Ask a′i to trim pa′i to equalize it with her most preferred piece among
the first i− 1 allocated pieces (we consider the cost value of each piece
from its leftmost side to its trim.);




11 if none of the agents envies to another agent then
12 return the envy-free partial allocation (at least one of the pieces has
been completely allocated) and the unallocated chore;
13 end
14 Ignore the previous trims and deallocate the allocated pieces;
15 end
16 end
Algorithm 11: Core Protocol
Data: Agent set A = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉, specified cutter acutter ∈ A, and unallocated
chore R
1 Specified cutter acutter divides the chore into n equal pieces according to her own
perspective;
2 Define p1, p2, . . . , pn the pieces that we have after the division of acutter;
3 Define main trims t1, t2, . . . , tn for pieces p1, p2, . . . , pn respectively where they are
initially on the rightmost side of the pieces;
4 Run Separated Chore Core Protocol on all the agents and all the pieces with their
main trims. The call gives an envy-free partial allocation (at least the main trim of
one of the pieces is not changed);
5 return envy-free partial allocation (at least one of the pieces has been completely
allocated) and the unallocated chore;
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Algorithm 12: Separated Chore Core Protocol
Data: A chore with n pieces 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉 with their main trims 〈t1, t2, . . . , tn〉
consecutively and a set of agents A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}
1 Remember the initial main trims of the pieces during this call;
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 Agent ai chooses piece p ∈ {p1, . . . , pn} which is the most preferred piece for
her among all pieces;
4 if p is not allocated to agents a1, a2, . . . , ai−1 then
5 Allocate p to agent ai;
6 end
7 else
8 Suppose that ai chooses a piece which has been allocated to aj;
9 if the main trim of p is not changed then
10 Run Allocation Extender Protocol for all the pieces with their main
trims, the first i agents with their current allocation, the popular piece p,
and its fan agents ai and aj . The call returns a neat allocation of pieces
to agents (one piece each agent) without changing the main trim of p;
11 end
12 else
13 Run Core Match Refiner Protocol for all the pieces with their main
trims, the first i− 1 agents with their current allocation, and the popular
piece p. The call returns a refined neat allocation and a flag (In the case
the flag is true, it returns the new popular piece q with agent a as its
happy fan and agent b as its sad fan);
14 Allocate p to ai;
15 if flag = true then
16 Run Allocation Extender Protocol for all the pieces with their main
trims, the first i agents with their current allocation, the popular
piece q, and its fan agents a and b. The call returns a neat allocation
of pieces to agents (one piece each agent) without changing the




20 Run Best Piece Equalizer Protocol on all n pieces with their main trims, all the
first i agents, and the current allocation. The call gives a neat allocation of
pieces to the called agents without any bad subset of agents;
21 end
22 return envy-free partial allocation (with at least one intact piece) and the
unallocated chore;
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Algorithm 13: Allocation Extender Protocol
Data: A chore with m pieces 〈p1, p2, . . . , pm〉 with their main trims 〈t1, t2, . . . , tm〉
consecutively, a set of agents A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} (n ≤ m) with a neat
allocation of pieces to agents, one specific popular piece
p ∈ {p1, p2, . . . , pm}, and its two specific happy fan agent a ∈ A as well as
sad fan agent b ∈ A
1 Remember the initial main trims of the pieces during this call;
2 for each piece q ∈ {p1, . . . , pm} do
3 Ask agents a and b to trim q equal to p;
4 Set the main trim of piece q as the rightmost trim among the trims that agents a
and b made on q;
5 end
6 Deallocate the allocated pieces but remember the allocation as the original
mapping;
7 Run the SubCore Protocol on all m pieces except p with their main trims and all
agents except a and b with their original mapping. The call gives a neat allocation
of pieces to the called agents;
8 After the allocation, at least one piece q among pieces {p1, . . . , pm} except p is not
allocated;
9 if the main trim of q is made by agent a then
10 Allocate q to a, and p to b;
11 end
12 else
13 Allocate q to b, and p to a;
14 end
15 return neat allocation of pieces to the agents (one piece each agent), without
changing the main trim of p, and the unallocated chore;
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Algorithm 14: SubCore Protocol
Data: A chore with m pieces 〈p1, p2, . . . , pm〉 with their main trims 〈t1, t2, . . . , tm〉
consecutively and a set of agents A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} with an original
mapping of agents to pieces {pa1 , pa2 , . . . , pan} consecutively
1 Define a set P of pieces which is an empty set initially;
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 Agent ai chooses piece p which is the most preferred piece for her among the
pieces;
4 if p has not been allocated to agents a1, a2, . . . , ai−1 then
5 Allocate p to agent ai tentatively and add p to set P ;
6 end
7 else
8 Define a representative agent for each piece in P (not assigned yet);
9 for j = 1 to i do
10 Find the cost value of each piece outside of P for aj . We define cj as
the minimum cost value among these values;
11 for each piece q ∈ P do
12 aj makes a trim on q in a way that equalize it to cj . If the cost value
of the piece from its leftmost side to its original mapping trim was
not more than cj , aj makes a trim on the original mapping trim of
the piece;
13 if aj makes the rightmost trim on q then
14 Set aj as the representative of q if she makes the first rightmost




18 Define set W which initially contains the representative agents of the
pieces in P ;
19 while |W | ≤ |P | do
20 Ignore the previous trims of agents in W and deallocate the allocated
pieces;
21 Define set W ′ = {a1, . . . , ai} \W ;
22 Update the main trim of pieces in P by agents in W ′ (check Subsection
4.5.4 for more details);
23 Find the modified original mapping of W to P (check Subsection 4.5.4
for more details);
24 Run SubCore Protocol on all pieces in P with their main trims, the
agents in W , and the modified original mapping of W as the original
mapping. The call gives an allocation of pieces to agents in W ;
25 if |W | = |P | then
26 Break;
27 end
28 Take an arbitrary piece q from unallocated pieces of P such that
a ∈ W ′ is the agent with the lowest index among the agents who have
the rightmost trim on q;
29 Allocate q to a and add a to W ;
30 end
31 Let a be the only agent among a1, . . . , ai who is not in W ;
32 Find the cost value of each piece out of P for a from its leftmost side to its
main trim, and allocate the piece with the minimum cost value to a;
33 end
34 end
35 return an allocation of pieces to A (one piece each agent) with their updated main
trims;
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Algorithm 15: Best Piece Equalizer Protocol
Data: A chore with m pieces 〈p1, p2, . . . , pm〉 with their main trims 〈t1, t2, . . . , tm〉
consecutively and a set of n agents A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} (n ≤ m) with an
allocation of the pieces {pa1 , pa2 , . . . , pan} to the agents {a1, a2, . . . , an}
consecutively
1 while there exists a bad subset S ⊆ A of the agents do
2 Define set P as the set of pieces that we have allocated to S;
3 while S is a bad set do
4 for each agent a ∈ S do
5 for each piece p ∈ P do
6 Ask agent a to make a trim on p to equalize it with her most
preferred piece out of P (If the cost value of p from its leftmost side
to its rightmost side was less than the cost value of her most




9 Define an equalizer trim for each piece in P (We have not set them yet);
10 for each piece p ∈ P do
11 Set the leftmost trim on p which is righter than its main trim as the
equalizer trim of p;
12 end
13 Set the current allocation of pieces to agents as the old allocation;
14 Run Separated Chore Core Protocol on all the agents in S and all the pieces
in P with their equalizer trims as their main trims. The call gives an
envy-free partial allocation of the pieces to agents, which we call it the new
allocation, and updates the main trims (At least the main trim of one of the
pieces is not changed);
15 Run Monotonicity Saver Protocol for the agents in S, the pieces in P , and
the old as well as new allocations of pieces to S. The call gives an
envy-free partial allocation of the called pieces to the called agents, and it
updates the main trims to keep the protocol monotone.
16 end
17 end
18 return a neat allocation (without any bad subset of agents) of pieces to A (one
piece each agent) with their updated main trims;
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Algorithm 16: Monotonicity Saver Protocol
Data: A chore with n pieces 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉, a set of n agents
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an}, an old allocation of the pieces {pa1 , pa2 , . . . , pan} to
the agents {a1, a2, . . . , an} consecutively, a new allocation of pieces to
agents, and the main trims of the allocations
1 Let P be the set of pieces whose the main trim in the new allocation is lefter than
its main trim in the old allocation;
2 Let S be the set of agents who owns the pieces in P ;
3 Deallocate the pieces that we have allocated to S in the new allocation;
4 for each agent ai ∈ S do
5 Change the main trim of pai to its main trim in the old allocation;
6 Allocate pai to ai;
7 end
8 return the updated new allocation which is an envy-free partial allocation of pieces
to A (one piece each agent);
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Algorithm 17: Core Match Refiner Protocol
Data: A chore with m pieces 〈p1, p2, . . . , pm〉, a set of n agents
A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} (n ≤ m) with a neat allocation of pieces to agents
(without any bad subset of agents), and a specific popular piece
p ∈ {p1, p2, . . . , pm}
1 Build the Core Match Refiner Graph G;
2 Define a directed path P which is initially P = 〈vp〉 where vp is the vertex of piece
p;
3 while the piece of the last vertex of P is not an unallocated or an intact piece do
4 Find a vertex vr out of P such that there exists an edge from vq one of the
vertices of P to it. Let vr and vq be the vertices of pieces r and q consecutively;
5 Remove all the vertices after vq from the path;
6 Add vr to the end of the path;
7 end
8 Let P = 〈v1, v2, . . . , vk〉 be the final path;
9 Define a flag which is false if the piece of vertex vk be an unallocated piece, and
true otherwise;
10 if flag = true then
11 Let agents a and b be the owners of the pieces of vertices vk−1 and vk
consecutively;
12 Let piece q be the piece of vertex vk. Define q as a popular piece with agents a
and b as its fans;
13 Deallocate the piece of vertex vk from agent b;
14 end
15 for i from k − 1 to 1 do
16 Deallocate the piece of vertex vi from its owner agent c;
17 Allocate the piece of vertex vi+1 to agent c;
18 end
19 return the refined neat allocation and the flag (In the case the flag is true, return the
popular piece q, its happy fan a, and sad fan b) ;
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Algorithm 18: Permutation Protocol
Data: List of agents A = {a1, a2, ..., an} and ISn isomorphic snapshots
S = {s1, s2, ..., sISn}
1 Set boolean flag done equal to false ;
2 for i = 1..n do
3 for i′ = 1..n do
4 for j = 1...la′i do
5 Ask agent ai to reserve
1
2
of the snapshots in W which the have the






9 while done = false do
10 Create an empty graph G ;
11 for each active piece pa do
12 Add a directed edge from a to the agent who has the next rightmost trim on
pa ;
13 end
14 for each inactive piece pb do
15 Add a directed edge from b to all other agents ;
16 end
17 Let C = b1, b2, · · · , b|C| be the cycle with at least one active node ;
18 for each bi in C do
19 Let c the next agent in the cycle ;
20 if bi is an active node then
21 Relabel the agents in order that they had a trim line on pbi , so that agent
a1 was the first agent who had this piece, agent a2 detached a first part
and so on.
22 Lets suppose that trim line of agent ak is already detached and agent ak
is the owner of this piece and we want to detach from the trim line of
agent ak+1 and give the piece to him.
23 for i′ = 1..k do
24 Take |W | snapshots from each of
Savea1,k+1ai′ ,a1 , Save
a1,l+1
ai′ ,a2
, · · · , Savea1,l+1ai′ ,ak and piecewise merge them
to get a snapshot s′;
25 Add virtual pieces to make this allocation envy-free ;
26 for j = 1..l do
27 Cut s′aj from the trim of the agent ak+1;
28 end
29 Run Sub Core Protocol with set of pieces s′a1 , · · · s′ak and set of
agents a1, · · · ak with their original mapping of these pieces;
30 if detached parts costs significant for at least one agent then
31 Let X be the union of the detached parts ;
32 return Discrepancy Protocol(X ,R) ;
33 end
34 end








41 Exchange the pieces of agents in C in all the working set snapshots, such that
agent bi gives all his pieces to the next agent in the cycle;
42 for each bi in C do
43 if there was at least one more trim on pbi then
44 Relabel the agents in order that they had a trim line on pbi , so that agent
a1 was the first agent who had this piece, agent a2 detached a first part
and so on, ak+1 is the current owner of this piece.
45 for i′ = 1..la1 do
46 Recall that la1 is number of trims on this piece. for j = k + 2...la1
do
47 Ask agent ai′ to reserve
1
2
of the snapshots in W which have the








52 while there is an active piece pa such that all its trims are detached do
53 if pa had less than n− 1 trims then
54 Set B to be set of agents who didn’t have a trim on this piece;
55 return B ;
56 end
57 else





Algorithm 19: Discrepancy Protocol
Data: List of agents A = {a1, a2, ..., an}, a discrepant piece e and residual chore R
1 Let B be set of agents who thinks p costs very significant.
B = {∀ai : Cai(e) ≥ Cai(R)× 2n} ;
2 Let B be other agents. C = A \B ;
3 Let PC be the output of Near Exact(B,e,2|C|+1,1/(2|C|+2)) ;
4 Let PB be the output of Near Exact(C,R,2|B|+1,1/(2|B|+2)) ;
5 Call Oblige Protocol(C,PC) ;
6 Call Oblige Protocol(B,PB) ;
7 Let RB be the unallocated parts of PB ;
8 Run Main Protocol(B,RB) ;
9 Let RC be the unallocated parts of PC ;
10 Run Main Protocol(C,RC) ;
11 return B ;
12 (Since the whole chore is already allocated, every agent dominates the others.)
Algorithm 20: Oblige Protocol
Data: List of agents A = {a1, a2, ..., an} and partition of chore into 2n+1 pieces
p1, p2, ..., p2n+1 .
1 for i = 1...n do
2 Ask agent ai to set aside her 2i−1 largest pieces. ;
3 end
4 for i = n...1 do
5 Ask agent ai to return part of her reserved pieces to the remaining pieces to
create a 2i−1 + 1-way tie for her smallest pieces ;
6 end
7 for i = 1...n do
8 Ask agent ai to choose her smallest piece in the remaining pieces. Each agent
have to take a piece she augmented if one is available;
9 (Break ties in lexicographic order.)
10 end
11 return partial envy-free allocation and remaining of the chore ;
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Chapter 5: Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods to Asymmetric Agents
5.1 Introduction
In this work, we conduct a study of fairly allocating indivisible goods among n
agents with unequal claims on the goods. Fair allocation is a very fundamental problem
that has received attention in both Computer Science and Economics. This problem dates
back to 1948 when [16] introduced the cake cutting problem as follows: given n agents
with different valuation functions for a cake, is it possible to divide the cake between
them in such a way that every agent receives a piece whose value to him is at least 1/n
of the whole cake? Steinhaus answered this question in the affirmative by proposing a
simple and elegant algorithm which is called moving knife. Although this problem admits
a straightforward solution, several ramifications of the cake cutting problem have been
studied since then, many of which have not been settled after decades [68, 69, 89, 85, 81,
90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95]. For instance, a natural generalization of the problem in which we
discriminate the agents based on their entitlements is still open. In this problem, every
agent claims an entitlement ei to the cake such that
∑
ei = 1, and the goal is to cut the
cake into disproportional pieces and allocate them to the agents such that every agent ai’s
valuation for his piece is at least ei fraction of his valuation for the entire cake. For two
agents, Brams et al. [96] showed that at least two cuts are necessary to divide the cake
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between the agents. Furthermore, Robertson et al. [97] proposed a modified version of
cut and choose method to divide the cake between two agents with portions e1, e2, where
e1 and e2 are real numbers. McAvaney, Robertson, and Web [98] considered the case
when the entitlements are rational numbers. They used Ramsey partitions to show that
when the entitlements are rational, one can make a proper division via O(n3) cuts.
Recently, a new line of research is focused on the fair allocation of indivisible
goods. In contrast to the conventional cake cutting problem, in this problem instead of
a heterogeneous cake, we have a set M of indivisible goods and we wish to distribute
them among n agents. Indeed, due to trivial counterexamples in this setting1, the previ-
ous guarantee, that is every agent should obtain 1/n of his valuation for all items from his
allocated set, is impossible to deliver. To alleviate this problem, Budish [1] proposed a
concept of fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods namely the maxmin share. Sup-
pose we ask an agent ai to divide the items between the agents in a way that he thinks is
fair to everybody. Of course, agent ai does not take into account other agents’ valuations
and only incorporates his valuation function in the allocation. Based on this, we define
MMSi equal to the minimum profit that any agent receives in this allocation, according to
agent ai’s valuation function. Obviously, in order to maximize MMSi, agent ai chooses
an allocation that maximizes the minimum profit of the agents. We call an allocation fair
(approximately fair), if every agent ai receives a set of items that is worth at least MMSi
(a fraction of MMSi) to him.
It is easy to see that MMSi is the best possible guarantee that one can hope to obtain
in this setting. If all agents have the same valuation function, then at least one of the
1For instance if there is only one item, at most one agent has a non-zero profit in any allocation.
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agents receives a collection of items that are worth no more than MMSi to him. A natural
question that emerges here is whether a fair allocation with respect to MMSi’s is always
possible? Although the experiments are in favor of this conjecture, Kurokawa, Procaccia,
and Wang [2] (EC’14) refuted this by an elegant and delicate counterexample. They show
such a fair allocation is impossible in some cases, even when the number of agents is
limited to 3. On the positive side however, they show an approximately fair allocation
can be guaranteed. More precisely, they show that there always exists an allocation in
which every agent’s profit is at least 2/3MMSi. Such an allocation is called a 2/3-MMS
allocation. Amanatidis, Markakis, Nikzad, and Saberi [12] later provided a proof for the
existence of an MMS allocation for the case, when there are large enough items and the
value of each agent for every items is drawn independently from a uniform distribution.
A generalized form of this result was later proposed by Kurokawa et al. [23] for arbitrary
distributions. In a recent work, Ghodsi et al. [3] provided a proof for existence of a
3/4-MMS allocation.
Although it is natural to assume the agents have equal entitlements on the items,
in most real-world applications, agents have unequal entitlements on the goods. For in-
stance, in various religions, cultures, and regulations, the distribution of the inherited
wealth is often unequal. Furthermore, the division of mineral resources of a land or inter-
national waters between the neighboring countries is often made unequally based on the
geographic, economic, and political status of the countries.
For fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, two pro-
cedures are proposed in [68]. The first one is based on Knaster’s procedure of sealed bids.
In this method, we have an auction for selling each item. Therefore, for using it all the
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agents should have an adequate reserve of money which is the main issue of the proce-
dure. The second procedure mentioned in [68] is based on method of markers developed
by William F. Lucas which is spiritually similar to the moving knife procedure. In this
method, first we line up the items, and then the agents place some markers for dividing
the items. This method suffers from high dependency of its final allocation to the order
of the items in the line.
Agent duplication is another idea to deal with unequal entitlements. More precisely,
when all of the entitlements are fractional numbers, we can duplicate each agent ai to
some agents with similar valuation functions to ai. The goal of this duplication is to
reduce the problem to the case of equal entitlements. After the allocation, every agent ai
owns all of the allocated items to her duplicated agents. For instance, assume that we have
three agents with entitlements 1/2, 2/5, and 1/10, respectively. In this case, we duplicate
the first agent to five agents and the second agent to four agents each having an entitlement
of 1/10. This way, we can reduce our problem to the case of equal entitlements. Although
agent duplication may be practical when the items are divisible, in the indivisible case,
this method does not apply to the indivisible setting. For instance, if the number of the
agents is higher than the number of available items, we cannot allocate anything to some
agents. Another issue with this method is that it works only for fractional entitlements.
In this chapter, we study fair allocation of indivisible items with different entitle-
ments using a model which resolves the mentioned issues. Our fairness criterion mimics
the general idea of Budish for defining maxmin shares. Similar to Budish’s proposal,
in order to define a maxmin share for an agent ai, we ask the following question: how
much benefit does agent ai expect to receive from a fair allocation, if we were to divide
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the goods only based on his valuation function? If agent ai expects to receive a profit
of p from the allocation, then he should also recognize a minimum profit of p · ej/ei for
any other agent aj , so that his own profit per entitlement is a lower bound for all agents.
Therefore, a fair answer to this question is the maximum value of p for which there ex-
ists an allocation such that agent ai’s profit-per-entitlement can be guaranteed to all other
agents (according to his own valuation function). We define the maxmin shares of the
agents based on this intuition.
Recall that we denote the number of agents with n and the entitlement of every
agent ai with ei. We assume the entitlements always add up to 1. For every agent ai,
we define the weighted maxmin share denote by WMMSi, to be the highest value of p
for which there exists an allocation of the goods to the agents in which every agent aj
receives a profit of at least p · ej/ei based on agent ai’s valuation function. Similarly, we
call an allocation α-WMMS, if every agent ai obtains an α fraction of WMMSi from his
allocated goods. Notice that in case ei = 1/n for all agents, this definition is identical to
Budish’s definition. Since our model is a generalization of the Budish’s model, it is known
that a fair allocation is not guaranteed to exist for every scenario. However, whether a 2/3
approximation or in general a constant approximation WMMS allocation exists remains
an open question.
Our main result is in contrast to that of Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang. We settle
the above question by giving a 1/n hardness result for this problem. In other words, we
show no algorithm can guarantee any allocation which is better than 1/n-WMMS in gen-
eral. We further complement this result by providing a simple algorithm that guarantees a
1/n-WMMS allocation to all agents. As we show in Section 5.3, this hardness is a direct
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consequence of unreasonably high valuation of agents with low entitlements for some
items.
In contrast to our theoretical results, we show in practice a fair allocation is likely to
exist by providing experimental results on real-world data. The source of our experiments
is a publicly available collection of bids for eBay goods and services2. Note that since
those auctions are truthful3, it is the users’ best interest to bid their actual valuations for
the items and thus the market is transparent. More details about the experiments can be
found in Section 5.4. We also support our claim by presenting theoretical analysis for
the stochastic variants of the problem in which the valuation of every agent for a good is
drawn from a given distribution.
5.2 Our Model
LetN be a set of n agents, andM be a set ofm items. Each agent ai has an additive
valuation function Vi for the items. In addition, every agent ai has an entitlement to the
items, namely ei. The entitlements add up to 1, i.e.,
∑
ei = 1.
Since our model is a generalization of maxmin share, we begin with a formal defini-
tion of the maxmin shares for equal entitlements, proposed by Budish [1]. In this case, we
assume all of the entitlements are equal to 1/n. Let Π(M) be the set of n-partitionings







3An action is called truthful, if no bidder has any incentive to misrepresent his valuation
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One can interpret the maxmin share of an agent as his outcome as a divider in a divide-
and-choose procedure against adversaries [1]. Consider a situation that a cautious agent
knows his own valuation on the items, but the valuations of other agents are unknown to
him. If we ask the agent to run a divide-and-choose procedure, he tries to split the items
in a way that the least valuable bundle is as attractive as possible.
When the agents have different entitlements, the above interpretation is no longer
valid. The problem is that the agents have different entitlements and this discrepancy
must somehow be considered in the divide-and-choose procedure. Thus, we need an
interpretation of the maxmin share that takes the entitlements into account.
Let us get back to the case with the equal entitlements. Another way to interpret
maxmin share is this: suppose that we ask agent ai to fairly distribute the items in M
between n agents ofN , based on his own valuation function. In an ideal situation (e.g., if
the goods are completely divisible), we expect ai to allocate a share with value Vi(M)/n
to every agent. However, since the goods are indivisible, some sort of unfairness is in-
evitable. For this case, we wish that ai does his best to retain fairness. MMSi is in fact, a
parameter that reveals how much fairness ai can guarantee, regarding his valuation func-
tion.
Formally, to measure the fairness of an allocation by ai, define a value F iA for any





In fact, we wish to make sure ai reports an allocation A∗ such that F iA∗ is as close to 1 as
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It is easy to observe that Equations (5.1) and (5.2) are equivalent, since the fairest alloca-















Now, consider the case with different entitlements. Let ei be the entitlement of
agent ai. Similar to the second interpretation for MMSi, ask agent ai to fairly distribute the
items between the agents, but this time, considers the entitlements. In an ideal situation
(e.g., a completely divisible resource), we expect the allocation to be proportional to the
entitlements, i.e. ai allocates a share to agent aj with value exactly Vi(M)ej (note that
when the entitlements are equal, this value equals to Vi(M)/n for every agent). But
again, such an ideal situation is very rare to happen and thus we allow some unfairness.
In the same way, define the fairness of an allocation A = 〈A1, A2, . . . , An〉 as





LetA∗ = 〈A∗1, A∗2, . . . , A∗n〉 be an allocation by ai that maximizesF iA∗ . The weighted
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maxmin share of agent ai is defined in the same way as MMSi, that is:
WMMSi = F
i















For more intuition, consider the following example: Assume that we have two
agents a1, a2 with e1 = 1/3 and e2 = 2/3. Furthermore, suppose that there are 5 items
b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 with the following valuations for a1: V1({b1}) = V1({b2}) = V1({b3}) =
4, V1({b4}) = 3 and V1({b5}) = 9. For the allocation A = 〈{b5}, {b1, b2, b3, b4}〉, we
have FA = min( 924·(1/3) ,
15
24·(2/3)) which means FA = 15/16. Moreover, for allocation
A′ = 〈{b1, b2}, {b3, b4, b5}〉, we have FA′ = min( 824·(1/3) , 1624·(2/3)) which means FA′ = 1.
Thus, A′ is a fairer allocation than A. In addition, A′ is the fairest possible allocation and
hence, WMMS1 = 1 · 24 · 1/3 = 8.
This example also gives an insight about why agent duplication (as introduced in the
Introduction) is not a good idea. For this example, if we duplicate agent a2, we have three
agents with the same entitlements. But any partitioning of the items into three bundles,
results in a bundle with value at most 7 to a1.
Finally, an allocation of the items inM to the agents inN is said to be α−WMMS,
if the total value of the share allocated to each agent ai is worth at least αWMMSi to him.
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Algorithm 21: 1/n-WMMS allocation
Input: N ,M, valuation functions V1, . . . , Vn, and entitlements e1, . . . , en (without
loss of generality, sorted in descending order).
Output: Allocation A = A1, . . . , An.
1
2 i from one to |M| assign an unassigned item bj to ai mod |N | where
Vi mod |N |({bj}) is maximum among unassigned items
5.3 A Tight 1/n Bound on the Optimal Allocation
In spite of the fact that there exists a 2/3-WMMS guarantee when all the entitle-
ments are equal, in our general setting surprisingly we provide a counterexample which
proves that there is no guarantee better than 1/n-WMMS. We complement this result by
showing that a 1/n-WMMS always exists. Thus, these two theorems make a tight bound
for the problem.
The main property of our counterexample is a large gap between the value of items
for different agents. We provide a counterexample according to this property in Theorem
5.3.1.
Theorem 5.3.1 There exists no guarantee better than 1/n-WMMS when the entitlements
to the items may differ.
Theorem 5.3.1 gives a 1/n-WMMS upper-bound. In Theorem 5.3.2, we show that
the provided upper-bound is tight. Algorithm 2 uses a simple greedy procedure, which is
spiritually similar to an algorithm in [12], guaranteeing 1/n-WMMS allocation as follow:
sort the agents in descending order of entitlements. Starting from the first agent, ask every
person to collect the most valuable item from the remaining set, one by one. Repeat the
process until no more item is left.
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Figure 5.1: The vertical line denotes the ratio of the valuation of the allocated set to the
maximin guarantee of the agents. The horizontal line shows the number of items varying
from n to 2n. Blue, red, and yellow poly lines illustrate the performance of our algorithm
for n = 10, n = 50, and n = 200 respectively.
Theorem 5.3.2 Algorithm 2 guarantees a 1/n-WMMS allocation.
5.4 Empirical Results
As we discussed in Section 5.3, in extreme cases, making a WMMS allocation
or even an approximately WMMS allocation is theoretically impossible. However, our
counter-example is extremely delicate and thus very unlikely to happen in real-world.
Here, we show in practice fair allocations w.h.p exist, especially when the number of
items is large.
We draw the valuation of the agents for the goods based on a collection of bids for
eBay items publicly available at http://cims.nyu.edu/ munoz/data/. More precisely, for m
items, we randomly choose m different categories of goods from the dataset. Moreover,
for every agent ai and item bj , we set Vi({bj}) to a submitted bid for the corresponding
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Figure 5.2: The vertical line denotes the ratio of the valuation of the allocated set to the
maximin guarantee of the agents. The horizontal line shows the number of items varying
from n to n2. Blue, red, and yellow polylines illustrate the performance of our algorithm
for n = 10, n = 50, and n = 200 respectively.
category of item bj chosen uniformly at random. The bids vary from 0.01 to 113.63 and
their mean is 6.57901. Moreover, the expected variance of the bids in every category is
200.513.
For an instance of the problem with n agents and m items, we run the experiments
with 1000 different vector of entitlements drawn from the uniform distribution (and scaled
up to satisfy
∑
ei = 1). For every n and m, we take the minimum WMMS guarantee
obtained all 1000 runs, and show it in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. We used heuristic algorithms
to compute the maxmin shares and maxmin guarantees. Thus, our results are only lower
bounds to the actual WMMS guarantees. Nonetheless, the optimal guarantees are very
close to the estimated ones.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the result of the runs for n = 10, n = 50, and n = 200
respectively. Figure 5.1 only depicts the WMMS guarantees for m ∈ [n, 2n] whereas in
253
Figure 5.2 the number of items varies from n to n2.
As shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the approximation guarantee improves as we
increase the number of items. Moreover, unless m is very close to n, a WMMS allocation
exists in our experiments (notice that the guarantee is above 1 when m is considerably
larger that n).
5.5 Stochastic Setting
In Section 5.3 we presented a counterexample to show that no allocation better than
1/n-WMMS can be guaranteed. However, the construction described in the counterexam-
ple is very unlikely to happen in the real settings. Here, we show that WMMS allocation
exists with high probability when a small randomness is allowed in the setting.
Considering stochastic settings is common in the fair allocation problems since
many real-world instances can be modeled with random distributions [1, 23, 12, 55]. The
general probabilistic model used in previous works is as follows: every agent ai has a
probability distribution Di over [0, 1] and for every item bj , the value for Vi({bj}) is ran-
domly sampled from Di. In [12], the existence of an MMS allocation is proved for the
special case of Di = U(0, 1), where U(0, 1) is the standard uniform distribution with
minimum 0 and maximum 1. Kurokawa, Procaccia, and Wang [23] considered the prob-
lem for arbitrary random distribution Di with the condition that V[Di] ≥ c for a positive
constant c. A considerable part of the proof for the existence of an MMS allocation in [23]
is referred to [55], where the authors proved the existence of an envy-free allocation in
the stochastic settings with arbitrary random distributions.
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In this section, we consider two different probabilistic models. Our first model is
the same as [23], with the exception that we omit the restriction V[Di] ≥ c. We name this
model as Stochastic Agents model. In the second model, every item bi has a probability
distribution Di and for every agent aj , value of Vj({bi}) is randomly drawn from Di. We
choose the name Stochastic Items for the second model. We believe that Stochastic Items
model is more realistic since the first model does not make any distinguish between the
items. None of the previous works mentioned above considered this model.
We leverage Hoeffding inequality to prove the existence of WMMS allocation. The-
orem 5.5.1 states the general form of this inequality [99].
Theorem 5.5.1 (General Form of Hoeffding (1963)) LetX1, X2, . . . , Xn be random vari-
ables bounded by the interval [0, 1] : 0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1. We define the empirical mean of these
variables by X̄ = 1
n
(X1 +X2 + . . .+Xn). Then, the following inequality holds:
P(|X̄ − E(X̄)| ≥ t) ≤ 2e−2nt2 (5.4)
Regarding Theorem 5.5.1, let X = nX̄ =
∑
iXi and let µ = n × E(X̄). By Inequality
(5.4), we have:
P(|X − µ| ≥ nt) ≤ 2e−2nt2 (5.5)
By setting nt = δµ, we rewrite Equation (5.5) as:




5.5.1 Model I: Stochastic Agents
As mentioned before, in the first model we assume that every agent has a probability
distribution Di and for every item bj , the value of Vi({bj}) is randomly sampled from Di.
Furthermore, we suppose µi = E(Di). Throughout this section, we assume that m ≥ n.
This is w.l.o.g , because for the case m < n, WMMSi for every agent ai equals to zero.
For the Stochastic Agents model, we state Theorem 5.5.2.
Theorem 5.5.2 Consider an instance of the fair allocation problem with unequal entitle-
ments, such that the value of every item for every agent ai is randomly drawn from dis-
tribution Di. Furthermore, let s = mini si and µ = mini µi. Then, for every 0 < ε < 1,













if m ≥ m′, then almost surely a (1− ε)-WMMS allocation exists.
In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 5.5.2. Consider the algorithm that
allocates ti = bmeic items to every agent ai. We know that the value of item bi for agent
aj is randomly sampled from Di. From the point of view of the algorithm, it trivially
does not matter whether the value of items are sampled after the allocation or before
the allocation. Thus, we can suppose that the value of every item is sampled after the
allocation of items.
For now, we know that ti = bmeic number of items are assigned to ai. Argue that
for every ε > 0, there exists a value m′, such that for every m ≥ m′, ti ≥ mei(1− ε). In
Lemma 5.5.3 we bound the value of m′ in terms of ei and ε.
Lemma 5.5.3 For every m > 1
εei
, bmeic ≥ mei(1− ε).
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Proof. We know bmeic ≥ mei − 1 = mei(1 − 1mei ). If m >
1
εei




) = mei(1− ε). This, completes the proof. 2
For the rest of the proof, suppose that m > 1
εei
. Let Xi be the variable indicating
total value of items allocated to ai. Note that E(Xi) = tiµi. Regarding Equation (5.6),
we have:























ln 2 + lnm
eimµi2(1− ε)
Therefore, it’s enough to choose δ such that
δ ≥
√
ln 2 + lnm
eimµi2(1− ε)
. (5.7)
Now, let t′i be the number of items that are not assigned to ai. Since ti + t
′
i = m,
regarding the fact that ti ≥ mei(1 − ε), we have t′i ≤ m − mei(1 − ε), which means
t′i ≤ m + mei(ε − 1). On the other hand, t′i ≥ m(1 − ei). Also, let X ′i be the variable
indicating total value of the items that are not allocated to ai. By the same deduction as ti
257
for t′i we have:






















Thus, it’s enough to choose δ in a way that Inequality (5.8) holds. Regarding the








ln 2 + lnm
m(1− ei)µi2
.
Therefore, it’s enough to choose δ′ in a way that
δ′ ≥
√
ln 2 + lnm
m(1− ei)µi2
(5.9)
Now, suppose that both Inequalities (5.7) and (5.9) are held. Considering Si as the






(1 + δ)tiµi + (1 + δ′)t′iµi
It is easy to show that, there always exist an m′i such that for all m ≥ m′i both Inequalities
258














(1 + ε)2 − 4ε
1 + ε
ei




≥ (1 + ε)ei − 4εei = (1− 3ε)ei






≥ (1− 3ε)ei (5.10)
Now, suppose that the Inequality 5.10 holds for every agent ai, with probability at least
1 − 1
mn
. Considering all the agents, with the probability at least (1 − 1
mn





, value of Vi(Si)
Vi(M) for every agent ai is at least ei(1 − 3ε). Regarding the fact that
WMMSi ≤ eiVi(M), we have
∀ai∈N Vi(Si) ≥ WMMSi(1− 3ε)
This completes the proof.
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5.5.2 Model II: Stochastic Items
As mentioned, in Stochastic Items model, every item bi has a probability distribu-
tion Di and the value of every agent aj for item bi is randomly chosen from Di. For this
model, we prove Theorem 5.5.4. The theorem states that for large enough m, almost
surely a (1− ε)-WMMS allocation exists.
Theorem 5.5.4 Suppose that for every agent ai, E(Di) > c for a non-negative constant
c. Then for all 0 < ε < 1, there exists m′ = m′(c, ε, n, e1, ..., en) such that if m ≥ m′,
then, almost surely, (1− ε)-WMMS allocation exists.
In the rest of the section, we prove Theorem 5.5.4. First, in Lemma 5.5.6 we prove the
existence of an allocation that assigns to every agent ai, a set of items with value at least
WMMSi − Mi, where Mi = maxj(Vi({bj})). The idea to prove this fact is inspired
by [70]. Argue that we can formulate the allocation problem with unequal entitlements as
the following Integer program:
∑
bj∈M
Vi({bj}) · fi,j ≥ V (M) · ei ∀ai∈N
∑
ai∈N
fi,j = 1 ∀bj∈M
fi,j ∈ {0, 1}
(5.11)
In IP(5.11), variable fi,j determines whether bj is assigned to agent ai or not. Considering
the fact that Vi(M) · ei is a trivial upper bound on WMMSi, any solution to IP5.11 is a
feasible solution to the assignment problem with unequal entitlements. By relaxing the
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second and the third condition, we can convert IP5.11 to LP5.12:
∑
bj∈M
Vi({bj}) · fi,j ≥ V (M) · ei ∀ai∈N
∑
ai∈N
fi,j ≤ 1 ∀bj∈M
fi,j ≥ 0
(5.12)
For every feasible solution A to LP5.12, we construct the bipartite graph GA〈I, J, E〉
where I = {1, 2, ..., n} and J = {1, 2, ..,m} correspond to the set of players and items,
respectively. An edge i, j is included if fi,j > 0. Then by the same way used by [70], we
will prove the following theorem.
Lemma 5.5.5 There exists a solutionA′ to LP5.12, such thatGA is a pseudoforest. (each
component of the graph is either a tree or a tree with an extra edge)
Proof. We have mn + m + n inequalities defining the polytope of feasible solutions of
LP5.12. We havemn variables fi,j , therefore every solution which is located in the corner
of polytope satisfies at least mn inequalities as equalities and there will be at most m+ n
non-zero variables in these solutions. By the same method used by [70], it is clear to show
that ifA′ is corresponding solution to a corner of polytope, then GA′ is a pseudoforest. 2
We call the solution with the property defined in Lemma 5.5.5 as constrained solu-
tion. In [70] it is shown that every constrained solution for LP5.12, can be converted to a
solution for IP5.11, such that every agent ai loses at most one item bj where fi,j > 0.
Lemma 5.5.6 There exists an allocation in which every agent ai gets at least WMMSi −
maxj Vi({bj}).
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Proof. The polytope of of feasible solutions of LP5.12 is non-empty, because it has at
least one solution which is, fi,j =
1
ei
for every agent ai and item bj . Therefore there exists
a constrained solution for LP5.12, and using the same method in [70] this solution can be
converted to a solution for IP5.11, such that every agent loses at most one item. 2
Proofs of Lemmas 5.5.5 and 5.5.6 are omitted and included in the full version.
Now we show that there exists m′i = m
′
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mn





n), with the probability at least (1−
1
mn





every agent ai, WMMSi ≥
1
ε
. According to Lemma 5.5.6, there is an allocation in which
every agent gets at least
WMMSi −max
j










Lemma 5.5.7 Suppose that for every agent aj , E(Dj) > c for a non-negative constant
c. Then for all 0 < ε < 1, there exists m′i = m
′




with the probability at least 1− 1
mn
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every agent aj , then:

















, then for every item bk and every agent aj , we assign this item to this
agent with the probability ej . Let Xj,k be a random variable that takes the value Vi({bk})
with the probability ej and 0 otherwise. We have E[Xj,k] >
c
ej
. Let Xj =
∑m
k=1 Xj,k. By
setting nt = γ, we rewrite Equation (5.5) as:
P(|X − µ| ≥ γ) ≤ 2e−2γ
2
n (5.14)
E(Xj) will be at least
αc
εej
. Regarding Equation (5.14), we have:



































































































Since the right hand side of the inequality is a constant, and the left hand side is an
increasing function on its domain, we can find an α′j such that whenever αj ≥ α′j , this
inequality holds. Therefore, Vi(Bj) ≥
1
εei
with the probability at least 1− 1
mn2
whenever
αj ≥ α′j . Thus, by choosing proper α such that for all aj ∈ N , α ≥ α′j , WMMSi would
not be less than
1
ε
with the probability at least (1− 1
mn2




Chapter 6: Future Work
In this chapter, we will briefly describe the future work which we aim to include
in this thesis. As stated earlier in individual chapters, each of these problems have many
open directions to be pursued. Here we focus on a subset of these.
• In chapter 3, we provided an approximation algorithms for the EFR and EFX allo-
cation. However, the question of whether an EFX (or even EFR) allocation always
exists has remained an important open problem.
• Similar to the fair division of indivisible items, EF1 allocation always exists in the
fair division of indivisible chores, and the same question for the EFX allocation is
still open. However, in the chore setting, there is no approximation algorithm for
the EFX allocation. Giving an approximation algorithm for the EFX allocation of
indivisible chores is an interesting direction for the future work.
• As we described in Chapter 4, in a recent breakthrough, after many decades, [9]
provide a protocol for the bounded and envy-free cake cutting problem for any
number of agents. Our work in [10] gives a protocol for the bounded and envy-
free chore division problem for any number of agents. Now, an interesting open
problem is giving a bounded and envy-free protocol when we are given a mixture
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of cake and chore. The simple cut and choose protocol solves the problem when
the number of agents is two. The problem is even interesting for the case that we
have three agents.
• There is a large gap between the bound of the protocol proposed by [9] for the cake
cutting problem and its lowerbound [100]. Improving any of these bounds is an
interesting direction for the future work.
• An important variant of the fair allocation problem of the indivisible goods is when
the goal is maximizing the least value that any agent obtains from the allocation.
Asadpour and Saberi [13] give the first polynomial time algorithm for this problem
that approximates the optimal solution within a factor of O(
√
n log3 n) in the addi-
tive setting. This was later improved by Chakrabarty, Chuzhoy,and Khanna [101]
to an O(mε) approximation factor. A very interesting open problem is giving a
constant approximation algorithm for this problem.
• A special case of the above problem in which the valuation of every agent for an
item is either 0, or a fixed value is called the Santa Claus problem. This problem
was first introduced by Bansal and Sviridenko [102]. In this paper, they give an
O(log log n/ log log log n) approximation algorithm for this problem that runs in
polynomial time. Later Feige [103] showed that the objective value of the prob-
lem can be approximated within a constant factor in polynomial time. This was
later turned into a constructive proof by Annamalai et al. [104]. Improving their
approximation ratio is an interesting future work.
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• For allocating indivisible goods, spliddit, a popular fair division website, uses the
maximum Nash welfare allocation (the allocation that maximizes the product of
utilities). [105] provide the first constant approximation algorithm for maximizing
the geometric mean of the agents’ valuation. Improving and generalizing their work
is an interesting direction for the future work.
• In Chapter 2, we provided a better guarantee for the approximate maximin share.
As we described, the works by [20] and [19] have considered the minimax share
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